UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Mark Edward MYERS, Appellee, 439 F.3d 415

BEAM, Circuit Judge. Mark Edward Myers pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of an unregistered firearm in violation 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5845(a)(2), 5861(d), and 5871. The district court determined that the advisory guidelines sentence was thirty-seven to forty-six months, and sentenced Myers to twelve months and one day. The government appeals the sentence, as unreasonable. We remand for further fact-finding and reconsideration of Myers’ sentence. I. BACKGROUND On November 20, 2003, Myers and a friend, Shawn, met a man, Gary, at a bar.

The three left the bar to go to Gulfport, Illinois, but stopped at Myers’ house on the way. At this point the accounts of events diverge wildly, from Myers’ girlfriend’s friend’s tale of a pre-meditated attempted murder and robbery to Myers’ presentence interview account of a valiant attempt to defend his girlfriend’s honor in the face of Gary’s disparaging remarks, followed by Myers acting as peacemaker. However, it is undisputed that Myers hit and kicked Gary and that Myers used the offending firearm in connection with this assault.

After the altercation, Myers took Gary to the Lee County, Iowa, Sheriffs Office, where they both told officers that Myers had found Gary in a parking lot already beaten up. Myers then transported Gary to the hospital, because Gary said he could not afford an ambulance. A Sheriffs deputy met them at the hospital and advised Myers that he could go home. Gary was treated for facial injuries, abrasions to his left shoulder, and a large laceration to his head, receiving twelve to fourteen staples in the top of his head.

Later the same morning, Myers’ girlfriend’s friend called the Sheriffs Office to report that Myers and Shawn had assaulted Gary. Sheriffs deputies stopped Myers on his way to work, and Myers confessed to hitting Gary with a shotgun. Myers accompanied the Sheriffs deputies to his house and provided the clothing he had been wearing and the shotgun. He told the deputies that he bought the shotgun from his cousin several years earlier, which the cousin confirmed. The shotgun was determined to have a sixteen-inch barrel and an overall length of twenty-three and nine-sixteenths inches.

On January 22, 2004, Myers pled guilty to assault with intent to inflict serious injury in Iowa state court. On September 20, 2004, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, Myers pled guilty to unlawful possession of an unregistered firearm. There was no written plea agreement filed with the court. On January 24, 2005, Myers appeared for sentencing. The district court determined that the guidelines sentence was thirty-seven to forty-six months, based on the Presentence Investigation Report.

The guidelines sentence was calculated from a base offense level of eighteen, a three-level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, a two-level increase because the offense involved a destructive device, and a four-level increase because the firearm was used in connection with another felony offense. At sentencing, Myers argued that he should be sentenced to the eighteen to twenty-four month guidelines sentence without the level increases, requesting a sentence of either probation or eighteen months.

He argued that the two-level increase for possessing a destructive device should not apply, since the gun was not readily capable of launching a missile or otherwise being a destructive instrumentality. Myers also argued that since he had been punished separately in the state court for some of the conduct, the four-level increase for the firearm being used in connection with another felony offense should not apply. The government argued that Myers should be sentenced at the bottom of the guidelines range: thirty-seven months. The district court sentenced Myers to twelve months and one day.

The court considered the nature of the circumstances of the present offense, including the victim, Myers’ characteristics, and the seriousness of the offense. The court found that probation was inappropriate, considering the seriousness of the offense, the need for deterrence and the need to send a message. The court also determined that Myers needed rehabilitation and that he had made a start in rehabilitation through successful completion of an outpatient alcohol class. The government appeals the sentence as unreasonable. II. DISCUSSION A.

Standard of Review Under the advisory sentencing guidelines, we engage in a two-step inquiry on review. United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1016-17 (8th Cir.2005). We first “examine de novo whether the district court correctly interpreted and applied the guidelines.” Id. at 1017. We then review the sentence imposed for unreasonableness, taking into account the factors present in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). We have determined that a sentence imposed within the guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. United States v.

Cawthom, 429 F.3d 793, 802 (8th Cir.2005). While it does not follow that a sentence outside the guidelines range is unreasonable, we review a district court’s decision to depart from the appropriate guidelines range for abuse of discretion. United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 276, 163 L.Ed.2d 246 (2005).

Thus, “[a] discretionary sentencing ruling ... may be unreasonable if a sentencing court fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only appropriate factors but nevertheless commits a clear error of judgment by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the limited range of choice dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. at 1004. B. Reasonableness of the Sentence Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(

a) Because neither party appeals the district court’s calculation of the thirty-seven to forty-six month guidelines sentence, the sole issue is whether the imposition of a twelve-month-and-one-day sentence was unreasonable.

The government argues that the sentence is unreasonable because the district court erred (1) by giving too much weight to Myers’ lack of criminal history since the Criminal History Category of the sentencing guidelines matrix adequately accounts for this factor; (2) both by factually determining that Myers’ had his family’s support and by considering this factor in sentencing; and (3) by considering the needs of Myers’ family for economic and emotional support as a factor in sentencing. We cannot entirely agree with the government’s position.

Myers’ lack of a criminal history, while reflected in the advisory sentencing guidelines, was properly considered as part of “the history and characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The availability of support from Myers’ family and his family’s need for his support are not specifically mentioned in

section 3553(a). Though the district court did not err as a matter of course in considering these facts, the problem is that the record does not reflect how these facts connect to a relevant

section 3553(

a) factor. The issue that we face is whether a twelve-month-and-a-day sentence is unreasonable in light of the

section 3553(

a) factors considered at sentencing: the nature of the circumstances of the current of- . fense, including the victim, Myers’ characteristics, and the seriousness of the offense. Nothing about the victim was mentioned at sentencing, and the district court termed the offense “extremely serious.” The only

section 3553(

a) factor identified by the district court that weighs toward a more lenient sentence is Myers’ lack of criminal history. Inasmuch as a guidelines sentence reflects a defendant’s criminal history, a wide divergence from the guidelines sentence based solely on this single criterion would conflict with the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

Thus, if the district court’s departure is based merely on a lack of criminal history, the significant divergence from the guidelines range would be unreasonable. However, we also recognize that there is no numerical formula to determine whether a sentence is unreasonable and that significant deviations from guidelines sentences have been affirmed post-Booker. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 423 F.3d 823, 829-30 (8th Cir.2005) (affirming increase from 57-71 month guidelines range to 360-month sentence), United States v.

Pizano, 403 F.3d 991, 992 (8th Cir.2005) (affirming sentence of 18 months, which was calculated beginning with a mandatory minimum of 120 months and reduced by the guidelines’ safety valve and downward departure for substantial assistance). Though we have affirmed sentences within the guidelines range when the district court did not “categorically rehearse” each of the factors in

section 3553(a), United States v. Dieken, 432 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir.2006), we here reiterate our concern that district courts elucidate their reasoning when sentencing defendants in order to assist reviewing courts and to avoid needless appeals. United States v. Engler, 422 F.3d 692, 696-97 (8th Cir.2005); see also United States v. Dumorney, 949 F.2d 997, 998 (8th Cir.1991). Additionally, in this case, we cannot evaluate the nature of the offense conduct, since the Presentence Investigation Report contained conflicting accounts from Myers and other witnesses interviewed by the Lee County, Iowa, Sheriffs Office.

Because both parties stated that there was no factual dispute, the district court did not address the varying accounts. On appeal, we cannot evaluate the veracity of Myers’ explanation of the events and, so, must remand for further fact-finding. III. CONCLUSION We remand for imposition of sentence following more explicit and thorough consideration of all factors enumerated in

section 3553(a), without expressing any opinion on the reasonableness of the sentence that should be imposed. United States v. Feemster, 435 F.3d 881, 884 (8th Cir.2006). . The facts are gathered primarily from the Presentence Investigation Report, which contains the accounts of several witnesses. However, these accounts conflict in some important details, and discrepancies have been noted.