Stephanie WILLIAMS, Individually, and as Next Friend of Terrance Williams, Jr., a Minor, and Terrance Williams, Individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF GROSSE POINTE PARK, a municipal corporation, and Michael Miller, Officer, Jointly and Severally, Defendants-Appellees, 496 F.3d 482

GIBBONS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which KENNEDY, J., joined. ALDRICH, D.J. (pp. 488-95), delivered a separate dissenting opinion. OPINION JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Stephanie Williams filed the instant civil rights action on behalf of Terrance Williams, Jr., against defendants-appellees the City of Grosse Pointe Park and Officer Michael Miller of the Grosse Pointe Park Police Department. In their suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs alleged that Miller violated Williams’s rights under the Fourth Amendment by subjecting him to an unreasonable seizure.

Plaintiffs further alleged that Grosse Pointe Park is liable under § 1983 for the failure of its police department adequately to train Miller. The district court granted

summary judgment in favor of defendants and held, as a matter of law, that Miller’s conduct in stopping Williams’s flight was objectively reasonable and that Miller therefore did not violate Williams’s constitutional rights. With respect to Grosse Pointe Park, the district court held that there could be no municipal liability under § 1983 in the absence of a proven constitutional violation on the part of Miller, its agent. Plaintiffs subsequently appealed, arguing that there are issues of material fact as to the reasonableness of Miller’s conduct precluding resolution of their claims against Miller and Grosse Pointe Park on a motion for

summary judgment. Because we agree with the district court that no rational juror could conclude that Miller acted unreasonably, we affirm the decision of the district court. I. On the evening of August 17, 2003, Miller and Sgt. James Hoshaw — also an officer with the Grosse Pointe Park Police Department — were on duty. While on duty, they learned of a citizen report that three individuals in a green Dodge Shadow were tampering with cars. Miller and Ho-shaw came upon a green Dodge Shadow (the “Shadow”), driven by Williams and containing two other passengers.

Miller and Hoshaw subsequently determined that the Shadow had been reported stolen. The video camera in Miller’s police cruiser captured the events that followed. Miller and Hoshaw pursued the Shadow. At approximately 7:14 p.m., Hoshaw positioned his cruiser in front of the Shadow in order to block its path, while Miller’s cruiser continued to approach from the rear. One of the passengers of the Shadow exited the car on foot. Williams then put the Shadow in reverse in an apparent effort to flee but found his egress blocked by Miller’s cruiser. As it reversed, the Shadow collided with Miller’s cruiser.

Following the collision, Hoshaw exited his cruiser and, brandishing his weapon, directed an expletive toward Williams. Hoshaw approached the Shadow and stuck his gun in the driver’s side window, pointing his weapon at Williams’s head. Williams then accelerated in an effort to move around Hoshaw’s cruiser and flee. In his attempt to navigate around the cruiser, Williams drove the Shadow over the curb and onto the sidewalk. Hoshaw, failing to release his grasp on the car, was knocked down as it accelerated. In the next instant, the video depicts Miller firing several rounds as the car moves out of view.

One of Miller’s shots struck Williams in the back of the neck, leaving him paralyzed. A period of less than one minute elapsed from the time Hoshaw placed his car in front of the Shadow to the point at which Miller discharged his weapon. As noted above, plaintiffs filed a civil rights action against Miller and Grosse Pointe Park under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of Williams’s Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted

summary judgment in favor of Miller and Grosse Pointe Park, holding as a matter of law that no constitutional violation occurred. II. This court reviews the grant of

summary judgment de novo. DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 414 (6th Cir.2004).

Summary judgment will be affirmed if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). If, on the other hand, “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party,”

summary judgment for the moving party is inappropriate. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In reviewing the district court’s decision, this court draws all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). III. Title 42,

section 1983 of the United States Code imposes civil liability on those individuals who, acting under color of state law, deprive a citizen of, among other things, his or her federally guaranteed constitutional rights. In a §‘ 1983 action in which a defendant claims the protection of qualified immunity, such as the one here under review, the court must follow a two-step process in evaluating the defendant’s claim of immunity. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151.

Under this analytical framework, a court must first determine whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, could support a finding that the defendant has violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights. Id. If the facts would support a finding of a constitutional violation, the court must also find that the conduct of the defendant violated “clearly established” constitutional rights. Id.

If, however, the plaintiff is unable to establish sufficient facts to support a finding of a constitutional violation by the defendant, the inquiry ceases, and the court must award judgment to the defendant. See id. As the district court correctly noted, the proper inquiry on defendants’ motion for

summary judgment is whether, after considering the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, a rational jury could find that Miller’s use of, deadly force against Williams was objectively unreasonable. The Supreme Court has recently summarized the principles governing excessive force cases under the Fourth Amendment and the objective reasonableness with which an officer attempting to seize a suspect must conduct himself or herself: [T]he constitutional question ... is governed by the principles enunciated in Tennessee v. Garner and Graham v. Connor.

These cases establish that claims of excessive force are to be judged under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard. Specifically with regard to deadly force, we explained in Gamer that it is unreasonable for an officer to “seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead.” But “[wjhere the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.” Brosseau v.

Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197-98, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 588 (2004) (citations omitted). “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). This determination should also be made “in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [the officers], without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865.

It is not for the court to substitute its own personal notion of the appropriate procedure for those decisions made by police officers in the face of rapidly changing circumstances. Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir.1992). As the Smith court noted, “[w]hat constitutes ‘reasonable’ action may seem quite different to someone facing a possible assailant than to someone analyzing the question at leisure.” Id.

The Court’s mandate in Graham was clear: “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” 490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Ultimately, the Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” test requires a “careful balancing” of the individual interest in being free from unreasonable seizures and the important governmental interest in protecting the safety of its peace officers and the public.

See id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)). The reasonableness of a particular use of force “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including:” (1) “the severity of the crime at issue,” (2) the immediacy of the threat posed by the suspect to the officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect is “actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. A. In granting Miller

summary judgment, the district court relied almost exclusively on the video captured by the camera in Miller’s cruiser for its determination that Miller’s conduct was objectively reasonable. According to the district court, “based on Williams’ conduct, Officer Miller had probable cause to believe that Williams posed a threat of serious physical harm to Sgt.

Hoshaw, himself, and to other citizens.” The court continued, “[v]iewed objectively, Williams’ conduct showed that he was not intimidated by the police presence, would not hesitate to deliberately use the vehicle as a weapon, and was intent on fleeing from the police, which in turn posed a threat to the public traveling on a major Detroit thoroughfare.” Having reviewed the evidence, we are in agreement with the district court.

At the point Miller fired his weapon, he was faced with a difficult choice: (1) use deadly force to apprehend a suspect who had demonstrated a willingness to risk the injury of others in order to escape; or (2) allow Williams to flee, give chase, and take the chance that Williams would further injure Sgt. Hoshaw or an innocent civilian in his efforts to avoid capture. Moreover, Miller had only an instant in which to settle on a course of action. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that Miller acted unreasonably, nor do we believe that a rational juror could conclude otherwise.

The evidence fully supports the conclusion that Miller’s conduct was “objectively reasonable” as a matter of law. Miller and Hoshaw attempted to apprehend a suspected car thief. Williams, intent on escape, collided with Miller’s squad car. Then, in spite of the fact that Hoshaw’s weapon was pointed at his head, Williams continued his attempted flight, driving onto a sidewalk and knocking Hoshaw to the ground.

From Miller’s perspective, Williams: (1) was undeterred by having a weapon pointed at his head; (2) acted without regard for Hoshaw’s safety; (3) was obviously intent on escape; and (4) was willing to risk the safety of officers, pedestrians, and other drivers in order to evade capture. Miller had no way of knowing whether Williams might reverse the Shadow, possibly backing over Hoshaw, or cause injury to other drivers or pedestrians in the area. As a consequence, Miller elected to fire his weapon in order to prevent Williams’s potentially causing someone injury.

That Williams may not have intended to injure Hoshaw or anyone else is immaterial. From Miller’s viewpoint, Williams was a danger, and he acted accordingly. Turning to the factors identified in Graham, Williams was suspected of car theft, a felony. Hoshaw, having been knocked to the ground, was in immediate danger from the Shadow. While there are no pedestrians or vehicles in the immediate field of view of the camera in Miller’s cruiser, there can be no question that Williams’s reckless disregard for the safety of those around him in attempting to escape posed a threat to anyone within the vicinity.

Finally, Williams was actively avoiding arrest, apparently doing all he could to evade capture by the police. While the suspected crime was a nonviolent property offense, the immediate threat Williams posed to Hoshaw and other drivers and pedestrians and the fact that Williams elected to flee both suggest that Miller’s chosen use of force to apprehend Williams was reasonable. Our prior precedent bolsters our conclusion that Miller acted reasonably.

Prior panels of this court have held that an officer may use deadly force whenever he or she, in the face of a rapidly unfolding situation, has probable cause to believe that a suspect poses a serious physical threat either to the police or members of the public. See Dudley v. Eden, 260 F.3d 722, 726-27 (6th Cir.2001) (noting both that the officer was in a vulnerable position should the suspect have been armed and that the suspect could easily have continued his flight, possibly injuring innocent motorists as he had almost done at prior points in the police pursuit); Scott v.

Clay County, 205 F.3d 867, 871-73 (6th Cir.2000) (noting that the suspect engaged in a dangerous high speed chase and evidenced a complete disregard for the safety of the officers present and innocent motorists). While the facts of these cases vary somewhat from this case and both involve a more protracted flight from police, they each stress the need to assess the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct in view of uncertain and rapidly developing circumstances. Under the circumstances, we agree with the district court that Miller did not violate Williams’s constitutional rights. The dissent relies upon Sigley v.

City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d 527 (6th Cir.2006), and Smith v. Cupp, 430 F.3d 766 (6th Cir.2005), in support of its contention that the facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, demonstrate that Miller acted unreasonably. We respectfully disagree. The Sigley and Cupp courts were both presented with a factual dispute regarding the events that gave rise to the officers’ use of deadly force. See Sigley, 437 F.3d at 530; Cupp, 430 F.3d at 769.

In contrast, the facts of this case are undisputed, and while the dissent takes a different view of the events depicted on the video, we do not believe that any rational trier of fact could conclude that Miller acted unreasonably. Both Sigley and Cupp concluded that the plaintiffs’ version of the facts could support a finding that the defendants acted unreasonably, and we have no difficulty with those conclusions.

Sigley and Cupp are inapplicable to the facts of this case because the events depicted on the video demonstrate that Miller reasonably believed that Williams posed a threat of serious harm and acted in accordance with that belief. The dissent’s assertion that Smith and Cupp should control the outcome of this case depends upon its view of the facts of this case — purportedly after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs — for which we find no support in the record. B. As noted above, the district court also granted

summary judgment in favor of Grosse Pointe Park because, in the absence of a finding that its agent, Miller, violated Williams’s constitutional rights, Grosse Pointe Park could not be held liable under § 1983. Having already concluded the district court was correct with respect to the reasonableness of Miller’s conduct, we agree with the district court that Grosse Pointe Park may not be held liable under § 1983. See Cartwright v. City of Marine City, 336 F.3d 487, 495 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting Scott, 205 F.3d at 879); Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 687 (6th Cir.2001) (citing City of Los Angeles v.

Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986)). rv. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. . The district court held, in the alternative, that even if Miller's conduct violated the protection afforded Williams by the Fourth Amendment, Miller was entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate Williams’s “clearly established” constitutional rights. Because we find that the district court was correct in holding there was no constitutional violation, we need not reach this issue. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001).