In re INTERSTATE BAKERIES CORPORATION, also known as Butternut Bakeries, also known as Colombo Bakery, also known as Continental Baking Company, also known as Cotton's Holsum Bakeries, also known as DiCarlo Bakery, also known as Dolly Madison Bakery, also known as Drake's Bakery, also known as Eddy's Bakery, also known as Holsum Bakery, also known as Hostess Bakeries, also known as Interstate Brands Companies, also known as Interstate Brands West Corporation, also known as J.J. Nissen Bakery, also known as Merita Bakeries, also known as Millbrook Bakeries, also known as My Bread Bakery, also known as Parisian Bakery, also known as San Francisco French Bread Company, also known as Sunbeam Bakery, also known as Sweetheart Bakery, also known as Weber's Bread, also known as Wonder Bakeries, also known as Wonder/Hostess Bakeries, Debtor, U.S. Bank National Association, in its capacity as Trustee for the IBC Creditors Trust, Appellee, v. SMF Energy Corporation, doing business as Streicher Mobile Fueling, Inc., Appellant, 476 F. App’x 97

PER CURIAM. In this appeal arising from

Chapter 11 filings by Interstate Bakeries Corporation (IBC) and seven of its affiliates, SMF Energy Corporation, doing business as Streicher Mobile Fueling, Inc. appeals the decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) affirming the bankruptcy court’s adverse judgment on preference-avoidance claims asserted by U.S. Bank National Association, the Trustee for the IBC Creditors’ Trust. This court applies the same standards of review as the BAP: we review the bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear error, and we review its conclusions of law de novo.

See In re Vote, 276 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir.2002) (standards of review). After careful review of the record and the parties’ arguments on appeal, we agree with the BAP that there is no basis for reversing the judgment of the bankruptcy court. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 3 (civil action is commenced by filing complaint with court), 15(c)(1)(B) (amendment to pleading relates back to date of original pleading when amendment asserts claim or defense that arose out of conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out in original pleading); Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7003 (Fed.R.Civ.P. 3 applies in bankruptcy proceedings), 7015 (Fed.

R.Civ.P. 15 applies in adversary proceedings); Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 150 n. 3, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (per curiam) (rationale of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(

c) is that party who has been notified of litigation concerning particular occurrence has been given all notice that statutes of limitations were intended to provide); Moore Co. of Sikeston, Mo. v.

Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co., 347 F.2d 921, 922 (8th Cir.1965) (rejecting defendant’s contention that, in addition to filing complaint, reasonable diligence in obtaining service of process was required to toll statute of limitations; plain, clear, well-understood and unambiguous language of Rule 3 provides that civil action is commenced by filing complaint with court, and rule sets forth no additional requirements or conditions); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b) (for convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, court may order separate trial of one or more separate claims); Fed. R.

Bankr.P. 7042 (Fed.R.Civ.P. 42 applies in adversary proceedings); In re Alexander, 236 F.3d 431, 433 (8th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (arguments not presented to bankruptcy court were not properly before court of appeals). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. . The Honorable Jerry W. Venters, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Western District of Missouri.