CENTER FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lisa MADIGAN, Attorney General of the State of Illinois et al., Defendants-Appellees, 697 F.3d 464

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. The Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010), is best known for striking down as an unconstitutional restriction of free speech the federal law that bans corporations and labor unions from running campaign-related advertisements in the lead-up to an election. That holding largely overshadowed another part of the decision upholding the same law’s campaign finance disclosure provisions.

Those provisions require any outside entity or individual spending significant sums in a federal election to file reports with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) identifying the person or group making the expenditure, its amount, and the names of certain contributors. Describing disclosure requirements as a “less restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech,” the Citizens United Court wrote that “prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and supporters....

The First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way.” Id. at 916. Despite this holding, in the aftermath of Citizens United a number of suits have been filed challenging federal and state disclosure regulations as facially unconstitutional. Of the federal courts of appeals that have decided these cases, every one has upheld the disclosure regulations against the facial attacks. This case involves another such challenge.

Plaintiff-appellant Center for Individual Freedom (the Center) seeks to invalidate Illinois disclosure requirements on the grounds that they are facially vague and overbroad restrictions of speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Illinois’s disclosure law is modeled on the federal one. It requires groups and individuals that accept “contributions,” make “expenditures,” or sponsor “electioneering communications” in excess of $3,000 to make regular financial disclosures to the State Board of Elections. See 10 ILCS 5/9-1.8. The Illinois Election Code drew the key

definitions of “contribution,” “expenditure,” and “electioneering communication” from federal law. The only substantive differences are that the Illinois disclosure requirements (1) cover election activity relating to ballot initiatives, which have no federal analog; (2) do not exempt from regulation those groups that lack the “major purpose” of influencing electoral campaigns; and (3) cover campaign-related advertisements that appear on the Internet.

The Center argues that these differences, and a few other terms in the Illinois statute, render its disclosure regime unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on its face. To prevail in such a facial challenge, a plaintiff must cross a high bar. A statute is facially overbroad only when “it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech,” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008), and unconstitutionally vague only when its “deterrent effect on legitimate expression is ... both real and substantial.” Young v.

American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 60, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss, finding that the Center could not meet these standards. We affirm. 1. Factual and Procedural Background The Center is a Virginia-based § 501(c)(4) nonprofit organization whose stated mission is “to protect and defend individual freedoms and individual rights guaranteed by the U.S.

Constitution.” To that end, it broadcasts advertisements, maintains a website, publishes a weekly email newsletter, produces a bi-weekly radio show, and engages in other forms of mass media communications. Its tax exempt status under § 501(c)(4) is incompatible with partisan political activity, so the Center cannot endorse candidates or urge the public to “vote for so-and-so.” But apart from a need to avoid such “express advocacy,” in the lingo of campaign finance law, the Center and other § 501(c)(4) groups enjoy fairly wide latitude from the IRS.

During election seasons, the Center runs advertisements that refer to the positions of candidates or to ballot issues and call on the audience to take actions such as contacting candidates. The Center wished to engage in similar advocacy during the 2010 elections in Illinois and made plans to address “legal reform and other justice-related issues” in advertisements referring to incumbent officeholders who were candidates.

But the Center feared that Illinois’s newly-amended campaign finance laws would require it to register as a “political committee” and to disclose its election-related expenditures and its significant contributors. According to the Center, its donors require assurances that their identities will not be disclosed, and this anonymity is a condition of their support. The Center says it had no choice but to forbear from its Illinois “issue advocacy” in 2010, so its political speech was chilled by Illinois’s disclosure laws. These laws are codified in

Article 9 of the Illinois Election Code.

Article 9 is long and filled with the jargon of contemporary U.S. campaign finance law — “electioneering communications,” “independent expenditures,” etc. — which we detail in

Part IV of this opinion. But

Article 9’s basic provisions are fairly easy to summarize. Each political committee in Illinois must register with the Board of Elections, maintain records of every contribution received and expenditure made “in connection with” an election, 10 ILCS 5/9-7, and file a report of all such transactions each quarter, 10 ILCS 5/9 — 10(b).

This quarterly report must include the total sums of contributions received and expenditures made in the covered period; accountings of the committee’s funds on-hand and investment assets held; and the name and address of each contributor who gave more than $150 that quarter. 10 ILCS 5/9-11(a). In addition to the quarterly report, a political committee must disclose any contribution of $1,000 or more (along with the name and address of the contributor) within five days of its receipt, or within two days if received 30 or fewer days before an election. 10 ILCS 5/9-10(c).

For reporting violations, the Board may issue civil fines of no more than $5,000 for any one group (except in the case of “willful and wanton” violations), or seek to enjoin violators’ campaign activities in state court. 10 ILCS 5/9 — 10. Candidates’ campaign organizations and political parties of course must register as political committees. 10 ILCS 5/9-1.8(b), (c). But so too must outside groups and private individuals if, within any 12-month period, they accept contributions or make expenditures in excess of $3,000 “on behalf of or in opposition to” any candidate or ballot question. 10 ILCS 5/9 — 1.8(d), (e).

Any entity other than a natural person must also register as a political committee if it makes “independent expenditures” of more than $3,000 within one year. 10 ILCS 5/9-8.6(b).

Illinois has largely borrowed from federal law its definition of “electioneering communication,” which means a radio, television, or Internet broadcast that (1) refers to a “clearly identified” candidate, political party, or ballot issue; (2) is made within two months of a general election or one month of a primary election, (3) is “targeted to the relevant electorate,” and (4) is unambiguously an “appeal to vote” for or against a candidate, party, or ballot issue. 10 ILCS 5/9-1.14.

Funds spent on electioneering communications that are coordinated with a political committee are treated as contributions to that committee, while uncoordinated electioneering communications are considered independent expenditures. See 10 ILCS 5/9-1.15. The Center argues that five of

Article 9’s

definitions — “electioneering communications,” “political committee,” “contribution,” “expenditure,” and “independent expenditure” — are facially vague and overbroad. In July 2010, the Center brought suit against the Illinois Attorney General and members of the Illinois State Board of Elections in their official capacities, see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), seeking to invalidate and enjoin

Article 9’s disclosure requirements as unconstitutional restrictions of free speech. After the district court denied the Center’s motion for a preliminary injunction, 735 F.Supp.2d 994 (N.D.Ill.2010), and this court denied its request for an injunction pending appeal, the Center’s appeal was dismissed by agreement without prejudice. In January 2011, the Center filed an amended complaint containing the same allegations but taking into account changes to

Article 9 that took effect on January 1, 2011. The state moved to dismiss, and the Center moved for

summary judgment. The parties did not dispute any material facts. The district court denied the Center’s motion for

summary judgment and granted the state’s motion to dismiss. This appeal followed. II. Standing We begin, as we must, with the state’s argument that the Center lacks standing to bring a constitutional challenge against

Article 9. Although the state did not raise this issue in the district court, standing is a jurisdictional requirement that is not subject to waiver. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995); National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255, 114 S.Ct. 798, 127 L.Ed.2d 99 (1994). The standing requirement of

Article III is part of the restriction of the federal judicial power to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Arizona Christian School Tuition Org. v. Winn, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1436, 1441-42, 179 L.Ed.2d 523 (2011). Constitutional standing imposes three core requirements: First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact” — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (

a) concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ ” Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be “fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 1442, quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

On appeal, the state contends that the Center lacks standing because it has neither been subject to any past regulation— it has not been ordered to register as a political committee, threatened with sanctions, or named in a Board complaint — nor “demonstrate^] any probability that its speech will trigger

Article 9’s registration and reporting requirements” in the future. We construe this argument as a challenge to the Center’s injury-in-fact showing. (The state does not question whether the traceability and redressability prongs are satisfied here.) It is well settled that pre-enforcement challenges to government regulations can be

Article III cases or controversies. Brandt v. Village of Winnetka, 612 F.3d 647, 649 (7th Cir.2010). A plaintiff “does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief.” Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979), quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593, 43 S.Ct. 658, 67 L.Ed. 1117 (1923).

To satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement in a pre-enforcement challenge, the plaintiff must show only that she faces “a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or enforcement.” Id. The injury-in-fact standard is often satisfied in pre-enforcement challenges to limitations on speech. The Supreme Court has recognized “self-censorship” as a distinct “harm that can be realized even without an actual prosecution.” Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 388, 393, 108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988).

The chilling of protected speech may thus alone qualify as a cognizable

Article III injury, provided the plaintiffs “have alleged an actual and well-founded fear that the law will be enforced against them.” Id. The Center has made this showing. It has a history of broadcasting messages concerning public policy and political candidates across the United States. It has alleged that while it wishes to engage in similar advocacy in Illinois, it has curtailed its speech because it fears being regulated as a political committee. The Center’s President submitted an affidavit stating that but for

Article 9, his organization would have spoken out during the 2010 Illinois elections using “the typical form of issue ad,” that “[fjunding was available,” and that its “wish to speak in Illinois remained live.” The Center’s standard issue advertisements are run during election season, identify an issue of public policy, give concrete examples to “illustrate the policy” using candidates with whom the public is familiar, and call on the audience to take some “action other than voting, e.g. contacting named candidates and encouraging them to continue or embrace the policy.” The Center’s typical issue ads meet enough of the statutory elements to qualify, at least arguably, as electioneering communications under Illinois law, and the Center would easily pass the $3,000 registration threshold.

The Center’s self-censorship was based on an objectively reasonable, “actual[J and well-founded fear that the law will be enforced against” it. American Booksellers, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636. The state asserts that Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Paradise, 138 F.3d 1183 (7th Cir.1998), shows that the Center lacks a sufficiently well-founded fear of being subject to regulation.

In that case, we held that the plaintiff did not have standing to challenge Wisconsin’s political committee registration requirements because successive advisory opinions of the Wisconsin Attorney General and regulations promulgated by the state election board already established that the definition of political committee did not apply to groups like the plaintiff. Id. at 1185.

These formal determinations by the state authorities meant that the plaintiffs fear of prosecution under the law was not “objectively “well-founded,’ ” id., quoting American Booksellers, 484 U.S. at 393, 108 S.Ct. 636, that the lawsuit was an attempt “to resolve a controversy that has not yet arisen and may never arise,” id. at 1187-88, and that the plaintiff therefore lacked standing. This case is quite different for there has been no determination by any Illinois official that the Center and other such groups do not qualify as political committees under

Article 9. The named defendants are the Illinois Attorney General and members of the Board of Elections. They have not denied that the Center’s past out-of-state “issue ads” could qualify as electioneering communications under the Illinois disclosure laws. Unlike Paradise, there is a sufficiently realistic possibility that the Center would be subject to

Article 9’s registration and reporting requirements if it engages in the type of political advocacy it often does and wishes to in Illinois. That is enough to establish that the Center has an objectively reasonable fear of being subject to Illinois’s registration and reporting requirements if it engages in its intended speech, and that the Center chose to avoid those alleged burdens. “Such self-censorship in the face of possible legal repercussions suffices to show

Article III injury.” National Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 48-49 (1st Cir.2011) (finding that nonprofit group had standing to challenge state disclosure laws in preenforcement action); accord, Human Life of Wash. Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1001 (9th Cir.2010) (same). We find that the Center has

Article III standing to challenge the constitutionality of Illinois’s disclosure law. III. Scope of Review: Facial Challenge Next we must clarify the scope of the legal challenge before us. The Center describes its suit as both a facial and an as-applied challenge, arguing that

Article 9 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad “both facially and as applied to independent issue advocacy groups such as CFIF.” It is true that facial challenges and as-applied challenges can overlap conceptually. See Doe v. Reed, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 2817, 177 L.Ed.2d 493 (2010) (acknowledging that plaintiffs’ claim “has characteristics of both” as-applied and facial challenge); Richard Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Thirdr-Party Standing, 113 Harv. L.Rev. 1321, 1341 (2000) (“[F]acial challenges are less categorically distinct from as-applied challenges than is often thought.”).

But there is a difference: Where the “claim and the relief that would follow ... reach beyond the particular circumstances of the[ ] plaintiffs,” “[t]hey must ... satisfy [the] standards for a facial challenge to the extent of that reach.” Doe v. Reed, 130 S.Ct. at 2817. This is not a case where a group has actually engaged in a particular form of speech that is subject to regulation and seeks to challenge the applicability of the law to itself and other groups who have engaged in similar expressive activity. Cf. FEC v.

Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007) (as-applied challenge to federal statute banning electioneering communications brought by advocacy group that had run TV advertisements it believed would be covered by the statute if group continued to run them during 60-day pre-election blackout period). Here, the Center has not broadcast any communications in Illinois, so it would be impossible for this court to fashion a remedy tailored to its own particular speech activities and those of similar groups, for we have only a general idea of what its hypothetical broadcasts would say.

The Center has not laid the foundation for an as-applied challenge here. We analyze its claims under the standards governing facial challenges. Those standards set a high bar. In reversing a decision striking down a state election law in a facial challenge, the Supreme Court explained: Facial challenges are disfavored for several reasons. Claims of facial invalidity often rest on speculation. As a consequence, they raise the risk of premature

interpretation of statutes on the basis of factually barebones records. Facial challenges also run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts should neither “ ‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it’ ” nor “formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.” Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 [56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688] (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

Finally, facial challenges threaten to short circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution. Washington State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450-51, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) (some citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).

In determining whether a law is unconstitutional on its face, then, “we must be careful not to go beyond the statute’s facial requirements and speculate about ‘hypothetical’ or ‘imaginary’ cases.” Id. at 450, 128 S.Ct. 1184, citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22, 80 S.Ct. 519, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960). With these principles in view, we turn to the merits of the Center’s facial challenge to

Article 9. We review de novo the district court’s treatment of the constitutional questions presented. E.g., Anderson v. Milwaukee County, 433 F.3d 975, 978 (7th Cir.2006). IV. Overbreadth and Voidr-for-Vagueness Claims The Supreme Court has recognized a particular type of facial challenge in the First Amendment context under which a law may be struck down entirely as impermissibly overbroad. Under this overbreadth doctrine, “a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008).

The over-breadth doctrine is “ ‘strong medicine’ ” that should be “employed ... with hesitation, and then ‘only as a last resort.’ ” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982), quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). Accordingly, courts “vigorously enforce[ ] the requirement that a statute’s overbreadth be substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 292, 128 S.Ct. 1830. Since its seminal modern campaign finance decision in Buckley v.

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), the Supreme Court has consistently distinguished between laws that restrict the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication and laws that simply require disclosure of information by those who spend substantial sums on political speech affecting elections. Unlike contribution and expendí ture limits, disclosure laws “impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities,” id. at 64, 96 S.Ct. 612, and “do not prevent anyone from speaking.” Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 914, quoting McConnell v.

FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003), overruled in part on other grounds, Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 913. Disclosure laws are thus a “less restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech.” Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 915.

For that reason, the Court does not subject disclosure requirements to the same standard of strict scrutiny that applies to contribution and expenditure limits but rather to “exacting scrutiny,” which requires only “a ‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest.” Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 914, quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66, 96 S.Ct. 612. We apply exacting scrutiny to the Center’s facial challenges to

Article 9, examining whether the disclosure requirements are substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest. In this case, the state interest at stake is that of “providing] the electorate with information as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66, 96 S.Ct. 612 (internal quotation marks omitted). This “informational interest” is sufficiently important to support disclosure requirements. See, e.g., id. at 66-67, 96 S.Ct. 612.

In Buckley, the Court recognized that campaign finance disclosure was a critical tool for maintaining transparency in the political marketplace: “In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation.” Id. at 14-15, 96 S.Ct. 612.

Disclosure requirements advance the public’s interest in information by “allowing] voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches.” Id. at 67, 96 S.Ct. 612. By revealing “the sources of a candidate’s financial support,” disclosure laws “alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future performance in office.” Id.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized this informational interest and the unique role that disclosure plays in furthering it. Our court, too, has acknowledged the importance of disclosure regulations in providing “additional information useful to the consumer” of political messaging. Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 352 (7th Cir.2004).

In Majors, we upheld an Indiana law requiring political ads to identify the persons who paid for them: The avidity with which candidates for public office seek endorsements is evidence (as if any were needed) that the identity of a candidate’s supporters— and opponents — is information that the voting public values highly. In areas of inquiry where logic or exact observation is unavailing, a speaker’s credibility often depends crucially on who he is. As Aristotle said, “persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible.

We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided.” Id., quoting Aristotle, Rhetoric, in 2 The Complete Works of Aristotle 2152, 2155 (Jonathan Barnes ed. 1984); see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630, 40 S.Ct. 17, 63 L.Ed. 1173 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Of course, the identity of the source is helpful to evaluating ideas.”).

We agree that this is a sufficiently important governmental interest to support Illinois’s disclosure requirements, and we proceed below under the exacting-scrutiny framework to examine whether there is a substantial relation between Illinois’s informational interest and the features of

Article 9 that the Center contends are overbroad. Before doing so, however, we briefly describe the Center’s alternative theory, that certain provisions of

Article 9 are unconstitutionally vague. Like the overbreadth doctrine, the void-for-vagueness doctrine protects against the ills of a law that “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2317, 183 L.Ed.2d 234 (2012), quoting Williams, 553 U.S. at 304, 128 S.Ct. 1830.

The “vagueness doctrine addresses at least two connected but discrete due process concerns: first, that regulated parties should know what is required of them so they may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way.” Id., citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972).

In cases where the “statute abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (brackets omitted), “rigorous adherence to those requirements is necessary to ensure that ambiguity does not chill protected speech.” Fox Television Stations, 132 S.Ct. at 2317. Even under the heightened standard for the First Amendment, though, the potential chilling effect on protected expression must be both “real and substantial” to invalidate a statute as void for vagueness in a facial challenge. Erznoznik v.

City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975). In addition, a “plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 495, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982).

In sum, both the vagueness and overbreadth questions involve the same preliminary inquiry into whether the statute will have a substantial effect on constitutionally protected activity: “In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court’s first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.” Flipside, 455 U.S. at 494, 102 S.Ct. 1186 (footnote omitted). If it does not, then under either theory the facial challenge must fail.

In the First Amendment context, vagueness and over-breadth are two sides of the same coin, and the two sorts of challenges are often conceived of as “alternative and often overlapping” theories for relief on the same claim. Jordan v. Pugh, 425 F.3d 820, 827 (10th Cir.2005) (McConnell, J.). The Center has presented its over-breadth and vagueness claims as one undifferentiated argument, asserting that

Article 9’s provisions are both “vague and overbroad.” This is not unusual, see Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1020, and does not call for criticism. This case does not require us to parse fine distinctions between the two theories. Whether the argument is styled as overbreadth or vagueness, the central question in this facial challenge is whether the provisions at issue potentially reach a “substantial” amount of protected speech. Campaign finance disclosure requirements have existed at the federal level since 1910. See Campaign Expenses Publicity Act of 1910, Pub.L. No. 274, 36 Stat. 822.

The modern federal disclosure regime was part of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub.L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, as amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub.L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-34). Because the Supreme Court has upheld FECA’s disclosure requirements, we need not invent the wheel in this case. Instead, we identify the ways in which Illinois’s disclosure law is broader or more vague than FECA and then consider whether each difference is constitutionally permissible.

Article 9 differs from federal disclosure provisions in two significant respects. First,

Article 9 extends the disclosure of expenditures and contributions to ballot initiative campaigns. Second,

Article 9 regulates as a political committee any organization that exceeds the dollar-limit spending thresholds, while under federal law only those groups with the “major purpose” of influencing elections must register as political committees. In addition to these substantive differences,

Article 9’s

definitions of several key terms — “electioneering communication,” “expenditure,” “contribution,” and “independent expenditure” — differ slightly from their federal law analogs. We first analyze the two broader questions on ballot initiatives and the major-purpose test before turning to the statutory details. A. Disclosures for Ballot Issue Campaigns 1.

Contributions and Expenditures In Illinois, individuals and groups must register as “ballot initiative committees” when they accept contributions or make expenditures in support of or in opposition to any question of public policy in amounts exceeding $3,000 in a 12-month period. 10 ILCS 5/9-1.8(e). Federal law does not provide for ballot initiatives and referenda, so FECA contains no corresponding requirements. The issue here is whether this additional feature of

Article 9’s disclosure regime is substantially related to Illinois’s interest in maintaining an informed electorate. Educating voters is at least as important, if not more so, in the context of initiatives and referenda as in candidate elections. In direct democracy, where citizens are “responsible for taking positions on some of the day’s most contentious and technical issues, ‘[v]oters act as legislators,’ while ‘interest groups and individuals advocating a measure’s defeat or passage act as lobbyists.’ ” Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1006, quoting California Pro-Life Council, Inc. v.

Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1105 (9th Cir.2003); see also Doe v. Reed, 130 S.Ct. at 2833 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“When a ... voter signs a referendum petition ..., he is acting as a legislator.”). In an initiative campaign, “average citizens are subjected to advertising blitzes of distortion and half-truths and are left to figure out for themselves which interest groups pose the greatest threats to their self-interest.” Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1006, quoting David S. Broder, Democracy Derailed: Initiative Campaigns and the Power of Money 18 (2000).

Because the issues can be complex and the public debate confusing, voters’ interest in knowing the source of messages promoting or opposing ballot measures is especially salient in such campaigns. Disclosure laws are substantially related to the public’s interest in information during ballot initiative campaigns. Research shows that one of the most useful heuristic cues influencing voter behavior in initiatives and referenda is knowing who favors or opposes a measure. See Elizabeth Garret & Daniel A.

Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 Election L.J. 295, 296-98 (2005); Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus”, 50 UCLA L.Rev. 1141, 1157 (2003). Because nominally independent political operations can hide behind “misleading names to conceal their identity,” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 128, 124 S.Ct. 619, often only disclosure of the sources of their funding may enable the electorate to ascertain the identities of the real speakers. See Citizens Against Rent Control v.

City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298, 102 S.Ct. 434, 70 L.Ed.2d 492 (1981) (in ballot measure campaigns, “when individuals or corporations speak through committees, they often adopt seductive names that tend to conceal the true identity of the source”). The Supreme Court long ago approved Congress’s authority to require federal lobbyists to make financial disclosures because “full realization of the American ideal of government by elected representatives depends to no small extent on [Congress’s] ability to properly evaluate [the] pressures” to which it is regularly subjected. See United States v.

Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954). For the same reasons, when Illinois citizens “act[] as legislators” during initiative campaigns, see Doe v. Reed, 130 S.Ct. at 2833 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment), the State requires those who “attempt to influence legislation” being considered on the ballot to disclose a “modicum of information from those who for hire attempt to influence legislation or who collect or spend funds for that purpose” — namely, “who is putting up the money, and how much.” See Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625, 74 S.Ct. 808.

This “enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.” Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 916. Such regulation is substantially related to Illinois’s interest in preserving an informed electorate. Accord, Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d at 811; Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1008. Although the Supreme Court has not directly passed on state disclosure requirements for ballot initiatives, it has discussed such laws approvingly. See Citizens Against Rent Control v.

City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. at 298, 102 S.Ct. 434 (striking down cap on contributions but noting that law’s disclosure requirements adequately fulfilled need for information in ballot measure contests); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (striking down state law prohibiting corporate contributions or expenditures to influence referenda: “Identification of the source of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected.”); Buckley v.

American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 202-03, 119 S.Ct. 636, 142 L.Ed.2d 599 (1999) (striking down state law requiring proponents of initiatives to report the names, addresses, and earnings of all paid circulators, who had to wear name badges while gathering signatures; disclosure requirements remained in effect to aid voters in evaluating messages). These three cases strongly suggest that disclosure laws are substantially related to the state’s informational interest in the context of ballot initiative campaigns.

To be sure, requiring disclosure in the ballot initiative context may burden First Amendment rights in two ways. First, disclosure requirements may deter contributions or expenditures by some individuals and groups who would prefer to remain anonymous. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 68, 96 S.Ct. 612. Second, “disclosure requirements can chill donations to an organization by exposing donors to retaliation.” Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 916; see, e.g., Brown v.

Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 100, 103 S.Ct. 416, 74 L.Ed.2d 250 (1982) (First Amendment prohibits states from compelling disclosures of campaign finance information from minor political party where there is a “reasonable probability” that identified persons would be subject to “threats, harassment, and reprisals”).

On the record in this facial challenge, however, we must treat these burdens as modest. “[Disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, but they impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities, and do not prevent anyone from speaking.” Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 914 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The burden of public identification may foreclose application of disclosure laws to individual pamphleteers, see McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995), or small neighborhood groups that raise less than $1000, see Sampson v.

Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir.2010), for in these cases the state’s interest in disseminating such information to voters is at a low ebb. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348-49, 115 S.Ct. 1511. Here, however, the Center is a far cry from the lone pamphleteer in McIntyre, and its broad “interest in anonymity” does not justify invalidating disclosure laws in a facial challenge brought by a national political advocacy organization that seeks to use the mass media in Illinois to spread its political messages on a broad scale.

That is exactly the sort of campaign-related advertising about which Illinois has a substantial interest in providing information to its public. Similarly, the record in this facial challenge does not support any prospect of retaliation that could bar application of

Article 9. In Doe v. Reed, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state law that allowed for public disclosure of petition signers’ names and addresses. The Court held that disclosure of the names and addresses of petition signers would not ordinarily create a “reasonable probability” that they would be harassed. 130 S.Ct. at 2820-21, quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74, 96 S.Ct. 612. The same result applies here. The Center has “provided us scant evidence or argument,” id. at 2821, beyond bare speculation, that

Article 9 would be at all likely to precipitate “threats, harassment, or reprisals” against it or other similarly situated advocacy groups. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74, 96 S.Ct.

Article 9’s application to contributions and expenditures related to ballot initiatives is substantially related to Illinois’s strong interest in maintaining an informed electorate, and this interest strongly outweighs any burdens on protected speech, at least in the absence of facts that might be offered in support of a much narrower as-applied challenge. 2. Electioneering Communications on Ballot Issues

Article 9 also requires groups to register as ballot initiative committees when they spend more than $3,000 on electioneering communications that advocate for or against ballot issues. 10 ILCS 5/9-1.8(e). This provision likewise advances the state’s interest in ensuring voters are informed about ballot initiatives. The Center argues that the requirement imposes significant burdens on speakers because the definition of electioneering communication does not adequately distinguish ballot initiative campaign advocacy from pure issue discussion.

The Center’s argument relies principally on two Supreme Court cases — Buckley v. Valeo and FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007). The Buckley Court upheld all of the disclosure and reporting requirements in FECA. To avoid the regulation of pure “issue discussion,” though, the Court placed a narrowing construction on the term “expenditure” “to reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80, 96 S.Ct. 612 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

This was the genesis of a distinction Buckley had earlier drawn in the context of independent expenditures between issue discussion and express advocacy. The latter, the Court said, would typically involve the use of unequivocal words and phrases “such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ... ‘defeat,’ ‘reject’ ” — a list that has come to be known as Buckley’s “magic words.” Id. at 44 n. 52, 96 S.Ct. 612. For many years the Court adhered to the distinction, but it repeatedly emphasized that “the express advocacy limitation ... was the product of statutory

interpretation rather than a constitutional command.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 191-92, 124 S.Ct. 619; see also Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 475 n. 71, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (principal opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (reiterating that Buckley’s “magic words” definition “does not dictate a constitutional test” and the “express advocacy restriction was an endpoint of statutory

interpretation, not a first principle of constitutional law”). In Wisconsin Right to Life, the Supreme Court’s lead opinion held that the federal ban on corporate and labor disbursements for campaign-related broadcasts could be applied only to advertisements that were “express advocacy” or its “functional equivalent.” 551 U.S. at 465, 127 S.Ct. 2652, citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206, 124 S.Ct. 619. A broadcast is the “functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable

interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.” Id. at 469-70, 127 S.Ct. 2652. While “[c]ourts need not ignore basic background information that may be necessary to put an ad in context,” id. at 474, 127 S.Ct. 2652, “there generally should be no discovery or inquiry into the sort of contextual factors” that would go to either the speaker’s “subjective” intent or the likely “effect” of the ad on the electorate, id. at 474 n. 7, 127 S.Ct. 2652. The Center contends that

Article 9’s definition of electioneering communication is inconsistent with Buckley and Wisconsin Right to Life because it considers whether a broadcast refers to a “clearly identified question of public policy that will appear on the ballot.” 10 ILCS 5/9-1.14. The Center calls this “an intent- or-effect standard that requires a judgment as to how a listener will understand speech,” since the public discussion of certain policy issues could be considered discussion of a ballot question. For two reasons, we disagree.

First, Citizens United made clear that the wooden distinction between express advocacy and issue discussion does not apply in the disclosure context. In Citizens United, which came after Wisconsin Right to Life, the Court explicitly rejected the plaintiffs attempt to graft the express advocacy/issue discussion dichotomy onto the constitutional law of campaign finance disclosure. 130 S.Ct. at 915. The Court reaffirmed that disclosure is a less restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech.

In Buckley, the Court upheld a disclosure requirement for independent expenditures even though it invalidated a provision that imposed a ceiling on those expenditures. In McConnell, three Justices who would have found § 441b to be unconstitutional nonetheless voted to uphold BCRA’s disclosure and disclaimer requirements. And the Court has upheld registration and disclosure requirements on lobbyists, even though Congress has no power to ban lobbying itself.

For these reasons, we reject Citizens United’s contention that the disclosure requirements must be limited to speech that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy. Id. at 915 (citations omitted). Accordingly, mandatory disclosure requirements are constitutionally permissible even if ads contain no direct candidate advocacy and “only pertain to a commercial transaction.” Id. at 915.

Whatever the status of the express advocacy/issue discussion distinction may be in other areas of campaign finance law, Citizens United left no doubt that disclosure requirements need not hew to it to survive First Amendment scrutiny. With just one exception, every circuit that has reviewed First Amendment challenges to disclosure requirements since Citizens United has concluded that such laws may constitutionally cover more than just express advocacy and its functional equivalents, and in each case the court upheld the law.

Second, even if disclosure requirements were constitutionally applicable only to express advocacy and its functional equivalent, Illinois’s definition of “electioneering communication” is limited by language nearly identical to that used in Wisconsin Right to Life to define the functional equivalent of express advocacy. Compare 10 ILCS 5/9-1.14 (the broadcast must be “susceptible to no reasonable

interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a clearly identified candidate, ... a political party, or a question of public policy that will appear on the ballot”), with Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 469-70, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (principal opinion) (“a court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable

interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate”). Moreover,

Article 9’s definition tracks BCRA’s in every respect, as each is limited by the same five factors: (1) by medium, (2) by total amount spent, (3) temporally, (4) geographically, and (5) by content. Although there are some differences with the federal statute’s definition, which we consider below in

Section IV.C, the point is that

Article 9 is carefully drawn to track a definition already approved by the Supreme Court in Wisconsin Right to Life. Even if disclosure requirements could reach only so far as express advocacy or its functional equivalent, on its face,

Article 9 regulates no more than that and so is not facially overbroad. 3. Vagueness The Center’s final concern about

Article 9’s regulation of ballot initiative activity is that it is triggered by contributions or expenditures received or made “with the purpose of securing a place on the ballot for, [or] advocating the defeat or passage of’ any ballot initiative, “regardless of whether petitions have been circulated or filed with the appropriate office or whether the question has been adopted and certified by the governing body.” 10 ILCS 5/9-1.8(e). The Center first argues that the “in support of or in opposition to” language is vague.

In McConnell, however, the Court found that very similar language was not unconstitutionally vague. See 540 U.S. at 170 n. 64, 124 S.Ct. 619 (“The words ‘promote,’ ‘oppose,’ ‘attack,’ and ‘support’ clearly set forth the confines within which potential party speakers must act in order to avoid triggering the provision. These words ‘provide explicit standards for those who apply them’ and ‘give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.’”), quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 38 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972).

This part of McConnell remains valid after Citizens United, and it forecloses the Center’s argument that subsection 1.8(e)’s support/opposition language is unconstitutionally vague. Accord, National Org. for Marriage, 649 F.3d at 62-64 (rejecting vagueness challenge to terms “promoting,” “support,” and “opposition”).

The Center also contends that the definition is vague because it could apply to advocacy on any issue that might one day become the subject of a ballot initiative, and the statute “provides no guidance ... for determining when such a policy issue becomes a regulated ‘question of public policy.’” For example, a group might spend $3,000 producing an ad that denounces high sales taxes, only to find six months later that a sales tax cut will be on the ballot as an initiative. The Center argues that under

Article 9, that group might be found to have violated the statute if it failed to register as a ballot initiative committee and make required disclosures. Courts do not decide facial challenges on the basis of such speculative hypotheticals. As the district court observed, campaign-related broadcasts are considered electioneering communications only when they are made within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primary, “at which point it would already be known if an initiative is on the ballot.” As for expenditures that are not for electioneering communications (for example, glossy mailers, bumper stickers, buttons, and other campaign paraphernalia),

Article 9’s definition of “ballot initiative committee” is quite plainly aimed at regulating groups that are either campaigning in favor of or against actual ballot measures or actively advocating or opposing placing a specific question on the ballot. We have no reason to suppose the Board would construe or enforce the provision more expansively, so we cannot say that the definition of ballot initiative committee is substantially overbroad in relation to its plainly legitimate sweep, see United States v.

Stevens, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1587, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010), or that its “deterrent effect on legitimate expression is ... both real and substantial.” Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 60, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976). Illinois’s regulation of expenditures for, contributions to, and electioneering communications about ballot initiative campaigns is not facially overbroad or vague. B.

Definition of Political Committee: The “Major Purpose” Test The Center argues that Illinois’s disclosure requirements are vague and over-broad because they regulate as political committees groups that do not have as their “major purpose” the election of a candidate. Recall that outside groups are required to register as political committees if -within a 12-month period they make or receive more than $3,000 worth of contributions, expenditures, or independent expenditures for electioneering communications. See 10 ILCS 5/9-1.8, 5/9-8.6(b).

The Center contends that Supreme Court precedent strictly cabins regulation of political committees to organizations that are “under the control of a candidate” or whose “major purpose” is “the nomination or election of a candidate.”

Article 9’s political committee provision covers additional entities, and thus, the Center contends, the provision is fatally overbroad. We disagree. Like the express advocacy/issue discussion distinction, the Center’s proposed major purpose test also has its origins in Buckley.

The Buckley Court reviewed FECA’s reporting requirements on political committees, which the statute defined as “any committee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives contributions or makes expenditures during a calendar year in an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79 n. 105, 96 S.Ct. 612, quoting 2 U.S.C. § 431(d) (current version at § 431(4)(A)).

A parallel provision of FECA defined “contribution” and “expenditure” as the “use of money or other valuable assets ‘for the purpose of ... influencing’ the nomination or election of candidates for federal office.” Id. at 77, 96 S.Ct. 612, quoting 2 U.S.C. § 431(e), (f) (current version at § 431(8), (9)).

In the context of this definition, the Court concluded that the disclosure requirements could present “vagueness problems, for ‘political committee’ is defined only in terms of amount of annual ‘contributions’ and ‘expenditures,’ and could be interpreted to reach groups engaged purely in issue discussion.” Id. at 79, 96 S.Ct. 612.

To avoid these line-drawing problems, the Court construed the term political committee more narrowly: To fulfill the purposes of the Act, [political committees] need only encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate. Expenditures of candidates and of “political committees” so construed can be assumed to fall within the core area sought to be addressed by Congress. They are, by definition, campaign related. Id. (emphasis added). The Court has referred to this narrowing construction in subsequent opinions.

See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170 n. 64, 124 S.Ct. 619; FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 252 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986) (plurality opinion). The Center draws from this the conclusion that the First Amendment imposes a bright-line prohibition against applying disclosure requirements to a group whose “major purpose” is other than the nomination or election of candidates. The argument reads Buckley too broadly. First, as is clear from the quoted portion, the “major purpose” limitation, like the express advocacy/issue discussion distinction, was a creature of statutory

interpretation, not constitutional command. See National Org. for Marriage, 649 F.3d at 59 (‘We find no reason to believe that this so-called ‘major purpose’ test, like the other narrowing constructions adopted in Buckley, is anything more than an artifact of the Court’s construction of a federal statute.”); Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1009-10 (“Buckley’s statement ... does not indicate that an entity must have that major purpose to be deemed constitutionally a political committee.”).

Buckley's limiting construction was drawn for the statute before it, and the Supreme Court has never applied a “major purpose” test to a state’s regulation of political committees. See National Org. for Marriage, 649 F.3d at 59. For four reasons, we do not think this limitation extends to Illinois’s disclosure requirements. First, when Buckley was decided, political committees faced much greater burdens under FECA’s 1974 amendments than Illinois’s disclosure requirements impose.

For instance, FECA then included hard limits on the size of contributions to political committees, and on how much they could contribute to other political committees. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85, 96 S.Ct. 612. When regulation as a political committee entails adherence to these and other more burdensome requirements, there is more room to argue that the major purpose test might be needed under the First Amendment than when the law imposes only disclosure obligations.

For instance, the Supreme Court in Massachusetts Citizens for Life held that a federal law prohibiting corporations from making independent expenditures except through segregated funds was unconstitutional as applied to a nonprofit political advocacy organization, but the Court expressly acknowledged that the organization could be required to comply with FECA’s disclosure regime. See 479 U.S. at 262, 107 S.Ct. 616 (“These reporting obligations provide precisely the information necessary to monitor MCFL’s independent spending activity and its receipt of contributions.

The state interest in disclosure therefore can be met in a manner less restrictive than imposing the full panoply of regulations that accompany status as a political committee under the Act.”). Massachusetts Citizens for Life shows that there is nothing constitutionally magical about being labeled as a political committee; what matters are the burdens that attend the classification. Second,

Article 9 defines political committee more narrowly than FECA by covering only groups that accept contributions or make expenditures “on behalf of or in opposition to” a candidate or ballot initiative. This definition is more targeted to campaign-related speech than FECA’s definition of contribution and expenditure, which applies to anything of value given or received “for the purpose of ... influencing” an election. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8), (9). Again, in McConnell, the Court held that similar language (words such as “ ‘promote,’ ‘oppose,’ ‘attack,’ and ‘support’ ”) “provide[d] explicit standards” and was not vague.

See 540 U.S. at 170 n. 64, 124 S.Ct. 619. The Illinois limit of “on behalf of or in opposition to” confines the realm of regulated activity to expenditures and contributions within the core area of genuinely campaign-related transactions.

Third, as the First Circuit noted in upholding Maine’s campaign finance disclosure law, application of the major purpose test would “yield perverse results.” “[A] small group with the major purpose of electing a ... state representative that spends [$3,000] for ads could be required to register” as a political committee, while a “mega-group that spends $1,500,000 to defeat the same candidate,” but spends far more on non-campaign-related activities, “would not have to register because the defeat of that candidate could not be considered the [mega-group’s] major purpose.” National Org. for Marriage, 649 F.3d at 59, quoting National Org. for Marriage v.

McKee, 723 F.Supp.2d at 264; see also Vermont Right to Life Committee, 875 F.Supp.2d at 395, 2012 WL 2370445, at *16 (noting the “peculiar results” the major purpose test would produce inasmuch as “a group that spends $1.5 MM of a total of $6 MM on promoting candidates probably would not qualify, but one that spends $1500 of a total budget of $2000 probably would”). Fourth, limiting disclosure requirements to groups with the major purpose of influencing elections would allow even those very groups to circumvent the law with ease.

Any organization dedicated primarily to electing candidates or promoting ballot measures could easily dilute that major purpose by just increasing its non-electioneering activities or better yet by merging with a sympathetic organization that engaged in activities unrelated to campaigning. It is easy to imagine how implementing the kind of major-purpose test the Center advances could devolve into an administrative nightmare. The First Amendment does not require a state to build such an escape hatch into reasonable disclosure laws.

The Supreme Court has frequently warned of the “hard lesson of circumvention” in campaign finance regulation. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 165, 124 S.Ct. 619; see also Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 912; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 62, 96 S.Ct. 612. In political campaigns, it seems, “[m]oney, like water, will always find an outlet.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 224, 124 S.Ct. 619; see generally Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 Tex. L.Rev. 1705 (1999).

Illinois’s disclosure provisions attempt to reduce this risk of circumvention by defining “political committee” to include groups that either coordinate expenditures with campaigns and parties or that run ads that are unambiguous appeals to vote a particular way. In light of these considerations, the line-drawing concerns that led the Court to adopt the major purpose limitation for contribution and expenditure limits in Buckley do not control our overbreadth analysis of the disclosure requirements of

Article 9. Instead, as the Supreme Court has instructed in applying exacting scrutiny, our inquiry depends on whether there is a substantial relation between Illinois’s interest in informing its electorate about who is speaking before an election and

Article 9’s regulation of campaign-related spending by groups whose major purpose is not electoral politics. We find that there is. In Illinois, the voting “public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an election,” Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 915, whether that speaker is a political party, a nonprofit advocacy group, a for-profit corporation, a labor union, or an individual citizen.

The need for an effective and comprehensive disclosure system is especially valuable after Citizens United, since individuals and outside business entities may engage in unlimited political advertising so long as they do not coordinate tactics with a political campaign or political party. See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 916 (“A campaign finance system that pairs corporate independent expenditures with effective disclosure has not existed ' before today....

With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and supporters.”). Already in the 2012 federal elections, outside spending has approached $300 million nationwide. Amidst this cacophony of political voices — super PACs, corporations, unions, advocacy groups, and individuals, not to mention the parties and candidates themselves — campaign finance data can help busy voters sift through the information and make informed political judgments.

Transparency in campaign finance allows the public to weigh the “credib[ility]” of the speaker and thus the “persuasfiveness]” of the message, and that is so “generally whatever the question is.” Aristotle, Rhetoric, in 2 The Complete Works of Aristotle 2152, 2155 (Jonathan Barnes ed. 1984), quoted in Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 352 (7th Cir.2004) (upholding state statute requiring political ads to identify sponsors). Such transparency helps the public hold political speakers accountable for making false, manipulative, or otherwise unseemly ads that they might otherwise run with impunity.

As Justice Brandéis observed, “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.” Louis Brandéis, Other People’s Money 62 (1933), quoted in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67, 96 S.Ct. 612. We conclude that

Article 9’s regulation as political committees of groups that lack the major purpose of influencing elections does not condemn the disclosure law as unconstitutionally overbroad. C. “Electioneering Communication” In addition to its two major substantive challenges to

Article 9, the Center asserts that several other provisions are facially vague and overbroad. The first is the definition of “electioneering communication,” which applies to expenditures and contributions to determine whether an entity is a regulated political committee that must disclose its finances and donors.

Illinois defines “electioneering communication” as: any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication, including radio, television, or Internet communication, that (1) refers to a clearly identified candidate ..., clearly identified political party, or a clearly identified question of public policy that -will appear on the ballot, (2) is made within 60 days before a general election ... or 30 days before a primary election, (3) is targeted to the relevant electorate, and (4) is susceptible to no reasonable

interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a clearly identified candidate ..., a political party, or a question of public policy. 10 ILCS 5/9-1.14 (some internal numbering omitted). This definition is taken almost verbatim from the federal definition that was upheld (to the extent it triggered disclosure requirements) in Citizens United. Federal law defines “electioneering communication” as: any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which— (

I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; (II) is made within— (aa) 60 days before a general ... election candidate; or (bb) 30 days before a primary ... election ...; and (III) ... is targeted to the relevant electorate. ... [A] communication which refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office is “targeted to the relevant electorate” if the communication can be received by 50,000 or more persons— ... in the district [or state] the candidate seeks to represent.... 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(3)(A)-(C). The Center maintains that

Article 9’s definition of “electioneering communication” is vague and overbroad. The Supreme Court has already found the federal definition to be neither overbroad nor vague in the context of disclosure requirements, see, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 916, so in assessing

Article 9 we focus on the ways in which the Illinois statute is broader or less precise than the federal one and then inquire whether each difference is constitutionally permissible. There are three differences between the federal and

Article 9

definitions of “electioneering communications.” First, the Illinois statute covers communications related to ballot measure campaigns. We determined above that this element of

Article 9 does not render the statute vague or overbroad, see parts IV.A.2 & .3, and do not repeat our analysis here. Second,

Article 9 covers “Internet speech,” which is not regulated by the federal statute. Third, Illinois does not limit the phrase “targeted to the relevant electorate” by reference to minimum audience size. We now address these last two differences. 1. Internet Communications The Center contends that

Article 9’s regulation of certain Internet speech as electioneering communications renders it unconstitutionally broad because Internet speech, in contrast to radio and television broadcasts, is not confined to particular audience markets or moments in time. Without firm temporal or geographic limitations, the Center argues,

Article 9 potentially sweeps in an untold amount of online speech that has nothing to do with Illinois elections. The Center notes that “many Internet communications” — for example, postings on the Center’s website, emails to the Center’s membership distribution lists, or messages through social networking sites — “are equally accessible from almost anywhere in the world” and may even persist forever in cyber-space through the use of a so-called ‘Way-Back Machine” that stores web sites even after they have been removed by their creators or sponsors.

The consequence, it suggests, is that “politically-oriented websites around the world must review their content before each Illinois election to identify and remove any prior posting referring to someone who now is an Illinois candidate or something that now is an Illinois ballot question.” Keeping in mind that this is a facial challenge, we are not persuaded that this prospect invalidates the entire law. First, requiring disclosure of genuinely campaign-related Internet communications undoubtedly advances Illinois’s important interest in informing its voters about who is speaking before an election.

In recent years, a large and growing proportion of electioneering has been occurring online. In 2008, for the first time, “more than half the voting-age population used the internet to connect to the political process during an election cycle.” That portion is almost certainly higher today. By one estimate, the two major parties’ presidential campaigns will spend $159 million more on web ads in 2012 than in 2008 — a sevenfold increase.

Thanks to advanced Internet marketing strategies, campaigns and other political actors have now “acquired the technical capacity to target Web ads with the precision of mail or a door-to-door canvass.” Campaigns, parties, and advocacy groups have increasingly turned to the Internet to reach the electorate with campaign messages, and Illinois voters have just as much a stake in knowing who is behind such messages as when they are broadcast in traditional media.

On the other hand, we agree with the Center that the potential reach of Illinois’s disclosure law could be problematic if distant speakers were actually subject to regulation because their Internet postings inadvertently or obliquely coincided with the subjects of Illinois ballot measures. The state’s interest in informing its voters of the identities, financial outlays, and funding sources of such marginal political messengers does not rise to the importance the First Amendment demands.

Yet the Center has identified no case in which the State Election Board has asked out-of-state speakers to register as political committees for disseminating emails, tweets, zombie web pages, or any other Internet communications that merely mentioned Illinois candidates or discussed issues related to Illinois ballot measures. Nor could the Board legally do so, for under

Article 9 Internet ads count as electioneering communications only when they are both “targeted to the relevant [Illinois] electorate” and “susceptible to no reasonable

interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a clearly identified candidate ..., a political party, or a question of public policy.” 10 ILCS 5/9-1.14. The Center’s notion that the Board might consider an out-of-state advocacy group’s web ad generally endorsing low taxes to be an unambiguous appeal to vote for a “ballot question to balance the Illinois budget” sounds farfetched. With no evidence that the Board would actually construe

Article 9 in this surprising way, such remote, hypothetical applications do not justify invalidating Illinois’s disclosure provisions for facial over-breadth. See Washington State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) (“[W]e must be careful not to go beyond the statute’s facial requirements and speculate about ‘hypothetical’ or ‘imaginary’ cases.”), quoting United States v.

Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22, 80 S.Ct. 519, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960); see also Robert Bork, The Tempting of America 169 (1990) (“Judges and lawyers live on the slippery slope of analogies; they are not supposed to ski it to the bottom.”). For a facial challenge to prevail, a statute’s over-breadth must be “substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008). Cf. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R.R. Co. v.

Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 220, 33 S.Ct. 40, 57 L.Ed. 193 (1912) (“How the state court may apply [a statute] to other cases, whether its general words may be treated as more or less restrained, and how far parts of it may be sustained if others fail are matters upon which we need not speculate now.”). Neither the Board nor Illinois courts have had “occasion to construe the law in the context of actual disputes arising from the electoral context, or to accord the law a limiting construction to avoid constitutional questions.” Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450, 128 S.Ct. 1184.

It would be premature for this court to presume that the Board would disregard the obvious limits of the statutory text and seek to apply

Article 9 in such a sweeping fashion. The Center complains that it is too difficult to know when an “electioneering communication” is “made” on the Internet. Timing is important because of the duties that apply during the 30-day and 60-day windows before elections. See 10 ILCS 5/9-1.14(a). The district court and the defendants assert that a communication is “made” on a website both when it is first posted and while it remains available on the website. That is a sensible reading, just as a physical billboard is considered a communication made by the advertiser as long as it is displayed.

The Center wonders if it would still be responsible for later communications (within the 30-day and 60-day windows) if others copy its ads and post them on other websites. If that happens, the Center would not be “making” those later communications and would not be responsible for them. We do not anticipate that

Article 9 will restrict or chill a substantial amount of protected speech because it treats certain Internet speech as electioneering communications. On its face, this element of the statute is neither vague nor overbroad. 2. Targeted to the Relevant Electorate

Article 9 does not numerically define “targeting] the relevant electorate” as does FECA, which requires that the communication be capable of being “received by 50,000 or more persons.” 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(C). Illinois has good reasons for omitting a number. Its elections involve much smaller electorates, and it does not have an agency like the Federal Communications Commission that would let it monitor how large an audience a given broadcast reaches. This difference does not defeat Illinois’s substantial interest in informing its electorate for the purposes of this facial challenge.

In adjudicating facial challenges, federal courts do not assume that state officials will construe state law in the most expansive way imaginable. On the contrary, it “is reasonable to assume ... that a state court presented with a state statute ... will attempt to construe the statute consistently with constitutional requirements.” City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 441, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-83, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (as stated in plurality opinion).

We agree with the state that a “reasonable, and constitutional construction of ‘targeted to the relevant electorate’ means a broadcast communication receivable within the geographical area where potential voters on that candidate or issue live.” The absence of a numeric baseline does not condemn the phrase “targeted to the relevant electorate” as facially invalid.

Article 9’s definition of “electioneering communications” is not facially vague or overbroad. D. Contribution and Expenditure

Article 9 defines “contribution” as a “gift ... or anything of value, knowingly received in connection with the nomination for election, election, or retention of any candidate or person to or in public office or in connection with any question of public policy.” 10 ILCS 5/9-1.4(A)(1). “Expenditure” means “gift of money, or anything of value, [made] in connection with the nomination for election, election, or retention of any person to or in public office or in connection with any question of public policy.” 10 ILCS 5/9-1.5(A)(1).

The “transfer of funds by a political committee to another political committee” automatically qualifies as a contribution (for the transferee) and an expenditure (for the transferor). 10 ILCS 5/9-1.5(A)(3), 5/9— 1.4(A)(3). An expenditure “made in cooperation, consultation, or concert with another political committee” is considered a contribution to that committee. 10 ILCS 5/9-1.4(A)(5). The Center challenges three aspects of these

definitions as unconstitutionally vague. 1. In Connection With, Supporting, or Opposing First, the Center argues that the requirement that a contribution or expenditure be “in connection with” an election or ballot initiative is “so vague and broad as to provide no meaningful guidance.” By itself, the “in connection with” language would be of little help. But as the district court correctly observed, the scope of the “contribution” and “expenditure”

definitions is further limited by the narrower definition of “political committee,” which applies only to contributions or expenditures that are made “on behalf of or in opposition to a candidate” (for political action committees) or made “with the purpose of securing a place on the ballot for [or] advocating the defeat or passage of ... the question of public policy” (for ballot initiative committees). 10 ILCS 5/9-1.8(d), (e).

The only regulatory consequence of a transaction qualifying as a contribution or expenditure is when it triggers registration requirements for political committees, so the more circumscribed language in that latter provision is what matters for the vagueness analysis. Following McConnell, we concluded above that the “in support of or opposition” language in the definition of “ballot initiative committee” is clear enough. See

part IV. A.3. The same goes for the “on behalf of or in opposition to a candidate” language in the definition of “political action committee.” All of these

definitions “give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294. 2. Transfer of Funds from One Political Committee to Another Next, the Center attacks

Article 9’s treatment of any “transfer of funds by a political committee to another political committee” as a contribution or expenditure.

The Center claims this provision may apply to transfers with groups that qualify as political committees under the statute but have not yet registered, so it requires people “to judge whether a source or recipient of funds may later be judged to have made a $3,000 contribution, expenditure, or otherwise became a political committee.” Thus, the Center fears, it “could find itself classified as an Illinois political committee depending on how regulators later assess some other group’s speech or other activities that [the Center] could not have known about.” This result seems highly unlikely because it overlooks an important aspect of the transfer of funds provisions.

A transfer counts as a contribution and expenditure only if it is already between two entities that each qualify as political committees. See 10 ILCS 5/9-1.4(A)3 and -1.5(A)(3). That makes sense only if they each already qualify as political committees independent of the particular transfer.

The transfer to or from some other entity that is a political committee would not make the other entity a political committee. (Otherwise, for example, a contractor who produced an ad attacking a candidate for a political committee would itself be transformed into a political committee.) The mere possibility that the Board might enforce the statute in such an unfair way as the Center says it fears is a good example of the sort of “hypothetical or imaginary” situation with which courts do not concern themselves in facial challenges. Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450, 128 S.Ct. 1184.

If the Board sought to enforce

Article 9 as the Center says it fears, that might well provide a strong basis for an as-applied challenge. 3. Coordinated Expenditures Finally, the statute treats as a contribution any “electioneering communication made in concert or cooperation with or at the request, suggestion, or knowledge of a candidate, a political committee, or any of their agents.” 10 ILCS 5/9-1.4(A)(1.5) (emphases added).

The Center contends that the italicized words are vague because they do not specify the “degree of actual agreement required.” Since before Buckley, however, FECA has provided that “expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate.” 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i); see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46, 96 S.Ct. 612. With the exception of the word, “knowledge,”

Article 9’s definition of coordination is no less clear than the federal definition, which has long passed muster in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 219-23, 124 S.Ct. 619. We therefore reject the Center’s argument that the terms, “in concert or cooperation with,” “request,” and “suggestion,” are unconstitutionally vague. As for the word “knowledge,” we agree with the Center that standing alone, it would sweep in a wide range of expenditures as coordinated expenditures (and thus as indirect contributions to campaign committees).

For instance, if a candidate learned that an outside group had produced a favorable TV ad, would the candidate have “knowledge” that the electioneering communication was made? This would not be enough to say that the ad was coordinated with the campaign. Recognizing this problem, the district court adopted the limiting construction that “affirmative acquiescence is required, not mere after the fact knowledge that the advocacy has occurred.” Although we are somewhat puzzled by t

[…]