PER CURIAM. Rusty McCoy pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Finding that McCoy was an armed career criminal, the district court sentenced him to the statutory minimum of 15 years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4.
On appeal, McCoy challenges one of the predicate offenses underlying his armed-career-criminal status, arguing that aiding and abetting felony theft of a vehicle in violation of Kansas law should not automatically be deemed a “violent felony.” See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (defining “violent felony” as a crime that is punishable by more than one year in prison and “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”). Reviewing de novo, see United States v.
Mincks, 409 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir.2005), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1345, 164 L.Ed.2d 59 (2006), we conclude that McCoy’s challenge is unavailing. See United States v. Barbour, 395 F.3d 826, 827-28 (8th Cir.) (under controlling precedent, Kansas vehicle theft is violent felony within meaning of § 924(e)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 133, 163 L.Ed.2d 137 (2005). Accordingly, we affirm. . The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.