Raymond E. HUMPHREY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Duane M. MABRY; Kevin George; and Kevin Wheeler, Defendants-Appellants, 482 F.3d 840

OBERDORFER, D.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which GILMAN, J., joined. CLAY, J. (pp. 851-60), delivered a separate dissenting opinion. OPINION OBERDORFER, District Judge. This civil rights action, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arises out of a traffic stop, forcible seizure at gun point, search and brief restraint of the plaintiff, who was driving a car mistakenly identified by Columbus, Ohio police officers as a wanted car driven by a dangerous, gun-bearing suspect.

The plaintiffs complaint alleges that three Columbus police officers and the City of Columbus are liable for violating his constitutional rights, specifically the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures and the use of excessive force. We conclude that Humphrey’s complaint sufficiently alleges, and a reasonable jury could find, that Columbus police officers did violate his Fourth Amendment rights.

But we also conclude that, because a reasonable officer in the shoes of the individual officer defendants, in the particular circumstances here, could have reasonably believed that his actions were constitutional, we REVERSE the denial of qualified immunity for the three individual officer defendants and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the record establishes the following: 1.

The Seizure On the evening of December 10, 2002, Raymond Humphrey, was driving his bright blue PT Cruiser on Parsons Avenue in Columbus, Ohio. On his way home from work as the Director of Blackburn Recreation Center, a center for inner-city children, he stopped at a Kroger’s grocery store. A few minutes past 10:30 p.m., he left the Kroger’s and turned south onto Parsons Avenue. After driving a few blocks, he came upon a police roadblock. Officers Dwayne Mabry and Kevin George had stopped traffic and were waving each car through one at a time.

Unbeknownst to Humphrey, the two officers had been alerted by an officer in a helicopter, Officer Kevin Wheeler, that he had in sight a PT cruiser heading their direction being driven by a suspect with a gun. At approximately 10:35 p.m., Humphrey stopped his PT Cruiser in the line. To his surprise, Officers Mabry and George approached, drew their guns, pointed them at the car and yelled at Humphrey to get out. As he began to do as he was ordered, with Officer George acting as cover, Officer Mabry holstered his gun.

Officer Ma-bry then grabbed Humphrey roughly by the wrist, held on to him firmly while pulling him the rest of the way out of the car, and “patted him down.” As the officers started to handcuff Humphrey, he alerted them that he had an injured thumb. He was not resisting, and the officers left the injured hand uncuffed. Officer George holstered his gun and briefly shined his flashlight through the windows to search for a gun in the car. Within less than five minutes, Officers Mabry and George discovered that Humphrey was not a suspect. They released him forthwith. 2.

The Preceding Events Earlier that same evening, at approximately 9:52 p.m., Volanda Graham had called 911 from her home at 795 Thurman Avenue in the Eleventh Police Precinct in Columbus. She reported to the 911 dispatcher that her sister’s ex-boyfriend, Greg Dunson, “just tried to pull a gun out and shoot my dad.” (JA 173). She described Dunson as “male black,” very tall (about 6'3"), with glasses, curly hair, and wearing a black jersey with white letters and red writing, and black jeans. (JA 173, 176).

Graham also reported that Dunson had a silver Chrysler and was with a friend named “Lucas.” Graham described Lucas as light-skinned, 5'8" or 5'9" and wearing a toboggan-type hat. According to Graham, Dunson, still carrying the gun, had left her house on foot. In response to Graham’s 9:52 p.m. call, at 9:53 p.m. the police dispatcher immediately directed three police cruisers to Graham’s house for a “33 run” (an incident with a gun). The dispatcher stated that a “male black, 6'3" in a grey Chrysler, CFT2945, has a 33[gun] out and is threatening caller’s father.” (JA 178).

The dispatcher then aired that the suspect, named Greg Dunson, had left his car at the Graham house and “just now took off walking down the street.” (JA 178). The dispatcher also alerted the officer in a helicopter then in the air to be on the lookout for Dunson, who she further described as wearing a “black jersey with red lettering” and “wearing glasses and ... black jeans.” (JA 116,178).

Between the dispatcher’s initial broadcast and the mistaken stop of Humphrey at 10:35 p.m., officers searching for the suspect at and in the vicinity of the Graham house, officers in nearby police cars, officers in a police helicopter, and the dispatcher transmitted, via a police radio channel, what information they thought they had about where to locate Dunson, his friend, his car (whether Dunson or his friend was driving it) and, particularly, the gun as follows: • 9:56 p.m.: The dispatcher aired that Dunson was “supposed to be with another male black, light skinned, name of Lucas.” (JA 117, JA 179). • 9:58 p.m.: An officer who had arrived at the Graham house to investigate, Officer [first name] Smith, aired that Dunson “left westbound on Thurman,” that he left “in his vehicle,” and that the vehicle was “going to be a grey ...

PT Cruiser.” (JA 117,179). • 9:59 p.m.: Officer Wheeler began his shift in the helicopter.

The first he heard of the incident at the Graham house was a request from the dispatcher that he check “the area of 795 Thurman” because there was a car “headed westbound about 5 minutes ago on a 33 run, male black in a grey PT cruiser.” (JA 117,180). • 9:59 p.m.: Officer Smith reported from the vicinity of the Graham home that “the vehicle left eastbound with one of [the suspect’s] friends driving it and our suspect left westbound” “they’re also saying that the suspect threw the 33 into the PT Cruiser before he went walking westbound and the car went eastbound.” (JA 117, 180). • 10:02 p.m.: Another officer at the scene of the incident, Officer Russell, told Officer Wheeler, now in the helicopter, “that car PT Cruiser, grey in color, went eastbound from this location 5 minutes, possibly 10 minutes old now, that’s the one that has the 33 in it.” (JA 181). • 10:08 p.m.: The dispatcher reported that the license plate number originally given from the scene, CFT2945, came back to a 1996 GMC truck out of Toledo, Ohio, registered to a Ruth Smith, indicating that the tag number reported by Graham was incorrect. (JA 117-18). • 10:21 p.m.: Officer Smith reported to the dispatcher that the full name of Dunson’s friend is Lucas Downs and that it is Downs who is driving the suspect’s vehicle.

He added: “supposedly once again the 33 was seen and supposedly was put back in the vehicle before the vehicle left.” (JA 185). There was a brief lull in radio activity on this search from 10:21 p.m. until 10:33 p.m., while other incidents (including another gun incident) were reported and responded to. Then things started to happen very quickly in the search for Dunson.

Within five minutes, the entire incident with plaintiff Humphrey began and ended. • 10:88 p.m.: Officer Smith aired, without indicating the source of his information: “our suspect out of our 33 run was just seen in the PT Cruiser westbound on Frebis from Ohio.” (JA 190). • 10:Sí p.m.: Another nearby officer, Officer Wilson, responded that he would head eastbound on Frebis, from Parsons, to look for the vehicle. (JA 118,190). • 10:Si p.m.: Officer Russell, without indicating the source of his information, told Officer Wheeler (still in the helicopter) to look for the PT Cruiser on Parsons Avenue, and added: “you may want to check for that PT Cruiser anywhere from Frebis/Parsons, all the way to Livingston and Parsons.” (JA 190). • 10:Si p.m.: Officer Wheeler responded immediately: “We got a PT Cruiser dark grey, southbound from the Kroger here on Parsons, that’s probably it.” • 10:Si p.m.: Officer Russell added: “Be advised there is a 33 on board, either in the glove box or under the passenger seat.” • 10:3k p.m.: Officer Wheeler reported that the PT Cruiser he was watching was “still southbound on Parsons, right in front of Parsons market” and that it “is going to be the third one in line.” (JA 190). 3.

Realizing the Mistake Officers Mabry and George were the first officers near Parsons market at 10:35 p.m. They were on bicycles patrolling the thirteenth police precinct. They had heard portions of the earlier broadcasts pertaining to the incident at Graham’s house in the eleventh precinct, but they attested that they had been focused primarily on communications affecting their precinct. (JA 66, 71).

However, hearing the transmission from Officer Wheeler in the helicopter and realizing that they happened to be less than a block away, they set up a road block on the route that Humphrey, the driver of the PT cruiser, was following. At approximately 10:35 p.m., Officers Mabry and George conducted the stop without yet knowing Humphrey’s name. At that time, a back-up officer in a cruiser arrived on the scene and radioed to the dispatcher Humphrey’s license place number, AUN1NX. The officer asked what tag number had been reported.

The dispatcher responded that the reported license plate number was CFT2945; Officer Smith immediately aired: “the tag from the original run was bad.” (JA 191). The dispatcher then ran the new tag number, which identified the car stopped as belonging to Humphrey. Another back-up officer immediately requested the full description of the suspect and/or his friend. (JA 191).

An officer who was still investigating near the Graham house responded by radio with a description of Dunson, stating that he was “wearing a Cincinnati Reds shirt, black jacket, has wire-rimmed glasses, short curly hair, goatee, lite complected, about 6'1" 215, age 19, his name is Gregory Dunson.” (JA 191). The officer near the Graham house did not mention or provide a description of Downs.

The person stopped by Officers Mabry and George was obviously not Dunson, but a much older (52), much shorter (5' 6" tall), much lighter (weighing only about 160 pounds), darker-complexioned African-American male, with a much different hairstyle (graying beard, neatly cut short hair) and wearing different clothes (work clothes with a visible City of Columbus ID badge around his neck). Hearing the description of Dunson, and focusing on Humphrey, Officers Mabry and George immediately terminated their questioning and detention of Humphrey.

At 10:37 p.m., an officer in one of the cruisers aired that the stop was a “Code 4,” meaning that it was not the suspect. The exact length of the detention is not clear, but, according to Humphrey, it was no longer than five minutes. (JA 50). Officer Mabry apologized for their mistake and attempted to explain the confusion to Humphrey. About 20 minutes later, other police officers stopped a PT Cruiser, license number CFP 2945, at 747 Mithoff Avenue, approximately three-quarters of a mile from the Kroger parking lot on Parsons Avenue. (JA 75, 119).

They recovered a gun from the vehicle, and later identified Downs as the driver. Soon thereafter, police apprehended Dunson on foot. (JA 120, 200). B. Procedural Background On April 23, 2004, Humphrey brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against Officers Mabry and George, the City of Columbus, and six Joe Doe Officers. The complaint alleged that the defendants had violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by subjecting him to an unlawful seizure and an excessive use of force.

On September 27, 2004, Humphrey amended his complaint to include Officer Wheeler as a defendant, to add a claim for conspiracy against all of the defendants, and to add claims against the City of Columbus for failure to train, supervise, and discipline police officers and for ratification of improper police conduct. In May 2005, Humphrey moved for partial

summary judgment against Officers Mabry, George and Wheeler on his unlawful seizure claim. The defendants cross-moved for

summary judgment on the merits on all of Humphrey’s claims and/or that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the unlawful seizure and excessive force claims. On October 21, 2005, the district court granted the plaintiffs motions for partial

summary judgment, ruling that Humphrey was unlawfully seized, denied the individual defendants qualified immunity on both the unlawful seizure and excessive force claims, and granted the remainder of the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. The defendant officers timely filed this interlocutory appeal of the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. This being an interlocutory appeal from only the district court’s rejection of the individual officers’ qualified immunity defense, none of the other elements of the district court’s

summary judgment order are directly before us. II. DISCUSSION The two main issues presented on appeal are: (1) whether this court has jurisdiction; and (2) whether the district court erred in denying qualified immunity for the officers. A. Jurisdiction “[A] district court’s denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); see also Turner v.

Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 427 (6th Cir.1997). Even if there are factual disputes in the underlying case, the denial of qualified immunity may be interlocutorily appealed as long as the defendant is “prepared to overlook any factual dispute and to concede [for purposes of the appeal] an

interpretation of the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs case.” Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 562 (6th Cir.1998). The plaintiff argues that the defendants’ arguments on appeal do not accept the version of the facts most favorable to him and, therefore, whether the district court erred in denying qualified immunity does not turn on “neat abstract issues of law.” Id. at 563 (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995)).

However, the district court found no material facts in dispute, the parties have not identified any here, and we do not find any in the record. Accordingly, the issues in this appeal are purely legal, and we have jurisdiction. B. Qualified Immunity The defense of qualified immunity shields government officials from “liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); see also Smoak v.

Hall, 460 F.3d 768, 777 (6th Cir.2006). Once defendants satisfy their initial burden of demonstrating that they were acting within the scope of their authority, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. See Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 311 (6th Cir.2006); see also Wegener v. City of Covington, 933 F.2d 390, 392 (6th Cir.1991).

In determining whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity, a court must consider two sequential questions: (1) “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?”; and (2) “whether the right was clearly established.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001).

The issue of qualified immunity may be submitted to a jury only if “the legal question of immunity is completely dependent upon which view of the [disputed] facts is accepted by the jury.” Brandenburg v. Cureton, 882 F.2d 211, 216 (6th Cir.1989). We review de novo the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. See Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 847 (6th Cir.2003) (citations omitted); Yates v. City of Cleveland, 941 F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir.1991). 1. Would the Facts Alleged Establish a Violation of Plaintiffs Constitutional Rights?

We conclude that Humphrey has indeed alleged that the officers violated his constitutional rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. As a threshold matter, a search and seizure without a warrant by police officers is presumptively unreasonable, although several exceptions apply.

An officer may permissibly conduct an investigatory stop when he or she can point to “a particularized and objective basis” that “leads ... reasonably to [the conclusion] in light of [the officer’s] experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom [the officer] is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Houston v. Clark County Sheriff Deputy John Does 1-5, 174 F.3d 809, 813 (6th Cir.1999).

Reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop must be considered under the totality of the circumstances, considering “all of the information available to law enforcement officials at the time.” Feathers, 319 F.3d at 849. Whether excessive force was used in conducting an investigative stop is also subject to a Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989).

This inquiry “requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (internal quotation marks omitted). Reasonableness must be judged “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id.; Pray v. City of Sandusky, 49 F.3d 1154, 1158 n. 3 (6th Cir.1995).

Even if a stop at gunpoint is reasonable, the use of force to effect a seizure after officers knew or should have known that they had the wrong person is inherently unreasonable. Pray, 49 F.8d at 1161.

We agree with our dissenting colleague that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Humphrey, he has alleged a constitutional violation; that is, considering “all of the information available to law enforcement officials at the time,” Feathers, 319 F.3d at 849, a reasonable jury could conclude that the Columbus police violated Humphrey’s Fourth Amendment rights when they misidentified his car, stopped him at gunpoint, forcibly seized him and restrained him, albeit briefly. Accordingly, we move to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. 2. Were the rights “clearly established”?

A right is “clearly established” for qualified immunity purposes if “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151; see also Smoak, 460 F.3d at 778; Feathers, 319 F.3d at 848. This inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151.

If no reasonably competent officer would have taken the same action, then qualified immunity should be denied; however, “if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on [the legality of the action], immunity should be recognized.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151.

Qualified immunity leaves government authorities “ample room for mistaken judgments.” Scott v. Clay County, 205 F.3d 867, 873 n. 9 (6th Cir.2000) (citations omitted). The doctrine protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092.

In a situation such as the present one where the constitutional violations are based on the collective knowledge of a number of police officers, it is important to recognize that an individual officer is still entitled to qualified immunity if an objectively reasonable officer in the same position could have reasonably believed that he or she was acting lawfully. See, e.g., Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151.

More specifically, where individual police officers, acting in good faith and in reliance on the reports of other officers, have a sufficient factual basis for believing that they are in compliance with the law, qualified immunity is warranted, notwithstanding the fact that an action may be illegal when viewed under the totality of the circumstances. See Feathers, 319 F.3d at 851; Smoak, 460 F.3d at 782. This Court has confronted on several occasions the question of when, for qualified immunity purposes, an officer is entitled to rely on communications from other officers.

In Feathers, for example, police officers entered the wrong building and seized a suspect based on a dispatcher’s inaccurate report. The court in Feathers ruled that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because the information they had at the time gave “the individual defendants ... a sufficient factual basis for thinking that they were acting consistently with Terry.” 319 F.3d at 851 (emphasis added).

Similarly, in Smoak, radio dispatches had instructed the defendant police officers to “be on the lookout” for suspects involved in a “possible robbery.” The Smoak family vehicle was improperly identified as suspicious after a citizen driver reported that it was traveling at a high speed and that money was flying out of the vehicle — it turned out that James Smoak had left his wallet on the roof after purchasing gasoline. During the stop, the officers pointed their guns at the family members’ heads, shot and killed them dog, and caused injury to James Smoak’s knee. Smoak, 460 F.3d at 773-75.

This court concluded that the stop was constitutional, but that the seizure was an unconstitutional arrest without probable cause. Nonetheless, the court in Smoak found that the officers had a “good-faith defense” relating to the felony stop and the use of guns: “This conduct, ... which in hindsight must be viewed as an unreasonable seizure under the totality of the circumstances, was not so clear to the [law enforcement officers] on the scene as to deny them qualified immunity on this basis.” Id. at 782.

Accordingly, in a case such as this where one officer’s claim to qualified immunity from the consequences of a constitutional violation rests on his asserted good faith reliance on the report of other officers, we consider: (1) what information was clear or should have been clear to the individual officer at the time of the incident; and (2) what information that officer was reasonably entitled to rely on in deciding how to act, based on an objective reading of the information. See id.; see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232-33, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). a. Officers Mabry and George

(1) Unreasonable Search and Seizure To reiterate: At approximately 10:34 p.m., Officers Mabry and George received information from Officer Wheeler, who was in a helicopter, that a PT Cruiser with a gun on board was headed in their direction and was wanted in connection with an investigation into a threat to use that gun. They observed that the helicopter was following the PT Cruiser. It was dark outside. When they saw what they thought was the PT Cruiser, Mabry and George walked into the street and stopped a line of traffic. The PT Cruiser was at the end of the line.

They drew their guns and approached it on foot. They both testified that when they made the stop, they were relying on the immediate radio communications alerting them that a PT Cruiser was nearby with a gun and gunman aboard and identifying the specific (albeit blue) PT Cruiser that was “probably it.” In retrospect, it is clear that during the half hour that elapsed between the 911 call and the stop of Humphrey, the officers searching for the suspect at and in the vicinity of the Graham house and the dispatcher all broadcast conflicting information.

There was confusion over whether Dunson was on foot or in his car; whether, if he was on foot, he had thrown the gun into the car before taking off; whether the PT Cruiser, once it left Graham’s house, was headed eastbound or westbound; what its license number was; and whether the driver of the car was Dunson or his friend, Lucas.

However, as the Supreme Court explained in Hensley, “effective law enforcement cannot be conducted unless police officers can act on directions and information transmitted by one officer to another and that officers, who must often act swiftly, cannot be expected to cross-examine their fellow officers about the foundation for the transmitted information.” 469 U.S. at 231, 105 S.Ct. 675 (quotation omitted).

The dissent concludes that Officers Ma-bry and George should have sought further confirmation that this was the PT Cruiser Wheeler wanted stopped, and before stopping it, should have checked the license tag or requested a physical description of the suspect. We find that Officer Wheeler’s detailed (albeit erroneous) identification of the car was sufficient for Ma-bry and George to decide quickly to stop the reportedly gun-bearing PT Cruiser pointed out from the helicopter.

A reasonable officer could have concluded that a suspect driving away from the scene of a crime where a gun was brandished creates a circumstance that is as exigent as a police confrontation with an armed robbery suspect. Compare Smoak, 460 F.3d at 774-75. We also note that during the stop, the officers covering in other cruisers checked to see if the tag number of Humphrey’s car corresponded to the tag number originally reported, to be told only that it was not a “good” number, without reporting what the original number was.

Similarly, it is possible to fault Officers Mabry and George for seizing a bright blue PT Cruiser, despite Officer Wheeler’s contemporaneous report that the PT Cruiser in question was dark grey. However, this is all hindsight. The reasonableness of the conduct of the officers is enhanced by Officer Wheeler’s specific identification of Humphrey’s PT Cruiser as “probably it,” and their belief that the driver was armed. Under these circumstances, a reasonable officer could have made the same mistake, and as a result, could have reasonably believed the stop was lawful.

Accordingly, Officers Mabry and George are entitled to qualified immunity on the unlawful seizure claim.

(2) Excessive Force The use of force during a Terry stop must be reasonable “based upon the facts known to the officers [on the scene] at the time of the stop.” Houston, 174 F.3d at 815. Furthermore, this court has specifically approved the use of guns and handcuffs during an investigatory stop. Id.; see also Smoak, 460 F.3d at 782. In conducting the stop, Officers Mabry and George forcibly removed Humphrey from his vehicle at gunpoint, conducted a pat-down, and partially handcuffed him.

The report that this was a “33 run” entitled these officers to believe reasonably that the suspect for whom they were looking in the PT Cruiser was armed. When Humphrey did not resist, the officers holstered their guns. Humphrey concedes that the officers did not harm him, and in fact were careful not to aggravate a “pre-existing injury” to his thumb. Our dissenting colleague suggests that the circumstances here were not exigent, and that the officers should have waited to approach the vehicle and forcibly secure the driver until they obtained more information to help them identify the correct suspect.

However, they had authoritative information that the suspect whom they believed they were apprehending was armed with a gun with which he had made a threat — a time-sensitive situation requiring a prompt reaction. It was not necessarily clear to them that they had the wrong man at the moment they made the decision to use force. Officers Mabry and George recalled, from “bits and pieces” of the initial radio reports describing the incident while they were on patrol in another precinct, that at the time they made the stop, the suspect for whom they were looking was a black male.

However, Officers Mabry and George testified that in this fast-moving night-time scenario, they were focused on the information most immediately transmitted to them — that there was a dangerous man with a gun in the PT Cruiser which they had stopped. Officers on foot confronting a suspect seated behind the wheel of a car could reasonably believe that they faced serious peril to life and limb.

They could reasonably believe that it was lawful for them, as speedily as possible, to point their guns at that suspect, quickly and forcibly remove him from his car, and restrain him thereafter, without stopping the process to obtain a fuller description. In any event, as soon as they obtained a detailed physical description of the suspect and realized that Humphrey did not match that description, they let him go. Officers Mabry and George could have reasonably believed that they were acting lawfully under the circumstances.

Accordingly, Officers Mabry and George are entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. b. Officer Wheeler Officer Wheeler’s entitlement to qualified immunity depends on a different set of considerations. For him, the issue is whether an officer in his situation could have reasonably believed that directing officers on the ground to stop Humphrey’s PT cruiser was lawful. Officer Wheeler began his helicopter shift just before 10 p.m.; he did not hear the initial reports that described the suspect and indicated that he had left the site of the 911 call on foot.

What Officer Wheeler did know was that he was looking for a dark-grey PT Cruiser “anywhere from Frebis/Parsons, all the way to Livingston and Parsons” on a “33-run.” He also heard the reports that the suspect’s friend was driving the PT Cruiser and that the gun was in the car. Officer Wheeler testified that from his vantage point, Humphrey’s blue PT Cruiser looked dark-grey. Finally, Officer Wheeler spotted Humphrey’s PT cruiser close to the scene of the original crime and in the limited geographic area where he had just been instructed to look.

In retrospect, Officer Wheeler’s identification of Humphrey’s PT cruiser as “probably it” was perhaps unreasonable. He was acting on fairly limited information in concluding, from 300-500 feet in the air, that Humphrey’s PT Cruiser was the vehicle the police were looking for.

However, given that Officer Wheeler came on duty while the search for the suspect was already in progress, he was not “plainly incompetent” in failing to elicit all of the details of the incident that were reported before his shift, or in failing to recognize immediately that the dark-colored PT Cruiser he spied from the helicopter could not have been the grey PT Cruiser for which the police were looking, especially given the inconsistencies in the reports he was receiving from officers on the ground.

Officer Wheeler’s mistakes were unfortunate, and they fall short of the ideal standards of diligence expected of officers searching at night by helicopter for suspects in vehicles in a large city. His lack of diligence directly resulted in the violation of Humphrey’s rights. However, his mistakes were not so egregious that we would characterize them as plain incompetence or mistakes no reasonable officer would make in the circumstances. Accordingly, we conclude that Officer Wheeler is also entitled to qualified immunity for his actions in directing the stop of Humphrey’s PT Cruiser. III.

CONCLUSION We agree with our dissenting colleague that the complaint alleges an unconstitutionally intrusive seizure and use of force. We also agree that if several police mistakes had not occurred, Humphrey would have been spared his brief ordeal. However, all three defendant officers’ individual mistakes were reasonable mistakes understandably committed in good faith while performing their job in a potentially dangerous situation. They are entitled to qualified immunity for those mistakes. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151.

Accordingly, we REVERSE the ruling of the district court denying the defendant officers qualified immunity and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. . The transmission record does not indicate the source of this information, but Officer Smith filed an affidavit stating that he thought it was accurate information given to him by people in the area. . The Feathers decision actually articulates a three-prong test, but as this court did in Smoak, we apply the two-prong test from Saw-cier. The distinction is not material. See, e.g., Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d 689, 696 n. 3 (6th Cir.2005). .

In the Smoak case, the Court further found that sufficient issues of fact remained as to the reasonableness of the use of force against James Smoak to deny qualified immunity. It also indicated that it would have been concerned about granting qualified immunity to the shooter of the dog, but it did not address that issue because of a stipulation of dismissal as to that officer. Id. at 783-4. . Officer Wheeler did not participate in the use of force against Humphrey; therefore, the excessive force claim is not relevant to him. . Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092. .

This decision is without prejudice to plaintiffs right to appeal the district court’s order granting

summary judgment on the claims against the City of Columbus for failure to train, supervise, and discipline police officers and for ratification of improper police conduct.