Dennis CLINE, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL DYNAMICS LAND SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant-Appellee, 296 F.3d 466

RYAN, Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the court. COLE, Circuit Judge (pp. 472-76), delivered a separate concurring opinion. WILLIAMS, District Judge (pp. 476-77), delivered a separate dissenting opinion. OPINION RYAN, Circuit Judge.

We must decide whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, which prohibits an employer from discriminating against any employee age 40 and over on the basis of age, provides a cause of action for employees within the protected class who claim that their employer discriminated against them on the basis of age because of the employer’s more favorable treatment of older employees, also within the class. We hold that on the facts of this case the ADEA does provide the plaintiffs a cause of action, and that they have made out an actionable claim.

We rest our holding on familiar canons of statutory construction too elementary to require a citation, which direct courts to apply statutes consistent with their plain language; that is, by assigning to the words of the statute their primary and generally understood meaning. We conclude that in dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint, the district court opinion departs from this familiar maxim, and therefore, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings. I.

Dennis Cline, as named representative for the putative class, and 195 other employees of General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc., brought suit against their employer after their labor union, the United Auto Workers, and General Dynamics entered into a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA2). The agreement took effect July 1, 1997. Before that date, the parties had been bound by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA1) that obligated General Dynamics to provide full health benefits to retired workers who had accumulated 30 years of seniority.

With one exception, the new agreement no longer required General Dynamics to provide full health benefits to retirees. That exception held that only employees 50 years of age or older on July 1, 1997, remained eligible to receive full health benefits upon retirement. As a result, the plaintiffs sought, and obtained, a determination from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that the CBA2 adversely affected General Dynamics employees who were between the ages of 40 and 49 on July-1, 1997.

Cline and his fellow employees then filed suit under the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, and the Ohio Civil Rights Act, Ohio Rev.Code § 4112.99. They alleged that the provision of health benefits solely to those over the age of 50 constituted illegal discrimination based on age. Each of the plaintiffs was between the ages of 40 and 49 on July 1, 1997, and thus a member of the ADEA’s protected class. For purposes of the lawsuit, the plaintiffs self-divided into three groups.

The so-called “Cline group” is composed of 183 current General Dynamics employees who are no longer eligible for full health benefits upon retirement. The “Babb group” consists of 10 employees who retired prior to July 1, 1997, in order to receive full health benefits. Finally, the “Diaz group” includes three employees who retired after July 1, 1997, and are ineligible for health benefits.

In addition to their age discrimination claims, the plaintiffs also sought “declaratory judgment,” but in their complaint they made no reference to the Declaratory Judgment Act; they simply requested that the district court determine whether the Cline group had standing to sue and whether their claims were ripe. If the court determined that the Cline group did not have either standing and/or ripe claims, the plaintiffs then requested that the district court determine when they would have standing and ripe claims.

Upon the defendant’s motion, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). At the outset of its memorandum opinion, the district court noted that the ADEA and the Ohio Civil Rights Act would be interpreted together and receive identical legal analy-ses. The district court characterized the plaintiffs’ argument as a claim that they were wrongfully denied existing job benefits on the basis of age.

The court held that under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), (2)(A), General Dynamics’s provision of health benefits upon retirement was part of a “welfare benefit plan,” which the company was not obligated to provide. The court concluded that it would have been permissible to withhold retiree health benefits from all employees under the CBA2.

While the district court admitted that the CBA2 “facially discriminates” by creating two classes of employees based solely on age, it ultimately concluded that the ADEA does not recognize claims for “reverse discrimination.” The court reasoned that the ADEA was drafted to aid “older workers,” not those who suffer age discrimination because they are too young. The district court did not specifically address Cline’s request for declaratory relief. II. We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Lawrence v.

Chancery Court of Tenn., 188 F.3d 687, 691 (6th Cir.1999). The starting point in determining how a statute is to be applied is the language of the statute itself. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980); United States v. Ospina, 18 F.3d 1332, 1335 (6th Cir.1994). This court has said that “[t]he primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent.” Hedgepeth v. Tenn., 215 F.3d 608, 616 (6th Cir.2000).

Legislative intent, however, is gleaned primarily from the statute’s plain language, and where the statute’s languáge is plain and unambiguous, there is no justification for resorting to legislative history to ascertain the lawmaker’s intent-the words of the statute suffice. In re Comshare Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir.1999). The Supreme Court has recognized that “statutory provisions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.” Oncale v.

Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998). Moreover, if a court thinks statutory language does not reflect what the court believes the legislators “must have” intended, the court may not, under the guise of “statutory

interpretation,” rectify the problem by holding, in effect, that the legislators intended something other than what they declared. “ ‘It is not the Court’s role to address perceived inadequacies in [a statute].’ ” In re Aberl, 78 F.3d 241, 244 (6th Cir.1996) (quoting Wolf Creek Collieries v. Robinson, 872 F.2d 1264, 1269 (6th Cir.1989)) (alteration in original). Thus, courts must apply a statute as its language directs, not in accordance with a judicial supposition as to what the legislature might, better have written. The application of these simple and settled canons easily determines the proper resolution of this case.

Section 623(a)(1) of the ADEA reads: It shall be unlawful for an employer— (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (emphasis added). This language clearly and unambiguously forbids employers from defining the terms and benefits of “any individual[’s]” employment based solely on his or her age.

In § 631(a), Congress declared that “any individual” means those “individuals who are at least 40 years of age.” 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). Thus, by the law’s plain language, an employer may not discriminate against any worker age 40 or older on the basis of age. Those younger than 40 are not protected by the ADEA. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996). To reach the conclusion for which the defendant argues, and that was found persuasive by the district court; we would be required to hold that the plain language of § 623(a)(1) and § 631(

a) does not mean what it says when it refers to “any individual,” but means, instead, “older workers.” Thus, only “older workers,” meaning those individuals who are at least 40 years of age and, in addition, relatively older than any other group of employees with whom they are compared, are protected.

This interpretive reading of the statute led the district court to conclude that the ADEA does not prohibit an employer from discriminating, on the basis of age, against “any individual” who is a member of the ADEA’s protected class, but only prohibits discrimination against those in the protected class who are “older” than the favored employees. We think the plain meaning of the statute will not bear that reading. In support of its holding, the district court cited to Hamilton v.

Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1228 (7th Cir.1992), for the proposition that the ADEA does not recognize claims of reverse age discrimination. We recognize that Hamilton and the majority of courts to consider the question before us have held that the ADEA does not provide a cause of action for “reverse discrimination.” See, e.g., Schuler v. Polaroid Corp., 848 F.2d 276, 278 (1st Cir.1988) (Breyer, J.); Karlen v. City Colls. of Chicago, 837 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir.1988); Dittman v. General Motors Corp., 941 F.Supp. 284, 287 (D.Conn.1996), aff'd on other grounds, No. 96-9442, 1997 WL 340267 (2d Cir.

June 20, 1997) (unpublished disposition); Parker v. Wakelin, 882 F.Supp. 1131, 1140 (D.Me.1995); but see Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Local Union Nos. 605 and 985, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 945 F.Supp. 980, 988 (S.D.Miss.1996); Rannels v. Hargrove, 731 F.Supp. 1214, 1220-21 (E.D.Pa.1990). For a variety of reasons, however, we do not find the reasoning undergirding these opinions persuasive. We find that the Hamilton opinion fails to properly interpret the ADEA. First, it assigns far too much weight to the hortatory, generalized language of Congress’s Statement of Findings and Purpose in the ADEA.

Second, it ignores, indeed it reverses, the familiar rule that the more direct and specific language of a statute ordinarily trumps the more generalized. Metro. Detroit Area Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 634 F.2d 330, 334 (6th Cir.1980). Turning to the Statement of Findings and Purpose: (

a) The Congress hereby finds and declares that- (1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs[.] (

b) It is therefore the purpose of this

chapter to promote employment of older persons based on their ability, rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)-(b) (emphasis added). Notably, neither § 621, nor any other

section of the statute, provides a definition of “older workers” or “older persons.” Nonetheless, because statutory language should be given its plain meaning absent evidence to the contrary, we agree that Congress intended to protect older workers. But to hold that the ADEA protects older workers from employers’ age discrimination provides no answer to the question this litigation presents. The question here is whether any worker over the age of 40 (“any individual”) may be discriminated against on the basis of age.

To hold, as the ADEA requires us to hold, that employment age discrimination against any worker at least 40 years of age is prohibited, does nothing to defeat the congressional intent to protect “older workers” and “older persons.” To repeat: § 623(a)(1) and § 631(a), taken together, prohibit an employer from discriminating against “any individual” 40 years of age or older based on that person’s age. “ ‘When we can discern an unambiguous and plain meaning from the language of a statute, our task is at an end.’” Henry Ford Health Sys. v. Shalala, 233 F.3d 907, 910 (6th Cir.2000) (quoting Bartlik v. U.S.

Dep’t of Labor, 62 F.3d 163, 166 (6th Cir.1995)). Our holding does not change even if one concludes-and we do not-that the hortatory language of § 621 is inconsistent with the plain meaning of § 623(a)(1) and § 631(a). When two different parts of a statute appear to conflict, the court should, if possible, give these parts a “harmonious, comprehensive meaning.” United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 684 F.2d 1174, 1184 (6th Cir.1982), aff'd, 464 U.S. 165, 104 S.Ct. 575, 78 L.Ed.2d 388 (1984).

The exhortation in § 621 to protect “older workers” and “older persons” is easily reconciled with the specific provisions of § 623 and § 631, which prohibit age discrimination against “any individual” age 40 or older. Courts must interpret statutes “ ‘as a whole, giving effect to each word and making every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous.’ ” Cafarelli v. Yancy, 226 F.3d 492, 499 (6th Cir.2000) (citation omitted).

In § 621, Congress declared its intention to protect older workers, and in § 623 and § 631, it identified the older workers it intends to protect as “any individual” age 40 or older. Thus, the several relevant sections of the statute are easily reconciled. Moreover, we do not share the commonly held belief that this situation is one of so-called “reverse discrimination.” Insofar as we are able to determine, the expression “reverse discrimination” has no ascertainable meaning in the law. An action is either discriminatory or it is not discriminatory, and some discriminatory actions are prohibited by law.

Presumably, what the district judge and others mean when they conclude that the ADEA does not prohibit “reverse discrimination” is that otherwise prohibited discrimination is permitted if the victims are literally (statutorily) within the protected class, but are a group within the class who in most cases are the beneficiaries of discrimination against others. There is no basis for this conclusion. We are not aware of any legal doctrine permitting courts to redraft anti-discrimination statutes so that they better advance the court’s view of sound policy.

Furthermore, even if we granted the district court its definition of “reverse discrimination,” it is clear that Cline and his classmates did not suffer “reverse age discrimination.” By the plain language of the ADEA they are the victims of “age discrimination.” Congress has singled out the over 40 class of workers from the general workforce for protection from age discrimination by their employers. All the plaintiffs are members of the protected class created by § 631(a), and all properly allege that they were denied job benefits due to their age.

Therefore, the protected class should be protected; to hold otherwise is discrimination, plain and simple. Finally, we note that those courts adopting the Hamilton holding do so in contravention of the EEOC. The EEOC’s

interpretation of the ADEA “is significant because an agency’s

interpretation of an ambiguous provision within the statute it is authorized to implement is entitled to judicial deference.” Burzynski v. Cohen, 264 F.3d 611, 619 (6th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted). In its review of the matter at hand, the agency notes: It is unlawful ... for an employer to discriminate in hiring or in any other way by giving preference because of age between individuals W and over.

Thus, if two people apply for the same position, and one is 42 and the other 52, the employer may not lawfully turn down either one on the basis of age, but must make such decision on the basis of some other factor. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (emphasis added). While a court can certainly interpret a statute and properly reach a different conclusion from a federal agency, we are persuaded that the EEOC’s

interpretation of the ADEA is a true rendering of the language. III. There is no doubt that the facts of this case are unusual and fall outside the typical ADEA claim, in that the plaintiffs were younger than the employees who were to receive health benefits upon retirement under the CBA2. But the fact that some members within the protected class were beneficiaries of the discriminatory action of which other members of the protected class — the plaintiffs — were victims, does not somehow suspend the language of the statute, which prohibits age discrimination against “any individual” within the protected class.

As we stated earlier, when the language of a statute is unambiguous we have no basis for seeking a statute’s meaning in its legislative history or intent. In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d at 549. The syllogism goes like this: The ADEA expressly prohibits denying any employee within the protected class an employment benefit solely because of age. The CBA2 provision in question denies a group of employees within the protected class an employee benefit based solely on their age. Therefore, the ADEA prohibits the CBA2 provision in question.

If Congress wanted to limit the ADEA to protect only those workers who are relatively older, it clearly had the power and acuity to do so. It did not. Whatever the policy justifications for holding otherwise, we are bound by the plain language of the statute and have no occasion to look outside of the text. IV. We express no opinion whether the plaintiffs have made out an actionable claim under the Ohio Civil Rights Act because we think the district court should be given the opportunity to consider that question in light of what we have decided today with respect to the ADEA. V.

Because Cline and the other plaintiffs were each within the ADEA’s protected class when their employer allegedly discriminated against them on the basis of age, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of the motion to dismiss. On remand, the district court should address the plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment argument concerning standing and ripeness, which was not considered by the district court and thus is not properly before us for review.