John DOE, 3, a minor by Doe 3's next best friend DOE 2, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ELMBROOK SCHOOL DISTRICT, Elmbrook Joint Common School District No. 21, Defendant-Appellee, 687 F.3d 840

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. A group of past and present students and their parents (collectively, the “Does”) brought this action against the School District of Elmbrook (the “District”), claiming that the District’s practice of holding high school graduations and related ceremonies at a non-denominational, evangelical Christian church was violative of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution of the United States. For redress, the Does sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. After denying the Does’ motions for a preliminary injunction and for

summary judgment, the lower court granted the District’s motion for

summary judgment, finding that the District did not act unconstitutionally when it held secular high school ceremonies at Elmbrook Church (the “Church”). The Does appealed. Prior to being presented to our en banc Court, the Does’ appeal was heard by a three-judge panel, which produced a majority opinion with three holdings, of which two were unanimous. Does v. Elmbrook Sell. Dist., 658 F.3d 710 (7th Cir.2011) (vacated Nov. 17, 2011). The panel first concluded that the Does’ case is justiciable, despite the District’s cessation of holding high school ceremonies at the Church.

Next, the panel determined that the district court did not err in allowing the Does to proceed anonymously. Finally, a majority decided that the District’s use of the Church did not violate the Establishment Clause. We adopt the panel’s original analysis on the issues of justiciability and anonymity and confine our discussion to whether the District’s actions were constitutional under the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. Our conclusion is that the public school graduation ceremonies at issue, which took place in the sanctuary of a non-denominational Christian church, violated the Constitution.

Before advancing the reasoning behind our decision, it is important to note the limited scope of this opinion. The ruling should not be construed as a broad statement about the propriety of governmental use of church-owned facilities. Rather, the holding is a narrowly focused one, as it must be under our Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. See McCreary Cnty. Kentucky v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 867, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 162 L.Ed.2d 729 (2005) (“[U]nder the Establishment Clause detail is key.”); Lee v.

Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992) (“Our Establishment Clause jurisprudence remains a delicate and fact-sensitive one....”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Every government practice must be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion.”). See also Cohen v.

City of Des Plaines, 8 F.3d 484, 489 (7th Cir.1993) (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678, 104 S.Ct. 1355) (“[0]ur inquiry ... under the [Establishment Clause] necessarily ‘calls for line-drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be framed.’ ”); Cooper v. U.S. Postal Service, 577 F.3d 479, 494 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The fact that a [Contract postal unit] is located in a religious facility ... does not offend the Establishment Clause. Any violation must arise from the specific conditions of [the defendant’s] structure and space, and its religious displays.”).

Nor should this opinion be read as critical of the cases permitting governmental use, in the proper context, of certain church-owned facilities. See, e.g., Otero v. State Election Bd. of Oklahoma, 975 F.2d 738 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that the Establishment Clause does not bar the use of churches as polling places in state and municipal elections); Porta v.

Klagholz, 19 F.Supp.2d 290, 302-04 (D.N.J.1998) (finding that a charter school’s use of space on church premises did not violate the Establishment Clause because, inter alia, “[t]here [was] no evidence of any religious iconography in the classroom area or in areas used by [the charter school].”). But see Spacco v.

Bridgewater School Department, 722 F.Supp. 834 (D.Mass.1989) (enjoining a school district from assigning two students to classes held in facilities owned by a church, based in part on the need for students to “pass beneath a large cross” to enter the facility and the existence of religious flyers that were confronted upon entry). We do not question the vitality of those decisions; rather, we underscore how this case differs. The difference is one of degree, not kind.

When confronted with an Establishment Clause challenge of this nature, the Supreme Court requires us to examine the context in which government interacts with a religious organization. Here, the involvement of minors, the significance of the graduation ceremony, and the conditions of extensive proselytization prove too much for the District’s actions to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause. We do not speculate whether and when the sanctuary of a church, or synagogue, or mosque could hold public school ceremonies in a constitutionally appropriate manner.

Nor do we seek to determine whether and when this sanctuary, or one akin to it, could be properly used as the setting for a graduation under other circumstances. For example, if a church sanctuary were the only meeting place left in- a small community ravaged by a natural disaster, we would confront a very different case. It is not our charge to consider the myriad alterations to the factual scenario before us in an attempt to determine what circumstances could have rendered the District’s practice constitutional.

Rather, our duty is to consider the set of facts before us, and on those facts, we conclude that an unacceptable amount of religious endorsement and coercion occurred when the District held important civil ceremonies in the proselytizing environment of Elmbrook Church. I. Background A. Facts 1. The District The District is a municipal public school district centered around Brookfield, Wisconsin, a suburb to the west of Milwaukee. Its two major high schools are Brookfield Central and Brookfield East.

For part of the last decade or so, Central and East have held their high school graduation ceremonies in the main sanctuary of Elm-brook Church, a local Christian evangelical and non-denominational religious institution. Central began the practice in 2000, and East followed in 2002; both schools rented the Church for graduation every year thereafter through 2009. For at least some years since 2003, Central also rented the Church’s chapel, a smaller room, for its senior honors night. East rented the Sharon Lynne Wilson Center for the Arts, a secular facility, for its honors night.

The impetus to move Central’s graduation to the Church appears to have come from the student officers of the senior class of 2000, who believed that the school’s gymnasium — the previous venue— was too hot, cramped and uncomfortable. Those attending were packed in; they had to sit on hard wooden bleachers or folding chairs; and there was no air conditioning. Seeking a better alternative, the student officers decided upon the Church, which was much larger than the gymnasium and had more comfortable seats, air conditioning and ample free parking.

They presented their idea to District Superintendent Matt Gibson and then to the senior class, which voted in favor of the proposal. After the vote, Principal Jim Brisco made the ultimate decision to choose the Church, and Superintendent Gibson approved. A similar process began at East two years later, and Principal Joe Schroeder “eventually adopted the proposal, after a majority of seniors voted for it.” Until 2005, each year the students in the senior class participated in advisory votes to choose between two or three venues. These preliminary selections were made by school officials and senior class officers.

The Church was always one of them, and the Church invariably emerged as the overwhelming favorite. In 2006, the principals of East and Central determined that holding a vote for the 2007 graduation venue would be pointless and simply selected the Church after it was recommended to them by the senior class officers of the two schools. Superintendent Gibson and Tom Gehl, a member of the school board since 2005 and president of the school board since 2009, are both members of the Church.

The Does have not alleged that Superintendent Gibson or Board President Gehl have engaged in any efforts to steer graduation ceremonies to the Church, nor do they allege that either of these officials has misused his office to benefit the Church or to form a relationship between the District and the Church. While there is no evidence that either Superintendent Gibson or Board President Gehl influenced or attempted to influence the student vote that resulted in the selection of the Church, Superintendent Gibson ultimately had to approve of the decisions made at the school level. With the exception of Mr.

Gibson, who has been Superintendent of the District since 1995, the major players on the District’s side have changed. Don LaBonte took over as principal of Central in 2005 after two intervening successors to Mr. Brisco. In the same year, Brett Bowers became principal of East when Mr. Schroeder left. The Church charged a standard rental rate to the District, which ran between $2,000 and $2,200 for each graduation exercise, and between $500 and $700 for honors night.

Money raised by the senior class of each school covered part of the rental fees, and the District funded the rest through its general revenues, which come from property taxes. 2. Elmbrook Church The atmosphere of the Church, both inside and outside the sanctuary, is indisputably and emphatically Christian. Crosses and other religious symbols abound on the Church grounds and the exterior of the Church building, and visitors encounter these symbols as they drive to the parking lot and walk into the building.

Many of these symbols — including a cross on the Church roof and a sign with a cross and the words “ELMBROOK CHURCH” — are visible from the public intersection outside the Church. The street names given to the drives' approaching the Church are “Agape” and “Barnabas.” To reach the sanctuary, visitors must pass through the Church lobby, which also has served as a natural congregation point for graduates and their guests after past graduation ceremonies.

The lobby contains tables and stations filled with evangelical literature, much of which addresses children and teens, and religious banners, symbols and posters decorate the walls. In the middle of the lobby is a large, circular desk displaying pamphlets such as “{young adults},” “{couples ministry},” “{middle school ministry},” “{high school ministry}” and “{college ministry}.” The District admits that Church members manned information booths that contained religious literature during the 2009 graduation, and a DVD recording of the 2002 ceremony shows people staffing these tables.

The District also admits that during the 2002 ceremony, “Church members passed out religious literature in the lobby” although neither the District nor the Does divulge further details about how the distribution took place or at whose behest. According to Doe 1, when he attended his older sibling’s graduation, “[mjembers of the church, instead of school officials, handed out graduation materials during the ceremony.” The graduation ceremonies take place on the dais at the front of the sanctuary, where school officials and students with roles in the ceremony are seated.

A large Latin cross, fixed to the wall, hangs over the dais and dominates the proceedings. The first time Central held its graduation in the sanctuary, the cross was covered, apparently by accident. During subsequent graduations, the Church refused Superintendent Gibson’s requests to veil the cross, in keeping with a general Church policy against covering its permanent religious displays. The Church did agree, however, to remove any non-permanent religious symbols from the dais. The chapel used by Central for its senior honors night also contains a cross.

During the ceremonies, “graduating seniors ... sit down in the front, center rows of pews of the [sanctuary’s] main level.” Guests sit in the other pews. The parties agree that “Bibles and hymnal books remain in all the pews,” as do a “yellow ‘Scribble Card for God’s Little Lambs,’ a pencil, a donation envelope entitled, ‘Home Harvest Horizon: offering to the work of Christ,’ ” and other religious literature. There is no evidence that any of these materials were placed in the pews specifically for the graduation ceremonies. 3.

The Controversy Complaints about the District’s use of the Church arose soon after the practice began. In 2001, a parent asked the District to stop holding graduation ceremonies at the Church because the parent, a non-Christian, did not want her child exposed to the Church’s alleged teachings about those who do not share its faith. In that same year, the Freedom from Religion Foundation and the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) of Wisconsin voiced objections to the graduation site and asserted that it violated the Constitution.

The Anti-Defamation League also objected in 2002, followed by Americans United for Separation of Church and State (“Americans United”) in 2007. A series of exchanges in 2007 between Superintendent Gibson and Aram Schvey, litigation counsel for Americans United, explored the constitutionality of the practice.

Although he defended the venue, Superintendent Gibson assured Schvey that “there are no references to religion or to the church in the graduation program,” that no religious literature would be distributed and that Superintendent Gibson previously has “request[ed] removal of any non-permanent religious banners that may be on stage” and would continue to do so. Schvey appreciated these steps, but he requested that the District cover the cross and “all other religious iconography[,] including permanent banners,” or select a secular venue.

Superintendent Gibson responded that the Church “made a policy decision several years ago that [the cross] not be veiled for rentals.” In many of the letters and correspondence, Superintendent Gibson noted that the District was building a new field house that could accommodate graduation ceremonies and had been engaging in efforts to obtain funding to renovate Central’s and East’s gymnasiums. Although earlier efforts to obtain funding had failed, the public later voted in favor of funding that allowed the District to begin construction and renovation.

In 2010, Central and East moved their graduation ceremonies to the District’s newly completed field house. Additionally, in July 2009, Principal LaBonte declared his intention to move Central’s 2010 honors night to its newly renovated gymnasium; in supplemental briefing before us, the District represented that the promised move had occurred. The District nonetheless refused to state that it would never again hold a graduation in Elmbrook Church. 4. The Does The plaintiffs are current and former students of District schools and their parents. Doe 1 graduated from either Central or East in 2009.

Doe 2 is Doe l’s parent and has an older child whose graduation ceremony was held in the Church four years earlier, as well as younger children who attend Elmbrook schools. One of Doe 2’s younger children is Doe 3, who “will graduate from a District high school no later than 2014.” Does 1 through 3 all attended the graduation ceremonies of Doe 1 and of Doe 2’s older child.

Does 4 and 9 are the parents of children currently attending schools in the district; their eldest children are expected to graduate from high school in 2016 and 2015, respectively. “Does 5 and 6 are the parents of Does 7 and 8, who graduated from a District high school in ceremonies held at Elmbrook Church in 2002 and 2005, respectively.” Does 2, 4, 5 and 6 also pay property taxes that go to the District. What the Does all have in common is that they are not Christians.

Those of the Does who attended past graduation ceremonies “felt uncomfortable, upset, offended, unwelcome, and/or angry” because of the religious setting. In fact, the setting completely ruined for Doe 5 the experience of his children’s graduation ceremonies, some of which he did not attend. Those plaintiffs still in school or with children still in school do not relish the prospect of attending future ceremonies at the Church. According to the Does, there are many other available venues that the District could use for its graduation ceremonies.

Moreover, the Wilson Center could host Central’s senior honors night and indeed does host East’s. The District already pays the Wilson Center a flat fee each year that allows District schools ample access. The District responds that, although other venues are available for graduation, none is as attractive as the Church, particularly for the price: approximately $2,000 per school per ceremony. However, the Does believe that some of the other venues are roughly equivalent in quality and price. B.

Proceedings Before the District Court On April 22, 2009, the Does filed this action against the District and moved simultaneously for a preliminary injunction that would bar the District from holding its 2009 graduation ceremonies at the Church.

After the district court denied that motion, the Does filed an amended complaint asking the district court to enjoin permanently the District from holding school events at the Church or, in the alternative, to enjoin permanently the District from using the Church “unless all visible religious symbols [were] covered or removed.” They also sought damages and a declaratory judgment. No discovery was taken, and the parties filed cross-motions for

summary judgment. The district court denied the Does’ motion for

summary judgment, granted the District’s and dismissed the case. After determining that the plaintiffs had standing, the district court proceeded to its Establishment Clause analysis. First, the district court held that the District was not engaging in religious coercion of the sort that the Supreme Court held to violate the Establishment Clause in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992), and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000).

The district court distinguished those cases on the ground that they “speak to coerced religious participation as opposed to exposure to religious symbols.” The district court reasoned that, because there was no religious exercise at the Elm-brook graduation ceremonies, there was no coerced religious participation.

Relying on Lee, it held explicitly that the plaintiffs’ “unease and offense at having to attend graduation ceremonies at the Church and face religious symbols, while in no way minor, is not enough.” Second, the district court concluded that the District’s use of the Church does not have the primary effect of endorsing religion in violation of the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Lemon v.

Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). “On its face,” the district court conceded, “the District’s decision to hold graduation ceremonies and the senior honors event holds symbolic force.” But because “the history and context of the community and the forum reflect that secular concerns directed the move away from school facilities toward an adequate, convenient, cost-effective graduation venue,” a reasonable observer would not understand the events to be an -endorsement of the Church or its teachings, (internal quotation marks omitted).

Finally, the district court disagreed with the Does that the use of the Church excessively entangled the District with religion. The court found the rental of the Church to be a standard fee-for-use arrangement and a non-enduring relationship. It also determined that the limited interaction between the District and the Church over the physical setting did not delegate impermissibly to the Church authority over the graduation events. Accordingly, the district court granted

summary judgment in favor of the District and dismissed the case. II. Discussion We review a district court’s decision to grant

summary judgment de novo, making all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Groesch v. City of Springfield, 635 F.3d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2011). “The court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A. Legal Framework The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, made applicable to the actions of state and municipal governments by the Fourteenth Amendment, Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 8, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947), provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. Const, amend. I, cl. 1.

The three-pronged test set forth by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), “remains the prevailing analytical tool for the analysis of Establishment Clause claims.” Books v. City of Elkhart (Books I), 235 F.3d 292, 301 (7th Cir.2000); see also Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Koch, 623 F.3d 501, 507 (7th Cir.2010) (applying the Lemon test), petition for cert. denied, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 92, 181 L.Ed.2d 22 (2011); Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n v. Clarke, 588 F.3d 523, 527 (7th Cir.2009) (same).

Under the Lemon test, a governmental practice violates the Establishment Clause if it (1) lacks a legitimate secular purpose; (2) has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion; or (3) fosters an excessive entanglement with religion. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105. The Supreme Court has also advanced two other approaches by which an Establishment Clause violation can be detected. In Lynch v.

Donnelly, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence asserted that under Lemon’s “primary effect” prong, “[w]hat is crucial is that a government practice not have the effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion.” 465 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In accord with further Supreme Court precedent approving of the endorsement approach, see, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v.

ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592-93, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (“[W]e have paid particularly close attention to whether the challenged governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ religion, a concern that has long had a place in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”), we have viewed the endorsement test as a legitimate part of Lemon’s second prong, and observed that under this test, we must “assess! ] the totality of the circumstances surrounding the display to determine whether a reasonable person would believe that the display amounts to an endorsement of religion.” Books I, 235 F.3d at 304.

The second additional Establishment Clause approach — the coercion test found in Lee and Santa Fe — seeks to determine whether the state has applied coercive pressure on an individual to support or participate in religion. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312, 120 S.Ct. 2266; Lee, 505 U.S. at 587, 112 S.Ct. 2649. Where the coercion test belongs in relation to the Lemon test is less clear. Compare Doe ex rel. Doe v.

Beaumont Independent School Dist., 173 F.3d 274, 285-86 (5th Cir.1999) (viewing the Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the coercion test as separate methods by which an Establishment Clause violation can be found); with Lee, 505 U.S. at 604, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that while “government coercion is not necessary to prove an Establishment Clause violation,” religious coercion “is an obvious indication that the government is endorsing or promoting religion.”).

Apart from how one views the coercion test in relation to the Lemon test, however, it is evident that if the state “coeree[s] anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise,” an Establishment Clause violation has occurred. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587, 112 S.Ct. 2649. Of course, the touchstone for Establishment Clause challenges remains “the principle that the First Amendment mandates government neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.” McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 860, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (quotation marks omitted).

The determination is case-specific: whether a particular practice violates the Establishment Clause is “in large part a legal question to be answered on the basis of judicial

interpretation of social facts” which “must be judged in their unique circumstances.” Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000). B. Application We conclude that conducting a public school graduation ceremony in a church — one that among other things featured staffed information booths laden with religious literature and banners with appeals for children to join “school ministries” — runs afoul of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause as applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

That conclusion is consistent with well-established doctrine prohibiting school administrators from bringing church to the schoolhouse. E.g., People of State of Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, Champaign Cnty., 333 U.S. 203, 211-12, 68 S.Ct. 461, 92 L.Ed. 649 (1948) (religious instruction in public schools held unconstitutional). The same result should obtain when administrators bring seminal schoolhouse events to a church — at least to one with the proselytizing elements present in this case.

The constitutional flaw with such activity is that it necessarily conveys a message of endorsement. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s “coercion cases,” Lee and Santa Fe, cannot be meaningfully distinguished — both because endorsement, especially as it relates to children, has the potential to be coercive, and because there was actual coerced activity in this case. 1.

Religious Endorsement Establishment Clause jurisprudence has long guarded against government conduct that has the effect of promoting religious teachings in school settings, and the case law has evinced special concern with the receptivity of schoolchildren to endorsed religious messages. In Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 101 S.Ct. 192, 66 L.Ed.2d 199 (1980) (per curiam), for instance, the Supreme Court barred enforcement of a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments on the wall of each public school classroom within the state.

The Court’s brief discussion concluded that the statute was in violation of Lemon’s first prong, whether the legislation had a secular purpose. Id. at 41, 101 S.Ct. 192 (concluding that the purpose for posting the commandments was “plainly religious in nature”). In reaching that conclusion, the Court entered into a discussion of Lemon’s second prong, whether the primary effect of government conduct advances or inhibits religion.

The Court reasoned that “[i]f the posted copies of the Ten Commandments are to have any effect at all, it will be to induce the school children to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the commandments.” Id. at 42, 101 S.Ct. 192. We perceive essentially the same problem in the circumstances of this case. Displaying religious iconography and distributing religious literature in a classroom setting raises constitutional objections because the practice may do more than provide public school students with knowledge of Christian tenets, an obviously permissible aim of a broader curriculum.

E.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 608, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 96 L.Ed.2d 510 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring). The concern is that religious displays in the classroom tend to promote religious beliefs, and students might feel pressure to adopt them. Such concern was front and center in Stone and apparent to one degree or another in the Supreme Court’s school prayer cases. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985) (Alabama law authorizing a moment of silence for meditation or voluntary prayer held unconstitutional); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pennsylvania v.

Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963) (opening exercises featuring Bible recitation and reading of Lord’s prayer held unconstitutional); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962) (prescribed daily prayer held unconstitutional). The same problem attends pervasive displays of iconography and proselytizing material at a public secondary school graduation. In this case, high school students and their younger siblings were exposed to graduation ceremonies that put a spiritual capstone on an otherwise-secular education.

Literally and figuratively towering over the graduation proceedings in the church’s sanctuary space was a 15- to 20-foot tall Latin cross, the preeminent symbol of Christianity. That symbol “carries deeply significant meaning for those who adhere to the Christian faith.” Salazar v. Buono — U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 1803, 1836 n. 8, 176 L.Ed.2d 634 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Moreover, it is a symbol that invites veneration by adherents. E.g., 2 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, q. 25, art. 3 at 2157 (Benzinger Bros., 1947). The cross, like many symbols, is “pregnant with expressive content.” See Texas v.

Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989). It acts as a “short cut from mind to mind,” West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943), for adherents who draw strength from it and for those who do not ascribe to Christian beliefs. Although the setting in which a symbol is displayed can shape its message, cf.

Buono, 130 S.Ct. at 1811 (plurality opinion) (stating that the purpose and intent of a Latin cross placed on an outcropping in the desert was “to honor American soldiers who fell in World War I”), there is no doubt that a sectarian message is conveyed by a cross prominently displayed in a house of worship. See also McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 868, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (stressing the importance of the context in which a “contested object appears”) (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 595, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (opinion of Blackmun, J.)); Van Orden v.

Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701, 125 S.Ct. 2854, 162 L.Ed.2d 607 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing contexts in which Ten Commandments displays might appear). What is more, Elmbrook Church’s sizeable cross was not the only vehicle for conveying religious messages to graduation attendees. Upon passing through the exterior doors of the church, attendees proceeded into a lobby that contained numerous religious materials. Those materials included pamphlets for “middle school” and “high school” ministries.

The middle school ministry pamphlet stated, ‘We are calling students to live and love like Jesus.” As previously noted, a poster on the wall asked, “Hey Jr. Highers! Who Are Your Heroes?” and depicts pop culture icons alongside Jesus Christ. Anticipating the desired answer to the poster’s question, there were several stations indicating that children and students could obtain religious literature tailored to them.

Among the banners that had been draped from the lobby’s ceiling during graduation ceremonies was one that read “Children’s Ministry: Leading Children to a Transforming Life in Christ.” Moreover, all 360 degrees of the lobby’s substantial, circular information booth were stocked with religious pamphlets. It was staffed during at least some of the school district’s graduation ceremonies, and the literature was readily accessible even without the staff presence.

Returning to the sanctuary itself, which is where the ceremonies took place, the pews were supplied with Bibles, hymnals, and additional informational literature. Children in attendance could find “scribble cards” in the pews on which “God’s Little Lambs” could draw. Anyone could partake of the cards soliciting membership in the Church. During at least one graduation ceremony, church members passed out religious literature directly to audience members.

Put simply, the environment was pervasively Christian, obviously aimed at nurturing Christian beliefs and gaining new adherents among those who set foot inside the church. Regardless of the purpose of school administrators in choosing the location, the sheer religiosity of the space created a likelihood that high school students and their younger siblings would perceive a link between church and state. That is, the activity conveyed a message of endorsement. High school graduations enjoy an iconic place in American life. Lee, 505 U.S. at 583, 112 S.Ct. 2649.

Given their centrality, the presence of religious iconography and literature is likely to prove particularly powerful, indicating to everyone that the religious message is favored and to nonadherents that they are outsiders. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 n. 1, 109 S.Ct. 890, 103 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting Wallace, 472 U.S. at 38, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). Here, the church was not just adorned with its own symbols, it was draped in the high schools’ decorations.

Banners for the high schools were displayed in the lobby and in the sanctuary, mixed in with the church’s religious decor and literature. In the sanctuary, the high schools’ names were projected onto a large screen adjacent to the Latin cross. Combined with presence of the Church’s pamphlets for its “school” ministries, the setting implied to nonadherents in attendance that the school district placed its imprimatur on Elmbrook Church’s message.

See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 307-08, 120 S.Ct. 2266 (remarking on the intermixing of the invocation with the accoutrements and hallmarks of high school life and concluding that “the listening audience must perceive the pregame message as a public expression of the views of the majority of the student body delivered with the approval of the school administration”). True, the District did not itself adorn the Church with proselytizing materials, and a reasonable observer would be aware of this fact.

But that same observer could reasonably conclude that the District would only choose such a proselytizing environment aimed at spreading religious faith — despite the presence of children, the importance of the graduation ceremony, and, most importantly, the existence of other suitable graduation sites — if the District approved of the Church’s message. The effect of endorsement created by the school district’s practice is not diminished by the explanation that the space was rented and school officials could exercise less control over the church than they could over a schoolhouse.

This view provides only superficial appeal. The point appears most cogent with respect to the Church’s cross, although the Church possessed means of covering the symbol. The point appears less cogent with respect to other aspects of the Church which might have been easily modified to render the space more inviting to others. This mode of distinguishing, however, would have us look at the issue of control through an exceedingly narrow prism.

The critical facts are that school administrators effectively required attendance, because graduations are not truly optional, see Lee, 505 U.S. at 595, 112 S.Ct. 2649, and school administrators selected the venue over several other suitable options. See Abington Twp., 374 U.S. at 222, 83 S.Ct. 1560 (the neutrality required by the Establishment Clause aims at preventing church and state from acting in concert such that government support is “placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies”); cf. also Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch.

Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (no Establishment Clause concern for church group to use school space for an event where the district created a public forum and the event would have taken place outside of school hours and without school sponsorship). Nor is the effect diminished by the administrators’ mechanism for choosing the graduation site. The record indicates that, following the results of student elections, the principals of the high schools made the ultimate decisions on where to hold graduation.

A “student election does nothing to protect minority views but rather places the students who hold such views at the mercy of the majority.” Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 304, 120 S.Ct. 2266; see also McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 884, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[W]e do not count heads before enforcing the First Amendment.”). 2. Religious Coercion In addition to impermissibly endorsing religion, the District’s decision to use Elm-brook Church for graduations was religiously coercive under Lee and Santa Fe.

In Lee, the Supreme Court invalidated a school district’s practice of including benedictions at high school graduations, and highlighted two dominant facts. 505 U.S. at 585-86, 112 S.Ct. 2649. First, state officials were directing the performance of a formal religious exercise at a graduation ceremony. Id. Second, graduation ceremonies were effectively obligatory even if attendance was technically voluntary. Id.

After examining the totality of the circumstances, Lee, 505 U.S. at 597, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (emphasizing the fact-sensitive nature of the inquiry), the Court concluded that the conformity required by the graduation ceremony “was too high an exaction to withstand the test of the Establishment Clause.” Id. at 598, 112 S.Ct. 2649. The same basic concern was evident in the Court’s discussions in Santa Fe, where the Supreme Court rejected student-led prayer at football games. 580 U.S. at 301, 120 S.Ct. 2266.

The Court noted that while football games may not be as “extraordinary” in terms of life impact as graduation ceremonies, “the choice between attending these games and avoiding personally offensive religious rituals is in no practical sense an easy one” for some students, and thus the principles in Lee governed. Id. at 311-12, 120 S.Ct. 2266. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Lee and Santa Fe cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the case at bar on the ground that the school district did not coerce overt religious activity.

Lee, 505 U.S. at 605 n. 6, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (observing that as a practical matter “any time the government endorses a religious belief there will almost always be some pressure to conform”). Although Lee and Santa Fe focus on the problem of coerced religious activity, it is a mistake to view the coercion at issue in those cases as divorced from the problem of government endorsement of religion in the classroom generally.

In fact, they are two sides of the same coin: “When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.” Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60 n. 51, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (alteration omitted) (quoting Engel, 370 U.S. at 430, 82 S.Ct. 1261). And governmental efforts at shaping religious views may prove effective over time. Lee, 505 U.S. at 592, 112 S.Ct. 2649; cf. also A Letter to Richard Burke, Esq., on Protestant Ascendency in Ireland, in vol.

VI Works of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke 395 (rev. ed. 1866) (“Man and his conscience cannot always be at war.”). The fact that graduation attendees need not do anything but participate in the graduation ceremony and take advantage of religious offerings if they so choose does not rescue the practice. Further, there is an aspect of coercion here. It is axiomatic that “[n]either a state nor the Federal Government ... can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will.” Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947).

The first principle is violated when the government directs students to attend a pervasively Christian, proselytizing environment.

Cf Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing in the context of creche displays that “[pjassersby who disagree with [their] message[s] ... are free to ignore them, or even to turn their backs, just as they are free to do when they disagree with any other form of government speech”); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 72, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that under an appropriately crafted moment of silence law a student “who objects to prayer ... is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts of others”).

Once the school district creates a captive audience, the coercive potential of endorsement can operate. When a student who holds minority (or no) religious beliefs observes classmates at a graduation event taking advantage of Elmbrook Church’s offerings or meditating on its symbols (or posing for pictures in front of them) or speaking with its staff members, “[t]he law of imitation operates,” Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60 n. 51, 105 S.Ct. 2479, and may create subtle pressure to honor the day in a similar manner.

See also id. at 81, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (where children are concerned, government endorsement “is much more likely to result in coerced religious beliefs”). The only way for graduation attendees to avoid the dynamic is to leave the ceremony. That is a choice, Lee v. Weisman teaches, the Establishment Clause does not force students to make. See also McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 881-82, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Free people are entitled to free and diverse thoughts, which government ought neither to constrain nor to direct.”). III.

Conclusion In sum, if constitutional doctrine teaches that a school cannot create a pervasively religious environment in the classroom, Wallace, 472 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 2479; Stone, 449 U.S. 39, 101 S.Ct. 192; Abington Twp., 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560; Engel, 370 U.S. 421, 82 S.Ct. 1261, or at events it hosts, Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290, 120 S.Ct. 2266; Lee, 505 U.S. 577, 112 S.Ct. 2649, it appears overly formalistic to allow a school to engage in identical practices when it acts through a short-term lessee. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 595, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (“Law reaches past formalism.”).

The same risk that children in particular will perceive the state as endorsing a set of religious beliefs is present both when exposure to a pervasively religious environment occurs in the classroom and when government summons students to an off-site location for important ceremonial events. The determination that the District operated outside permissible constitutional bounds should in no way be viewed as expressing hostility toward Elmbrook Church or its members.

The First Amendment, via its Free Exercise Clause, guarantees that government will not impinge on the freedom of individuals to celebrate their faiths, in the day-to-day, or in life’s grand moments. Without question, that is a desirable goal. Whether the event is a meal, a graduation, or a funeral, a signpost or a diversion, sincerely held religious beliefs can remind one to give thanks, spur reflection, or provide emotional rescue in dark days. Religion can lead one to perform works that benefit the community or meditate on what it means to live the good life.

Secular belief systems, of course, can serve those ends, too, e.g., Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics (J.E.C. Welldon trans., 1923); Seneca, On the Shortness of Life, in I Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales 322 (Richard M.

Gum-mere trans., 1918), and the Establishment Clause reinforces the promise of the free exercise clause by prohibiting government from influencing how a person relates to the universe. “A state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed.” Lee, 505 U.S. at 592, 112 S.Ct. 2649; see also McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 883, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

We conclude that the practice of holding high school graduation ceremonies in the Elmbrook Church sanctuary conveys an impermissible message of endorsement. Under the circumstances here, the message of endorsement carried an impermissible aspect of coercion, and the practice has had the unfortunate side effect of fostering the very divisiveness that the Establishment Clause was designed to prevent. Accordingly, we Reverse the district court’s grant of

summary judgment for the District, Reverse the district court’s denial of

summary judgment in favor of the Does, and Remand to the district court for proceedings consistent therewith. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. I join fully Judge Flaum’s opinion for the en banc court. His opinion provides a straightforward application of Establishment Clause doctrine to a relatively new context, when a public school chooses to hold one of its defining ceremonies in the sacred worship space of a particular faith. Judge Flaum’s opinion explains thoroughly and persuasively why this case cannot be meaningfully distinguished from Lee v.

Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992), and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000). I write separately only to respond to some concerns raised by the dissenting opinions — not their disagreements with Supreme Court precedents, but three specific criticisms of the court’s opinion that deserve respectful attention and response.

First, Judge Ripple’s and Judge Posner’s dissents suggest that this decision will invite a new jurisprudence of iconography, one that will focus on the details of religious symbols on display and that may even allow public school graduation ceremonies in worship spaces used by some faiths and not others. Judge Ripple suggests that this decision will itself endorse “safe religions,” and Judge Posner wonders how this precedent should apply to churches that have few religious symbols or images in their sanctuaries. I do not share these fears.

Judge Flaum’s description of the details of the large cross over the altar and the other religious symbols and activities in the Elmbrook Church illustrates the sacred character of this particular worship space and the experience of non-believers when they attend public school graduation ceremonies there. The logic of the court’s opinion points toward a conclusion that those specific details are not decisive.

The critical point is that this important rite of passage in the life of a public school and its students is held in the sacred worship space of any faith, absent unusual and extenuating circumstances such as a temporary emergency. We all recognize that a divisive parsing of differences between faiths would be anathema to First Amendment law and religious liberty. Nevertheless, Judge Flaum is prudent to decide only the facts actually before us and to leave room to consider unexpected facts and new arguments in later cases.

Second, the dissenting opinions accuse the plaintiffs and those who agree with them of hypersensitivity or applying a standard of an “obtuse” observer rather than a reasonable one. In Establishment Clause litigation, this is often the response to plaintiffs of minority religious traditions. The point calls for a deeper response in terms of how courts evaluate claims that a government practice endorses a particular faith. When federal courts deal with entanglements between government function and private religious faith, we confront some of the most sensitive aspects of our Nation’s public life.

We try to hold the delicate balance between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. We try to ensure that we recognize and protect faith and its importance in our individual, community, and national lives, on the one hand, while avoiding government support, endorsement, and subtle coercion in favor of particular faiths, on the other. To maintain these balances, the endorsement test asks whether a reasonable observer, apprised of the circumstances and history of the disputed governmental practice, would conclude that it conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval of religious faith.

E.g., Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n v. Clarke, 588 F.3d 523, 528 (7th Cir.2009). The danger, of course, is that this “reasonable, objective observer,” as in most fields of law, tends to sound a lot like the judge authoring the opinion. See Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. American Atheists, Inc., — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 12, 19-21, 181 L.Ed.2d 379 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (describing disagreements among circuit judges’ views of the reasonable observer).

Judge Posner raises this concern, noting that judges in Establishment Clause cases inevitably will “fall back on their priors, that is, on beliefs based on personality, upbringing,” attitudes toward religion, and even political orientation. Post at 872-73. The solution is not to require those troubled by government endorsement of religion to stop complaining and adopt an austere, Senecan stoicism. Rather, as judges, we must do our level best to overcome our individual perspectives. We can do so by deliberately trying to see the situation from others’ points of view.

When deciding a question of endorsement, it is critical that the inquiry include the perspective of those who do not share the faith at issue. The key question is whether a given practice “sends the ... message to ... nonadherents ‘that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community.’ ” Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 309-10, 120 S.Ct. 2266 (opinion for the Court), quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v.

Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is especially important to take account of the perspective of a reasonable observer who may not share the particular religious belief [the State] expresses.”); Lee v.

Weisman, 505 U.S. at 606 n. 9, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Direct government action endorsing religion or a particular religious practice is invalid under this approach because it sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.”), quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Lawrence H.

Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-15, at 1293 (2d ed. 1988) (“in deciding whether a government practice would impermissibly convey a message of endorsement, one should adopt the perspective of a non-adherent”). Adopting the perspectives of reasonable nonadherents should dampen any tendency judges may have to allow their own subjective sensibilities to creep into the legal analysis. By asking whether a governmental practice would make members of a religious minority group reasonably feel that their faith is disfavored, the focus shifts from the perceptions of the in-group to those of the out-groups.

These two perspectives will often diverge. “[A]ctions that reasonably offend non-adherents may seem so natural and proper to adherents as to blur into the background noise of society.” Tribe, supra, at 1293. It is too easy for a majority to underestimate the needs and values of minorities. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 523-24, 106 S.Ct. 1310, 89 L.Ed.2d 478 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). This additional focus also strengthens the First Amendment’s core value of protecting members of minority faiths and non-believers from persecution and exclusion by religious majorities. See Engel v.

Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962) (“When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.”); Everson v.

Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 9-10, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947) (Religion Clauses were adopted against backdrop of “religious establishments which all, whether believers or non-believers, would be required to support and attend” and “old world practices and persecutions” “designed to strengthen and consolidate the established faith by generating a burning hatred against dissenters”); see also Pinette, 515 U.S. at 799, 115 S.Ct. 2440 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A paramount purpose of the Establishment Clause is to protect such [a non-adherent] from being made to feel like an outsider in matters of faith, and a stranger in the political community.”); Goldman, 475 U.S. at 524, 106 S.Ct. 1310 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“A critical function of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is to protect the rights of members of minority religions against quiet erosion by majoritarian social institutions that dismiss minority beliefs and practices as unimportant, because unfamiliar.”).

This does not mean that any time a non-adherent plaintiff perceives a government endorsement of another faith, the inquiry is over and the plaintiff wins. Far from it. The reasonable observer test assumes a nonadherent who knows the history and circumstances of the governmental practice in question, and who remains, well, reasonable. This case becomes relatively easy, though, when the relevant constitutional question is: Would a non-Christian student or parent attending the graduation at Elmbrook Church have reasonably felt excluded by the choice of location?

Judge Flaum’s opinion for the court considers this question and correctly concludes that the answer is yes. To make the point another way, it would be much easier to treat these plaintiffs as “hypersensitive” or “obtuse” if there were any evidence that other public schools in the United States were using worship spaces of minority religions for graduation ceremonies. Would Christian majorities feel comfortable or excluded if their public school graduation ceremonies were held in synagogues, mosques, or Baha’i temples, for example? There is no indication that has ever happened anywhere in the United States.

If it were proposed, I expect there would be significant opposition from many Christian students and their families, probably expressing views familiar to the plaintiffs in this case. In applying the endorsement test, therefore, if we think non-adherents might be hypersensitive, we should imagine the shoe on the other foot. Call it the Golden Rule, the Categorical Imperative, or what you will, this principle of reciprocity is fundamental to morality and the rule of law.

In the endorsement analysis in this case, therefore, we should ask ourselves whether members of the religious majority would be comfortable participating in and attending graduation ceremonies in such venues sacred to other faiths. In the absence of evidence of such events, I believe the answer for many would be no. This point is not a criticism of those who would prefer not to have their ceremonies in such locations.

The point is that the plaintiffs in this case, who are not adherents of the majority Christian faith in this school district, were not unreasonable, obtuse, or hypersensitive in perceiving a government endorsement of Christianity when rites of passage with the symbolic importance of public high school graduations were held in a Christian sanctuary beneath the powerful symbol of the empty cross. Third, the dissenting opinions say the court’s decision will invite a parade of difficult challenges to routine and benign government activities. I respectfully suggest that these challenges are not difficult.

The dissenting opinions attempt, for exam-pie, to equate holding a graduation ceremony in sacred worship space to holding a ceremony in a sports arena or a movie theater, to selecting a brand of piano or beverage, or to praising the virtues of eating beef. These comparisons all have the unintended effect of demeaning religious faith and denying the power of its symbols, both for those who believe and for those who do not. The dissents’ hypothetical are easily distinguishable on this basis. The dissents’ strongest point is the analogy to voting.

Voting in public elections takes place in many churches and at least some synagogues and mosques, as well as schools, fire stations, town halls, and other public buildings. Voting is the defining way that citizens participate in governing. Why does the court’s reasoning on the public school’s graduation ceremony not extend to voting in churches and other places of worship? A closer look at the “history and circumstances” of voting practices provides the answer. First, voting usually takes place in non-consecrated parts of the church or other place of worship. See, e.g., Otero v.

State Election Bd., 975 F.2d 738, 741 (10th Cir. 1992) (use of churches as polling places defended where churches “typically have a commons area, parish hall, foyer, nursery or some other such nonconsecrated portion of the church building which can be used as the polling place”). In addition, there are ready alternatives — such as absentee or early voting — for voters who do not wish to vote in a house of worship where they are not comfortable. See Berman v.

Bd. of Elections, 420 F.2d 684, 685 (2d Cir.1969) (holding that availability of absentee voting and voting in adjoining district rendered moot the First Amendment claims of a voter who objected to voting in church). In terms of history and circumstances, American election days have historically been all-hands-on-deck efforts, calling on hundreds of thousands of volunteer poll workers and owners of many thousands of all sorts of public and private buildings to provide convenient neighborhood voting.

Yes, voting takes place in churches, but also in synagogues, mosques, Masonic temples, skating rinks, funeral homes, bakeries, and so on. Even if a voter perceives an endorsement by use of a church for his particular polling place, the informed reasonable observer would know that many houses of worship from many faiths, along with a wide variety of other public and private spaces, are used to make voting as convenient as possible.

From this more complete perspective, there is no endorsement of a particular faith but instead a sometimes frantic effort to find enough places willing to put up with the traffic and disruption that go with running an election. Finally, voting in the modern United States remains an individual act, alone in a voting booth, rather than a public ritual that is a symbolic rite of passage, like a graduation ceremony. All of these circumstances diminish the risk of government endorsement of a particular faith when churches are used as polling places.

If these grounds for distinction may not apply in a particular voting case, there mil be time to consider the particulars. The court’s reasoning in this case should not affect the way that voting is ordinarily handled in the United States. When the Nation’s Founders set the boundaries on the power of government, the first words they ratified in the Bill of Rights were “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion____” The Founders recognized that we are a people of many strong and vigorous faiths. They acted to protect the liberty to practice any of those faiths or none at all.

They also knew centuries of history in which religious conflicts had caused war and oppression. They recognized that even the best intentions of people of faith can lead to division, exclusion, and worse. So enforcing the Establishment Clause is not hostile to religious liberty. It protects that liberty for all. It is no accident that religious faith remains so vibrant in this Republic that has guarded against government establishment, including government endorsement, of particular faiths.

As the author of the First Amendment wrote: “experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation.” James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), in 8 The Papers of James Madison 295, 301 (W. Rachal, R. Rutland, B. Ripel & F. Teute eds., 1973). Judge Flaum’s opinion for the court reaches and ably explains the correct result in this case. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge, with whom EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and POSNER, Circuit Judge, join, dissenting.

In the panel opinion, I set forth, in plenary fashion, my views on the appropriate disposition of this case. There, I wrote that, on the basis of existing law and on the facts of record, the district court correctly granted

summary judgment because, in reply to the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, the plaintiffs simply had not come forth with sufficient evidence to establish a violation of the Establishment Clause. I adhere to that view, and, rather than elongate unduly this opinion, I invite the reader’s attention to the views that I expressed there.

Although I could stop at this point, my respect for the views of my colleagues in the majority and my obligations to the Supreme Court, which very well might be asked to review this matter on a petition for a writ of certiorari, and to my fellow judges in other circuits, who might face similar arguments in future cases, require that I set forth the basis of my respectful disagreement with the analysis employed in the majority opinion. There is no disagreement between myself and the majority about the general principles of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.

The majority correctly notes the three-pronged test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), under which a governmental practice violates the Establishment Clause if it lacks a legitimate secular purpose, if it has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion or if it fosters an excessive entanglement with religion. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105.

The majority also observes, correctly, that the Supreme Court has held that, under the “primary effect” prong of the Lemon test, the government cannot engage in a practice that has the primary “effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v.

Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000) (recognizing that the endorsement analysis proposed by Justice O’Connor is a “relevant question” in Establishment Clause cases). To violate this principle, the governmental practice must amount to an endorsement of religion or of non-religion. Finally, the majority notes, again correctly, that the Establishment Clause forbids coercive pressure on an individual to support or to participate in a religious activity. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312, 120 S.Ct. 2266; Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587, 592-93, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992).

Although we agree on the basic legal framework governing Establishment Clause cases, there remains a significant legal disagreement between my views and those expressed by my colleagues in the majority opinion.

With great respect, I cannot accept, as a threshold matter, the majority’s view that its holding today is only a fact-specific application of these general principles and that this case is nothing more than the judicial analogue of an excursion ticket “good for this day and train only.” In my view, today’s holding significantly alters existing principles in Establishment Clause analysis with respect to coercion.

In doing so, it sets this circuit’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence in a direction that may result in another form of coercion — the coercion of religious entities to conform to a judicially crafted notion of an acceptable “civil religion.” Those religious entities that resist this pressure will be marginalized in American civil life. This result is neither required nor sanctioned by Supreme Court precedent.

In short, by extending established law beyond the limits of its underlying rationale, the majority has transformed, significantly, the work of the Supreme Court and recalibrated, significantly, the relationship of religion and government. The court therefore “has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions” of the Supreme Court of the United States. The court’s decision today rests on its extension of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Lee and Santa Fe beyond the boundaries of their rationales.

In those cases, the Supreme Court held that including a prayer in the official program of a high school graduation ceremony or football game amounted to state sponsorship of religious activity and coerced the attending students to participate, at least passively, in that religious prayer activity. There, the state had affirmatively sponsored, endorsed and coerced participation in a specific religious activity. In Lee, students were expected to stand while a member of the clergy publically recited a prayer as part of the graduation program.

The Court noted that “[t]he undeniable fact is that the school district’s supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the invocation and benediction.” Lee, 505 U.S. at 593, 112 S.Ct. 2649. What had occurred, concluded the Court, was that the public school district, by conducting its graduation ceremony in such a way, effectively had “required participation in a religious exercise.” Id. at 594, 112 S.Ct. 2649.

Similarly, in Santa Fe, the Court determined that including a student-led prayer in the program of a football game placed the same sort of pressure on the unwilling student attendee. The government, the Court concluded, had improperly coerced the student attendees to participate in

an act of religious worship. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312, 120 S.Ct. 2266. This practice violated the basic maxim that “the religious liberty protected by the Constitution is abridged when the State affirmatively sponsors the particular religious practice of prayer.” Id. at 313, 120 S.Ct. 2266. The majority takes the view that the situation before us today is controlled by the holdings of Lee and Santa Fe. The difficulty is that the record simply does not show the same governmental endorsement, sponsorship or coercion of any religious activity.

Indeed, an examination of the record makes it clear that no such governmental sponsorship, endorsement or coercion in fact took place. Faced with this total absence of any showing of governmental sponsorship, endorsement or coercion of any religious activity — the essential focus of the Supreme Court’s holdings in Lee and in Santa Fe— the majority opinion makes the fulcrum of its argument another analogy and declares that the leasing of space in a church for a high school graduation is the constitutional equivalent of “bringing church to the sehoolhouse.” Majority Op. at 850.

It suggests that the mere presence of religious iconography and similar furnishings in the rented church makes the use of the church’s facility an impermissible endorsement of religion that has the coercive effect of promoting religion. An examination of the situation before us reveals the inappropriateness of this analogy and the novelty of the legal principle and the resulting judicial methodology that it produces.

Here, the District did not yet have a field house that could accommodate large assemblies and was in need of an interior venue for its graduation and honors ceremonies until it could construct a suitable facility of its own. The space at the church was among the rental spaces available in the area. Indeed, it appears from the record that the church regularly makes its facility available to groups for other assemblies. There is no indication in the record — and counsel makes no argument — that the rental was anything other than an arm’s-length business transaction between the District and the church.

There is no indication that the church made any special concession from its usual rental policies in order to attract the District’s business or to facilitate its use of the property. Because the court believes that the degree of religiosity of the church’s physical appearance is of prime importance to its new theory of coercion, it presents a detailed description of the church’s interior and its surrounding landscape, a description that would differ very little if one were to visit countless places of worship across our Nation on any given day.

There is no suggestion in the record that the church altered its appearance in any way to proselytize its visitors. Indeed, there is no indication in the record that the church viewed this rental arrangement as an opportunity to proselytize. The graduation ceremony was completely devoid of references to religion, to the church that rented the space or to any other church. There was no prayer, no religious speaker. No member of the clergy, from the landlord church or from any other congregation, participated in the ceremony or was present on the dais.

The mere recitation of these facts demonstrates that the rhetorical analogy of “bringing church to the schoolhouse” limps badly; a closer examination makes it clear that the analogy falters completely. Common, practical experience establishes that the graduation ceremony is hardly the same as the instructional setting of a public high school. No doubt, as the Justices noted in Lee, a public high school graduation is a community celebration of great significance to the students, their parents and relatives, the faculty and the entire community whose tax dollars have supported the educational endeavor.

Student attendance, even if not technically mandatory, is to be expected. Nevertheless, although the graduating students, and presumably their guests, may have been a “captive audience,” it certainly cannot be maintained that, like in Lee and in Santa Fe, they were coerced into participating, actively or passively, in any religious ceremony or activity. The validity of the majority’s proposition therefore depends on whether the students can be said to have been coerced or indoctrinated in any other way by their attendance at the graduation ceremony.

As the majority points out, the Supreme Court has held that the posting of theologically based material, such as the Ten Commandments, in a public school classroom, or the saying of a prayer or the affording of a period of silence for prayer or meditation in the classroom setting, carries a message of endorsement of the underlying religious principles to the students and, in the classroom environment, can have a coercive effect on those students who do not adhere to those underlying beliefs. “When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.” Engel v.

Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962). From these cases, the majority asks that we accept that the students will perceive the same endorsement and the same coercion from the incidental presence of iconography, ornamentation and literature in the building rented by their school district for several hours for an admittedly secular graduation ceremony. Our Establishment Clause jurisprudence fortunately has progressed beyond such stereotypical prognostications.

We require far more than proximity before we vitiate civil-religious relationships on the ground of endorsement, symbolic union or coercion. To the reasonable attendee, including the honored high school graduates and “reasonable non-adherents,” it was obvious that the public high school that educated the graduates does not own the church and did not place in the church the various displays and iconography that disturb the plaintiffs. Indeed, the graduates knew well that the iconography belonged to the landlord church, not to their school.

They knew that the iconography represents the beliefs of those who use the space, on another day, as a place of worship, not a place of graduation. Indeed, it would be totally unreasonable for any student to attribute to the District any endorsement of the message of the iconography; it belongs to — and they know it belongs to— someone else. It symbolizes the landlord’s view, not the District’s view. In a building rented for a single occasion of several hours duration, the presence of religious iconography hardly raises a message of endorsement by the very temporary tenant, the District.

The graduating students, now by virtue of their graduation, must be considered capable of exercising the judgment expected of all reasonable citizens of a democratic polity. Similarly, the fact that a church would have all kinds of religious literature and information on its programs and on its premises was no great revelation to the graduation visitors. Such material is found in most churches in this Nation — as well as in the newspapers, television programs and websites to which the average American turns everyday.

As one of my colleagues noted at oral argument, if the District had chosen to rent a local movie theater for its graduation, no reasonable person would have thought that the advertisements for the coming attractions adorning the lobby bore any endorsement from the high school. In short, when the government places a Ten Commandments poster on the wall of its school building, it is there for the instructional benefit of the students, and it is reasonable for the students to believe that the school authorities have endorsed it.

When the “message” appears in a church rented for a non-instructional purpose for several hours, the same conclusion is not reasonable at all. In the case before us, the record makes clear that the school district endorsed no religious doctrine, practice or institution. At most, its rental of the space at the church recognized the existence of the church, a reality certainly permissible under the Religion Clauses. The plaintiffs nevertheless claim that they “felt uncomfortable, upset, offended, unwelcome, and/or angry,” Appellants’ Br. 17, because of the religious setting.

The Establishment Clause forbids the government’s showing, in any way, support for, or a partiality to, any religion, broadly defined. The Establishment Clause forbids the government from endorsing a religion or a religious practice and, in so doing, creating a message that there are “ins” and “outs” on the basis of religious preference within the political community. It protects the individual from the government’s coercing him, because of governmental endorsement, to join or participate actively or passively in the activity of any religion.

But the Establishment Clause does not, and cannot, protect an individual from personal emotional and psychological unpleasantness. Bereft of any substantive support from Lee or Santa Fe, the majority opinion nevertheless maintains that mere exposure of the graduation audience to the “pervasively religious,” Majority Op. at 856, and, in its view, “proselytizing environment,” id. at 844, of the church is per se coercive.

It accepts the plaintiffs’ argument that, by convening the graduation in a rented church facility that contains the iconography, decorations and literature of the landlord church, the audience is being coerced unconstitutionally to be in the company of these religious signs and symbols. In accepting this argument, the court removes the governing case law from its doctrinal moorings and creates a new and, in my view, dangerous principle in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.

Although the majority’s holding is pointedly limited to the situation before it, that holding is animated by the assertion that the government must take on the responsibility to ensure that its relationships, including its contractual relationships, with religious entities do not offend the sensibilities of those who do not care to be exposed to the outward manifestations of a particular religion or of any religion.

Although the development of this new perspective on the breadth of the Establishment Clause must await future cases, it bears noting that the court suggests no principled limitation to this new broad endorsement/coercion doctrine. The court offers no reason why this new perspective ought not control any relationship or encounter between any other significant governmental activity and “pervasively religious” organizations. Majority Op. at 856.

Under the approach it announces today, judges apparently are to determine whether a religious institution is too “pervasively religious” to make any participation, including a mere contractual arrangement, between the institution and the civil community unconstitutionally coercive. Judges are to accomplish this task, moreover, through “an unguided examination of marginalia [that] is irreconcilable with the imperative of applying neutral principles in constitutional adjudication.” Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am.

Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 676, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). It would seem that the probable, and perhaps inevitable, result of this new direction in Establishment Clause analysis is that institutions determined to be “pervasively religious” will be excluded from any participation in the civil polity because their “religiosity” would amount to coercive endorsement on the part of the government.

Only a religious entity that strips itself down to a vanilla version of its real self is to be acceptable in the important moments of American civil life. That stripped-down version of our diverse and vibrant religious heritage soon will produce the functional equivalent of a judicially created “civil religion,” as the only “authorized” religious participant in any aspect of American civil life.

The appearance of any “pervasively” religious organization would amount, under the majority’s view, to unacceptable “coercion” of those individuals who might come into even incidental contact with its religious and, in the view of the court, apparently divisive nature. We would no longer be a polity “that lets each [religion] flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.” Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313, 72 S.Ct. 679, 96 L.Ed. 954 (1952). As a decision of the en banc court, today’s decision will become a cornerstone of our circuit’s Religion Clause jurisprudence.

Therefore, despite the majority’s good faith attempt to limit its decision to the situation before it, we must examine carefully whether the rationale and methodology it advances will affect other areas of American life. The tremors of this decision will no doubt be felt in the area of education. After today’s decision, it is difficult to see how any religious sign or symbol associated with a “pervasively religious” institution could be allowed even to cast a shadow on a public educational institution, or on an event sponsored by such an institution.

Although we must await further cases to know for certain how the court will treat these situations, the doctrinal and methodological foundation has been laid for a fresh look at many current govern

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