Nikolas MALACARA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF MADISON, City of Madison Water Utility Division, Chuck Englehart, Gail Glasser and George Holden, Defendants-Appellees, 224 F.3d 727

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Nikolas Malacara, a Hispanic male, began working for the City of Madison in 1987 as a seasonal maintenance employee in the City’s Parks Division. In 1989, he was given a permanent position as a Maintenance Worker I in the Water Utility Supply

Section where he remains today. During this time, Malacara requested cross training in other jobs within the Water Utility. All cross-training requests are handled by the employee’s supervisor, in this case Earl Cheek. Malacara claims that all his requests were denied. Then in 1996, he applied, but was not hired, for a Maintenance Mechanic I position. Malacara filed suit claiming that he was racially discriminated against by not being allowed to cross-train and by not being hired for the Maintenance Mechanic I position, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and Title VII. The district court granted a motion for

summary judgment finding that no reasonable jury could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants discriminated against Malacara on the basis of race. Malacara appeals that decision. We review de novo the district court’s granting of

summary judgment. Miranda v. Wisconsin Power & Light Company, 91 F.3d 1011, 1014 (7th Cir.1996).

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). We must view the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. Miranda, at 1014.

Because Malacara did not present direct evidence that he was discriminated against by defendants’ failure to promote him or provide him training in maintenance, the district court used the burden shifting formula established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-805, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), to determine whether discrimination occurred.

In a failure to train claim the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he is a member of a protected group; (2) that the City of Madison Water Utility Division provided training to its employees; (3) that he was eligible for training; and (4) that he was not provided training under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that he was denied training given to other similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected group. Pafford v. Herman, 148 F.3d 658, 667 (7th Cir.1998).

In order to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination Malacara must show: (1) that he belongs to a racial minority; (2) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (4) the position was given to someone of a different race who had similar or lesser qualifications. Perdomo v. Browner, 67 F.3d 140, 144 (7th Cir.1995). Once the prima facie case is established, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Miranda, at 1015.

The burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at all times. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). If the defendant articulates a nondiscriminatory reason, it has satisfied its burden and the plaintiff must then establish that defendant’s reasons were pretex-tual. Id:, Perdomo, at 144. Applying this formula, the district court determined that no reasonable jury could find that race played a role in the defendant’s failure to train claim or the decision not to hire Malacara for the Maintenance Mechanic I position.

The district court determined that the defendants met their burden of production and did not address whether Malacara established a prima facie case. Where the defendant has met its burden, it is irrelevant whether a prima facie case has been made. Sample v. Aldi, 61 F.3d 544 (7th Cir.1995). Because we agree with the district court’s determination that the defendants met their burden of production under McDonnell Douglas, we will not address whether a prima facie case was in fact established. Defendants established several legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not cross-training or hiring Malacara.

Malacara argues that Tim Sullivan received opportunities to cross-train that he did not. Sullivan, a white male, was hired in 1994 as an hourly employee in the Supply Section. Specifically, Malacara asked for cross-training in the Maintenance Section. In 1994, Cheek lent Sullivan to the Maintenance department instead of Mala-cara, citing staffing shortages and his preference to move hourly employees. Cheek considered Sullivan’s transfer as a temporary employee loan, not a training transfer. He testified that it was his general practice to transfer hourly employees rather than permanent employees.

Cheek loaned Sullivan, an hourly employee, rather than Malacara because he had less regularized duties. Malacara, a permanent employee, had set job responsibilities which were harder to replace. Sullivan was lent to alleviate a staff shortage, not for the purposes of training. Malacara was told he could not be spared. This was not an uncommon reason to deny employees requests. He contends that the shortage was in Sullivan’s position and not in his. The fact remains however that the decision was within Cheek’s discretion of who to loan to the Maintenance Section. Other employees were denied cross-training as well.

Theresa Peters verbally requested cross-training and was told that “it was not a good time to do cross-training.” Frank Rane and Jack Henderson, both white employees, were denied their requests in writing. Further, defendants established that Malacara did in fact receive cross-training on at least two occasions, including meter-reading in the Supply

Section and training in the Distribution Section. There is no evidence that the plaintiff was treated differently than similarly situated employees in his request for cross-training nor is there any evidence that race was a factor in those decisions. The district court properly dismissed Ma-lacara’s cross-training claims. Malacara next argues that defendants failed to promote him to the position of Maintenance Mechanic I because of race. Chuck Englehart and Gail Glasser conducted the interviews of the certified candidates. They used the same questions and topic material for each candidate.

Each interview began with a description of the duties of the position. Again, we will only discuss whether the defendants established legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not promoting Malacara. First, the defendants’ decision was based on which candidate they believed to have the most relevant experience for the duties of Maintenance Mechanic I position, not on race. The Maintenance Mechanic I position required more advanced skills than Malacara possessed. Malacara’s experience involved janitorial and lawn care work.

Much of the experience Malacara indicated on his application included informal jobs for his family or friends and described them as being “sporadic.” He failed to provide in his application the information necessary for the defendants to verify these experiences. The defendants determined that while he had some related experience, he lacked the direct experience that Sullivan possessed. Sullivan provided the information necessary to verify his work history. He had held numerous positions relating to maintenance.

He worked in the service and parts departments for several golf cart manufacturers with duties which included tune-ups and major overhauls of golf carts and utility vehicles. While working for the Water Utility, Sullivan maintained fans and pumps, heating and ventilating equipment, repaired chlorinators and fluorida-tors, valves and other equipment in the pump houses, and removed, installed, and repaired well pumps and booster pumps. These are all tasks that were part of the primary duties listed for a Maintenance Mechanic I and which could be verified.

Englehart and Glasser found that Sullivan provided a more accurate, complete understanding of the responsibilities and expectations of a Maintenance Mechanic I than Malacara did during his interview. Sullivan exhibited a better understanding that the responsibilities included repair and maintenance of in-unit wells and buildings. Without personal knowledge of Sullivan’s responses, Malacara can not dispute the defendants’ opinion that Sullivan had a more accurate understanding than him.

Finally, defendants argue that their pri- or experience with each of the candidates and the work histories within the Water Utility played an important role in their decision. Malacara had several instances of unsafe conduct that violated the Water Utility Safety policies. Malacara had been seen by Cheek riding on top of a lawn tractor’s backrest. He was told to sit down and that it was unsafe. Glasser and Englehart witnessed Malacara make a right hand turn directly in front of a Madison Metro bus in a Water Utility vehicle.

Englehart also witnessed him recklessly back into a well unit door with a Water Utility vehicle. Englehart further believed him to be sloppy from his observations when they were co-workers. These instances reflected poorly on Malacara’s application for the Maintenance Mechanic I position. The other candidates, Sullivan, Peters and Henderson, had good work histories.

The defendants determined that Sullivan was the more qualified candidate for the position and went on to say that had Sullivan not taken the job, the position would have been offered to Peters and then Henderson, and if they had declined, they would have interviewed a new pool of applicants. Defendants established legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not hiring Malacara. An employer may hire or refuse to hire an employee “for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for discriminatory reason.” Bruno v.

City of Crown Point, Ind., 950 F.2d 355, 364 (7th Cir.1991) (quoting Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir.1984)). There is no evidence that a reasonable jury could find that the defendants failed to hire Malacara based on race. The district court correctly found that Malacara failed to satisfy his burden on

summary judgment and properly granted judgment for the defendant on both his failure to cross-train and failure to hire claims. Affirmed.