Larry D. SMITH, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Gerald HOFBAUER, Respondent-Appellee, 312 F.3d 809

OPINION CLAY, Circuit Judge. Petitioner, Larry Donnell Smith, appeals from the district court’s order denying Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On appeal, Petitioner argues that because of his trial counsel’s conflict of interest, a structural defect in Petitioner’s trial occurred such that Petitioner was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel under the auspices of Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980).

Petitioner’s claim seeks to extend Sullivan’s lessened standard of proof necessary for a defendant to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance counsel based on a conflict of interest involving joint representation to other types of attorney conflicts of interest.

Because the rule sought to be invoked by Petitioner in order to succeed on his claim is a new rule that was not in effect at the time of conviction and, indeed, is still not in effect under Supreme Court precedent at this time, Petitioner’s claim fails inasmuch as it is not based upon “clearly established federal law” for purposes of satisfying § 2254 of the Antiter-rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s application for the writ, albeit for reasons other than those of the district court.

BACKGROUND Petitioner, a body builder who was thirty-one years old at the time, was arrested in late January of 1991, following an allegation that he performed fellatio on a sixteen-year-old boy by force. Petitioner was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 450.502b(l)(

e) in Kent County Circuit Court, Kent County, Michigan, and with being a fourth felony offender in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 769.12. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner fired his court-appointed counsel and retained attorney Jeffrey Balgooyen. On April 26, 1991, Petitioner was arraigned as a fourth felony offender on the first-degree criminal sexual conduct charge, which carried a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.

Three weeks later, on May 16, 1991, another assistant prosecuting attorney from Kent County obtained an indictment against Balgooyen, charging him with one count of possession with the intent to deliver cocaine, which carried a mandatory minimum sentence of one year’s imprisonment, and a maximum sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment. On the eve of Petitioner’s jury trial, Balgooyen moved to withdraw as Petitioner’s attorney, claiming that difficulties in establishing contact with Petitioner deprived Balgooyen of sufficient time to prepare his defense and to complete his financial arrangements with Petitioner.

The trial court denied Balgooyen’s motion, and reminded Petitioner of the prosecution’s earlier plea offer of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct, for which the maximum sentence would have been ten years’ imprisonment, instead of life imprisonment which Petitioner faced if he proceeded to trial. Petitioner indicated that he continued to reject the prosecution’s plea offer, and that he desired to go to trial. Following a three-day jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of first-degree criminal - sexual conduct on August 15, 1991.

About one month later, on September 13, 1991, Balgooyen appeared in Kent County Circuit Court, but before a judge different from the judge before whom Petitioner had appeared, on the charge of intent to distribute cocaine. The prosecuting attorney assigned to Balgooyen’s case, who was not the prosecuting attorney assigned to Petitioner’s case, made a plea offer to reduce the charge to attempted possession with the intent to deliver cocaine.

Balgooyen accepted the offer, pleaded guilty to the lesser charge, and was sentenced to five months’ imprisonment plus probation. , Prior to Petitioner’s sentencing on October 14, 1991, a court-appointed attorney replaced Balgooyen as Petitioner’s counsel, possibly because Balgooyen’s license to practice law may have been suspended as of his date of conviction under Michigan Court Rule 9.120. Yet another prosecuting attorney from Kent County represented the State of Michigan at Petitioner’s sentencing.

Petitioner pleaded guilty to being a second felony offender in exchange for the dismissal of the information charging him as being a fourth felony offender, and was sentenced to a term of twenty-five to forty years’ imprisonment. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Michigan Court of Appeals raising, among other things, a claim that Balgooyen’s pending drug charge in the same county in which Petitioner was tried and convicted created a conflict of interest which denied Petitioner his right to the effective assistance of counsel per se.

As far as the record indicates, this was the first time that Petitioner raised this issue. At the same time Petitioner filed his appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals, he also filed a motion to remand for an evidentia-ry hearing in the trial court, requesting further factual development regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Although Petitioner alleged six claims of ineffective assistance by Balgooyen for which further factual development was necessary, only one allegation involved Balgooyen’s potential conflict of interest.

And even that allegation was made in reference to Petitioner’s allegation that Bal-gooyen was ineffective for failing to challenge the composition of the jury pool. Specifically, Petitioner alleged as follows: 6. Mr.

Smith, who is black, also wishes to claim on appeal that counsel was ineffective because he failed to challenge the composition of the jury based on the underrepresentation [sic] of blacks. (This Court can take judicial notice that the under-representation of blacks on Kent County Circuit Court juries is a subject of ongoing concern in Kent County.) Counsel’s failure to raise this claim may have been the result of a conflict of interest created by a felony drug charge pending against him in the Kent County Circuit Court. (Kent County Circuit Court No. 91-54842-FH.) (Alternatively, Mr.

Smith wishes to claim that he was denied his federal and state constitutional right to a trial by jury because the jury members did not represent a fair cross-section of the community. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979).) (J.A. at 90; Petitioner’s Motion to Remand.) The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence in an unpublished per curiam opinion, opining that “[b]ecause the judge and prosecutor involved in counsel’s [Balgooyeris] case were not the same as defendant’s, no actual conflict of interest has been shown.” People v.

Smith, No. 148757, slip op. at 1 (Mich.Ct.App. July 11, 1995) (unpublished per curiam) (citing People v. Pickens, 446 Mich. 298, 521 N.W.2d 797 (1994)). Apparently, in light of the court’s decision, Petitioner’s motion to remand for an evi-dentiary hearing was denied. On July 31, 1995, Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, again raising the ineffective assistance of counsel issue. Leave was granted on that issue, along with an evidentiary claim, but the supreme court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction. See People v. Smith, 456 Mich. 543, 581 N.W.2d 654 (1998).

The court opined in relevant part that Petitioner “cited no evidence to suggest that defense counsel actively lessened his defense as a result of his pending felony charge, nor do we find evidence of an actual conflict of interest on the record. To the contrary, defense counsel vigorously pursued his objections and presented a strong case.” Id. at 660. Petitioner filed the instant application for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court raising the single issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Specifically, Petitioner argued that “because his trial counsel was being prosecuted on a drug charge in the same county in which Petitioner was being tried, a conflict of interest existed which created a structural defect, thereby denying Petitioner his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of trial counsel.” (J.A. at 6-7; Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.) The district court referred Petitioner’s case to a magistrate who recommended that the application be denied.

In a memorandum opinion, the district court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation, opining in relevant part as follows: The state court’s conclusion that defendant “cited no evidence to suggest that defense counsel actively lessened his defense as a result of his pending felony charge ...” is amply supported by the record. Counsel conducted a vigorous defense, lodging appropriate objections to evidence, engaging in extensive and competent cross-examination, and presenting testimony of defendant and two other witnesses.

The Michigan Supreme Court reasonably concluded that petitioner failed to show any adverse effect on his representation by counsel’s conflict of interest.

As a result, the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court that petitioner was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. (J.A. at 99; Memorandum Opinion Adopting Report and Recommendation (alteration in original).) The district court thereafter entered its corresponding order denying Petitioner’s application for the writ, and it is from this order that Petitioner now appeals.

DISCUSSION When reviewing a district court’s decision regarding a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, we review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. See Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 942 (6th Cir.2000). A.

AEDPA Standards AEDPA provides federal habeas relief for a state court defendant if the state court’s decision “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court[,]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or was based on “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

A state court adjudication is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent under § 2254(d)(1), “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law,” or “if the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent” and arrives at a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1519, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

A state court adjudication involves “an unreasonable application of’ Supreme Court precedent under § 2254(d)(2), “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular ... case,” or if the court unreasonably refuses to extend, or unreasonably extends, existing legal principles from the Court’s precedents to a new context. Id. at 1520. “Whether [Petitioner] was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo.” Hunt v.

Mitchell, 261 F.3d 575, 580 (2001) (citing Olden v. United States, 224 F.3d 561, 565 (6th Cir.2000)). This Court applies the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1) to mixed questions of law and fact. Id. (citing Harpster v. Ohio, 128 F.3d 322, 327 (6th Cir.1997)). The Supreme Court has cautioned that a federal habeas court may not overturn a state court’s decision simply because it concludes that a state court misapplied Supreme Court precedent; rather, the state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent must also be unreasonable. See id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495). B.

Supreme Court Precedent as to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Based Upon Counsel’s Conflict of Interest “It has long been recognized that the right to counsel [under the Sixth Amendment] is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). In this regard, the Court opined in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) that in general, in order for a criminal defendant to prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, the defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” According to Strickland, “[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” of the trial. Id.; see also Bell v.

Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1850, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (“Without proof of both deficient performance and prejudice to the defense, [under Strickland ] ... it could not be said that the sentence or conviction ‘resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that rendered the result of the proceeding unreliable,’ and the sentence or conviction should stand.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, Strickland also recognized that “[i]n certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is presumed.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Citing United States v.

Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 & n. 25, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), the Strickland Court recognized that “[ajctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice. So are various kinds of state interference with counsel’s assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

More specifically, in Cronic, the Court noted that there are “circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustifíed[,]” and found such circumstances to include the “complete denial of counsel” or the denial of counsel “at a critical stage” of the defendant’s trial; the failure to “subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testingf;]” and those circumstances in which counsel is called upon to render assistance where competent counsel very likely could not, such as in Powell v.

Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932). Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-62, 104 S.Ct. 2039. Strickland further recognized that “[o]ne type of actual ineffectiveness claim warrants a similar, though more limited, presumption of prejudice” than that found in the type of circumstances described in Cronic. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Specifically, the type of ineffectiveness claim referred to by Strickland in this regard was that of Cuyler v.

Sullivan, wherein the Court held that prejudice is presumed for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim only if the defendant demonstrates that “ ‘an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.’ ” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)). The Sullivan standard grew out of the Court’s prior recognition that when “a trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection[,]” ineffective assistance of counsel is presumed. Holloway v.

Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978) (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942)). The Court in Holloway held that where counsel is representing multiple defendants at trial, and timely objects in open court to the joint representation but is nonetheless forced to represent the co-defendants, an automatic reversal is required unless the trial court has determined that there is no conflict. Id.

The Court reasoned that a presumption of prejudice to the defendants is proper under such circumstances because in a case of joint representation of com flicting interests!,] the evil ... is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process.

It may be possible in some cases to identify from the record the prejudice resulting from an attorney’s failure to undertake certain trial tasks, but even with a record of the sentencing hearing available it would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney’s representation of a client. And to assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney’s options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible. Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless error here would require, unlike most cases, unguided speculation. Id. (emphasis in original).

Later, in Sullivan, the Supreme Court declined to extend Holloway’s automatic reversal rule to cases in which there was no objection made to the joint representation at trial. Rather, the Court found that “[i]n order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial [to joint representation] must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708.

The Court also noted that “nothing in [its] precedents suggests that the Sixth Amendment requires state courts themselves to initiate inquiries into the propriety of multiple representation in every case.” Id. at 346, 100 S.Ct. 1708. Instead, “[a]bsent special circumstances, ... trial courts may assume either that multiple representation entails no conflict or that the lawyer and his clients knowingly accept such risk of conflict as may exist.” Id. (footnote omitted).

The Court reasoned that “trial courts necessarily rely in- large measure upon the good faith and good judgment of defense counsel[,]” such that “[u]nless the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry.” Id. (footnote omitted).

Therefore, pursuant to Sullivan, where counsel engages in joint representation and makes no objection to the joint representation, and .nothing reasonably indicates to the trial court that a conflict exists, a convicted defendant raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must demonstrate that 1) an actual conflict existed that 2) affected his counsel’s performance. Id. at 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708. Recently, in Mickens v.

Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1239, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002), the Supreme Court had before it the question of “what a defendant must show in order to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation where the trial court fails to inquire into a potential conflict of interest about which it knew or reasonably should have known.” In affirming the Fourth Circuit’s en banc denial of the petitioner’s application for the writ brought on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court opined: Since this was not a case in which (as in Holloway) counsel protested his inability simultaneously to represent multiple defendants; and since the trial court’s failure to make the Sullivan-mandated inquiry does not reduce the petitioner’s burden of proof; it was at least necessary, to void the conviction, for petitioner to establish that the conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel’s performance.

The Court of Appeals having found no such effect, see 240 F.3d at 360, the denial of habeas relief must be affirmed. Id. at 1245. Having so found, the Court expressly cautioned that its holding was limited to the issue before it — i.e., what burden of proof under the Sullivan rule was required by a petitioner to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim when the trial court did not inquire into a potential conflict of interest of which it knew or should have known. Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1245.

The Court noted that the type of conflict itself at issue in Mickens was one of successive representation, not joint representation, and that the Sullivan rule, although having been “unblinkingly” applied by the circuits to a bevy' of various ethical attorney conflicts, had never been extended by the Supreme Court to conflicts other than joint representation at trial. Id. at 1245-46 (citing examples of various types of ethical conflicts of interests wherein the circuits have applied the Sullivan rule).

The Court therefore emphasized that although it adjudicated the question before it, it did so under the “assumption” that the case properly proceeded under Sullivan in the lower courts. However, the Court cautioned that its decision should not be “misconstrued” as extending the Sullivan rule to conflicts other than joint representation. Id. Specifically, the Court emphasized that [i]n resolving this case on the grounds on which it was presented to us, we do not rule upon the need for the Sullivan prophylaxis in cases of successive representation [or alleged conflicts based upon anything but joint representation].

Whether Sullivan should be extended to such cases remains, as far as the jurisprudence of this Court is concerned, an open question. Id. at 1246 (emphasis added). C. Application to Petitioner’s Case 1. Michigan Appellate Courts’ Decisions The Michigan Court of Appeals found that Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed inasmuch as “the judge and prosecutor involved in counsel’s case were not the same as defendant’s[; therefore,] no actual conflict of interest has been shown.” People v. Smith, No. 148757, slip op. at 1 (Mich.Ct.App. July 11, 1995) (unpublished per curiam) (citing People v.

Pickens, 446 Mich. 298, 521 N.W.2d 797 (1994)). The Michigan Supreme Court also held that Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed, opining as follows: Defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights because his attorney was charged with a felony pending in the same county. Defendant asks that we presume a conflict of interest exists whenever an attorney is being prosecuted in the same county as a criminal defendant whom he represents.

We decline to create such a rule and hold instead that in order to demonstrate that a conflict of interest has violated his Sixth Amendment rights, a defendant “must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). People v. Smith, 456 Mich. 543, 581 N.W.2d 654, 659 (1998) (footnote omitted).

The court concluded that “[i]n this case, defendant has cited no evidence to suggest that defense counsel actively lessened his defense as a result of his pending felony charge, nor do we find evidence of an actual conflict of interest on the record. To the contrary, defense counsel vigorously pursued his objections and presented a strong case.” Id. at 660. 2. District Court’s Order The district court concluded that the Michigan appellate courts did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent to Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s alleged conflict of interest.

The court held that the Michigan courts properly found that in order for Petitioner to succeed on his claim, he not only had to prove that a conflict existed, but that the conflict adversely affected his counsel’s performance under Sullivan. In doing so, the district court rejected Petitioner’s claim — that where he has shown that the conflict was actual, and not potential, prejudice is presumed — on the basis that Sullivan commands a showing of both actual conflict and adverse effect before prejudice will be presumed for purposes of succeeding on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Because Petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was adversely effected by his counsel’s alleged conflict, and because the record showed no indication that a factual record could be developed to support Petitioner’s claim, the district court denied Petitioner’s application for the writ. 3.

De Novo Review of District Court’s Order Because the question of whether the Sullivan’s lessened standard of proof for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon an attorney’s conflict of interest for anything other than joint representation remains an “open question” in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1246, and in fact was an open question at the time Petitioner’s case was heard, Petitioner’s claim fails because it is not based upon clearly established Supreme Court precedent as mandated by AEDPA. Indeed, in Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), the Supreme Court held that for purposes of the AEDPA, “whatever would qualify as an old rule under our Teague [v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989)] jurisprudence will constitute ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’ under § 2254(d)(1).” Pursuant to Teague, “a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” See Teague v.

Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (emphasis in original). In determining whether the relief requested would constitute a new rule, the question becomes “whether a state court considering [the defendant’s] claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the Constitution.” Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390, 114 S.Ct. 948, 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in Bohlen).

Accordingly, applying Teague principles to the matter at hand, “clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” means that the rule sought by Petitioner here — that the lessened standard of proof for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as set forth in Cuyler v. Sullivan be extended to conflicts of interest other than those of multiple concurrent representation — must have been dictated by Sullivan.

It clearly was not dictated by Sullivan and, as explained by the Court in Mickens, the concerns which led to the Sullivan standard of proof for conflicts of joint representation may not be present in situations involving other types of conflicts. See Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1246. That “is not to suggest that one ethical duty is more or less important than another.

The purpose of [the Court’s] Holloway and Sullivan exceptions from the ordinary requirements of Strickland, however, is not to enforce the Canons of Legal Ethics, but to apply needed prophylaxis in situations where Strickland itself is evidently inadequate to assure vindication of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Id.

The fact that it was not until Mick-ens that the Court expressly stated that Sullivan does not support such an expansion, and the fact that the Court said so in dicta, does nothing to change the fact that the rule sought by Petitioner was not clearly established federal law at the time of his conviction nor is at the current time. Said differently, it is not Mickens’ dicta that bars Petitioner’s claim; rather, it is the holding of Sullivan (and of Holloway v.

Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978) from which Sullivan arose) which bars Petitioner’s case inasmuch as Sullivan applied only to joint representation and the Supreme Court has yet to extend Sullivan’s reach to any other type of conflict. That is not to say that the Court may not do so in the future, but at the time Petitioner’s case was heard, and indeed up until the current time, the Supreme Court has yet to extend Sullivan. Because Petitioner’s claim does not rest upon a Sullivan conflict, Petitioner’s claim does not rest upon “clearly established” federal precedent.

Thus, the decision from the Michigan appellate courts denying Petitioner relief was not unreasonable for purposes of AEDPA. Moreover, it would be improvident for us to follow the other circuits, or even our own decisions on direct review, which have, in the words of Mickens, “unblinkingly” applied Sullivan’s lessened. standard to “all kinds of alleged attorney conflicts.” Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1245. Petitioner’s § 2254 application is governed by AEDPA, and therefore only decisions from the United States Supreme Court may be relied upon as authority for relief.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see also Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 944 (6th Cir.2000) (holding that when reviewing a § 2254 petition under AEDPA, “clearly established” federal precedent for purposes of obtaining relief is governed by decisions from the United States Supreme Court, and it is error for a court to rely on authority other that of the Supreme Court of the United States).

We therefore agree with the district court that the Michigan appellate courts did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in denying Petitioner relief under his ineffective assistance of counsel claim; however, we do so based on the fact that Petitioner seeks relief on a basis not supported by clearly established federal law inasmuch as the Supreme Court has never applied Sullivan’s lessened standard of proof to any conflict other than joint representation. See City Management Corp. v. U.S.

Chemical Co., Inc., 43 F.3d 244, 251 (6th Cir.1994) (finding that this Court may affirm the district court for any reason supported by the record). As a result, Petitioner’s request for an eviden-tiary hearing so as to establish whether his counsel’s performance was affected by the alleged conflict of interest is moot. CONCLUSION The district court’s order denying Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is AFFIRMED.