CORE-VENT CORP., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NOBEL INDUSTRIES AB, Defendant, and Per-Ingvar Branemark; Tomas Albrektsson; Ulf Lekholm; Lars Sennerby, Defendants-Appellees, 11 F.3d 1482

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge: We are called upon to decide whether a federal district court in California should exercise personal jurisdiction over four doctors in Sweden who allegedly defamed a California corporation in articles published in international medical journals. I Until very recently, Core-Vent was a California corporation with its headquarters in Encino. Core-Vent and its principal competitor, Nobelpharma AB (“Nobelpharma”), a Swedish corporation, are the two largest manufacturers of dental implants in the world.

Branemark, Albrektsson, and Lekholm are professors at the University of Gothenburg in Gothenburg, Sweden. Sennerby is a doctoral candidate at the University of Gothen-burg. (We will refer to the appellees collectively as “the Swedish doctors.”) All are Swedish citizens and none has visited the United States, or, in particular, California more than a few times on random occasions. Branemark visited California most extensively of the four and is alleged to have visited only five times in the last four years.

Brane-mark is a director of Nobelpharma, and also directs a research institute at the University that is allegedly financed by Nobelpharma. Albrektsson, Lekholm, and Sennerby work at the institute, and are alleged to be paid consultants to Nobelpharma. According to Core-Vent, Albrektsson and Lekholm co-authored, at the direction of Nobelpharma and Branemark, an

article published in the October 1989 issue of Dental Clinics of North America that “contained false and misleading comparisons of Core-Vent and Nobelpharma implants.” The journal is distributed worldwide, including within California. Albrekts-son and Sennerby similarly are alleged to have written, at Nobelpharma’s direction, an

article defaming Core-Vent. Their

article was published in the International Journal of Oral and Maxillofacial Implants, which is also distributed worldwide. Core-Vent alleges that Branemark controlled these and other studies in order to further an antitrust conspiracy. Core-Vent brought suit against Nobelp-harma, three individual American citizens, and five Swedish citizens, including the four Swedish doctors. In addition to various claims against the defendants that are not parties to this appeal, Core-Vent brought antitrust claims against Branemark and libel claims against Albrektsson, Lekholm, and Sennerby.

The Swedish doctors moved to dismiss the claims against them for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion. Final judgment was entered pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Core-Vent appeals. II As a preliminary matter, we must consider the Swedish doctors’ argument that the district court abused its discretion in granting Core-Vent’s motion for the entry of final judgment. Rule 54(

b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part: When more than one claim is presented in an action ... or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. (Emphasis added.) Here, the district court expressly determined that there was no just reason for delay because the jurisdictional claims were easily severable from the merits of the lawsuit.

The court also concluded that allowing for immediate appeal would serve the efficient administration of justice. In Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 797 (9th Cir.1991), we held that “Rule 54(

b) certification is proper if it will aid ‘expeditious decision’ of the case.” Id. (quoting Sheehan v. Atlanta Int’l Ins. Co., 812 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir.1987)). “However, Rule 54(

b) certification is scrutinized to ‘prevent piecemeal appeals in cases which should be reviewed only as single units.’ ” Id. at 797-98 (quoting McIntyre v. United States, 789 F.2d 1408, 1410 (9th Cir.1986) (internal citations and quotations omitted)). We are satisfied that dealing with the jurisdictional issue now may obviate the need for a second trial, and thus aids expeditious decision of the case.

The jurisdictional question at issue here is unrelated to the other issues in the case; thus, entry of final judgment will not lead to undesirable “piecemeal appeals.” In short, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Core-Vent’s motion under Rule 54(b). Ill The district court dismissed the claims against the Swedish doctors, concluding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over them. Where, as here, there is no applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction, the law of the state in which the district court sits applies. See Hylwa, M.D., Inc. v.

Palka, 823 F.2d 310, 312 (9th Cir.1987). This case was brought in the Central District of California; California’s long-arm statute allows courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants to the extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1286 (9th Cir.1977). Thus, we “need only determine whether personal jurisdiction in this case would meet the requirements of due process.” Brainerd v.

Governors of the Univ. of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257, 1258 (9th Cir.1989). “[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (citations omitted).

Where the defendant has not had continuous and systematic contacts with the state sufficient to subject him or her to general jurisdiction, the following three-part test is applied to determine whether the defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum:

(1) The nonresident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable. Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir.1987).

Here, Core-Vent claims that the Swedish doctors purposefully directed their activities into California by publishing or causing to be published libelous articles about Core-Vent’s products in international medical journals. The libel claims clearly “arose out” of the publication of the articles; we thus need consider only the first and third elements of the minimum contacts test.

A “The first step of the specific jurisdiction analysis involves a qualitative evaluation of the defendant’s contact with the forum state,” Lake, 817 F.2d at 1421, in order to determine whether the “defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). Fulfilling this step is not necessarily precluded by a lack of physical contacts with the forum.

Rather, “within the rubric of ‘purposeful availment’ the [Supreme] Court has allowed the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant whose only ‘contact’ with the forum state is the ‘purposeful direction’ of a foreign act having effect in the forum state.” Haisten v. Grass Valley Medical Reimbursement Fund, 784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir.1986) (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 1487, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984)). Core-Vent claims that the Swedish doctors’ contacts with California are analogous to those of the individual defendants in Calder.

The plaintiff in Calder was an entertainer who lived and worked in California. She brought suit there, claiming that she had been libeled by an

article written in Florida and published in the National Enquirer, a newspaper published in Florida with a large circulation in California. Two of the defendants in the ease, the editor of the paper and the reporter who wrote the story, moved for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction on the ground that they lacked physical contacts with California. Calder, 465 U.S. at 784-85, 104 S.Ct. at 1484-85.

The Court concluded that because “California [was] the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered,” id. at 789, 104 S.Ct. at 1486-87, “[j]urisdiction over [the defendants was] ... proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.” Id. The Court stressed that the defendants had not engaged in “untarget-ed negligence” but instead had “expressly aimed” their tortious actions at a California resident. Id. at 789, 104 S.Ct. at 1487.

In determining that the actions were “expressly aimed” at the forum state, the Court considered the totality of the circumstances surrounding the events. Id. at 788, 104 S.Ct. at 1486. The activities that were the subject of the story took place in California, and the story was - drawn from California sources. Id. at 788-89, 104 S.Ct. at 1486-87. Most significant, the court concluded defendants knew that the brunt of the harm would be suffered in California for two reasons.

First, since the defendants knew that the plaintiff lived and worked in California, the defendant knew that the negative effects on the plaintiffs reputation would primarily be suffered there. Id. at 789-90, 104 S.Ct. at 1487. Second, the defendant knew that the National Enquirer had a large circulation in California — in fact the largest of any place in the country. The Court concluded that the effects of a libel would be felt most severely in the place where the libel was most extensively published.

Id. “Under these circumstances,” the Court concluded, the defendants “must [have] reasonably anticipated] being haled into court” in California. Id. at 790, 104 S.Ct. at 1487 (citations omitted). Calder thus established that personal jurisdiction can be predicated on (1) intentional actions (2) expressly aimed at the forum state (3) causing harm, the brunt of which is suffered — and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered — in the forum state.

Although Calder did not purport to make this an exclusive list of the circumstances under which the new “effects test” could be applied, we have thus far refused to extend the holding to defendants whose contacts are more remote. In Casualty Assurance Risk Insurance Brokerage Co. v. Dillon, 976 F.2d 596, 601 (9th Cir.1992), for example, we refused to accept the plaintiffs argument that the ef-fécts of libel-are felt and jurisdiction exists wherever a corporate plaintiff resides. Likewise, in McGlinchy v.

Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 817 (9th Cir.1988), we refused to apply the Calder effects test when the underlying action involved a contract dispute, not a tort. Cf., e.g., Brainerd, 878 F.2d 1257 (jurisdiction upheld where facts were analogous to Calder). Whether the conduct in this case meets the Calder effects test is a close question. Core-Vent suggests that Calder is precisely analogous to the situation here. We are unpersuaded. First, we cannot conclude by analogy to Calder alone that the acts in question here were “expressly directed” at California.

While in Calder the events underlying the libelous story occurred in California and the story was researched through California sources, here the libel concerned a product that was distributed worldwide. It has not been alleged that the product reached the doctors other than through the stream of commerce. Unlike in Calder, therefore, the articles cannot be seen as a comment on a California event. Moreover, while any

article written in the National Enquirer might well be directed at a California audience, here, by contrast, although the medical journals were circulated worldwide, it has not been alleged that California was a primary audience for the medical journals or that the defendants knew that the journals would be circulated in that state. Second, unlike in Calder, it is unclear whether the brunt of the harm was suffered in California. Calder involved a libel against an individual; this case involves a libel against a corporation.

A corporation does not suffer harm in a particular geographic location in the same sense that an individual does. We concluded in Dillon that the harm from an allegedly libelous statement is not necessarily suffered in the place of incorporation. Dillon, 976 F.2d at 599-600. We have never considered whether such harm is primarily suffered in the place where the corporation is headquartered. Although we cannot conclude that Calder is precisely analogous, Calder does not preclude the possibility that acts were expressly directed at the forum state.

The libelous articles were written about the product of a California corporation, and the Swedish doctors were allegedly aware of the California affiliation. Moreover, the Swedish doctors allegedly intended their actions to cause harm in California. According to Core-Vent, the doctors wrote the articles with the express purpose of driving Core-Vent out of business. Nor does Calder preclude us from deciding that the harm was suffered in California.

The Swedish doctors argue that acts intended to harm a corporation cannot be said to be directed at any particular geographic location, and thus Calder does not apply to any case in which the plaintiff is a corporation. We must reject this contention. Such a categorical approach is antithetical to Calder’s admonishment that the personal jurisdiction inquiry cannot be answered through the application of a mechanical test but instead must focus on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation within the particular factual context of each ease. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789, 104 S.Ct. at 1487.

Moreover, other circuits have implicitly rejected this argument, applying Calder without comment in cases with corporate plaintiffs. See, e.g., First American First v. National Ass’n of Bank Women, 802 F.2d 1511, 1517 (4th Cir.1986); Blue Ridge Bank v. Veribanc, Inc., 755 F.2d 371 (4th Cir.1985); see also Paccar Int'l, Inc. v. Commercial Bank of Kuwait, 757 F.2d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir.1985) (suggesting by negative implication that the Calder analysis could apply in some situations where a corporation was the plaintiff).

Thus, instead of easy categorization, determining where the brunt of the harm is felt requires a difficult case-specific analysis. Here, there are powerful arguments on both sides. Unlike the corporation in Dillon, Core-Vent’s principal place of business was in the forum state and thus any economic effects were arguably ultimately felt there. On the other hand, the brunt of the harm was perhaps felt most strongly where the libelous statements affected business most significantly.

Core-Vent does not allege that this effect was felt most significantly in California. “Though neither side decisively triumphs under this analysis,” Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 622 (9th Cir.1991), we will assume that purposeful availment prong has been satisfied. We need not decide this issue definitively, however, because we conclude in Part B that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable in any event. See FDIC v. British-American Ins.

Co., Ltd., 828 F.2d 1439, 1442 (9th Cir.1987) (declining to decide if the defendant had purposefully availed itself of the forum state in light of the conclusion that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable). B “Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum State, these contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2184, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985).

However, “where a defendant who purposefully has directed his activities at forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” Id. Nevertheless, “jurisdictional rules may not be employed in such a way as to make litigation ‘so gravely difficult and inconvenient’ that a party unfairly is at a ‘severe disadvantage in comparison to his opponent.’ ” Id. at 478, 105 S.Ct. at 2185 (citations omitted).

In determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with “fair play and substantial justice,” we must consider seven factors: (1) the extent of the defendants’ purposeful interjection into the forum state’s affairs; (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendants’ state; (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiffs interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum.

Paccar, 757 F.2d at 1065. None of the factors is dispositive in itself; instead, we must balance all seven. Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 623 (9th Cir.1991). We consider each factor in turn. 1 We first consider the extent of the Swedish doctors’ purposeful interjection into the forum state. Although perhaps sufficient to meet the purposeful availment test, the Swedish doctors’ contacts with the forum state are nevertheless attenuated. Some of our cases have suggested that once the minimum contacts threshold is met the degree of intrusion into the forum becomes irrelevant. See Corporate Invest.

Business Brokers v. Melcher, 824 F.2d 786, 787 (9th Cir.1987). We made plain in our very first case to articulate the reasonableness factors, however, that the extent of interjection is to be considered: Even if there is sufficient ‘interjection’ into the state to satisfy the [purposeful availment prong], the degree of interjection is a factor to be weighed in assessing the overall reasonableness of jurisdiction under the [reasonableness prong]. Insurance Company of North America v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir.1981).

We went on to conclude, “[t]he smaller the element of purposeful interjection, the less is jurisdiction to be anticipated and the less reasonable is its exercise.” Id. This is consistent with the approach of the Supreme Court. In Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476, 105 S.Ct. at 2184, for example, the Court stated that the minimum contacts must be evaluated “in light of’ the reasonableness factors, suggesting that the minimum contacts and reasonableness factors occupy a sliding scale. Similarly, as one commentator noted, the Court in Asahi Metal Industry Company v.

Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987), suggested that “a greater volume of additional connections is required to justify the exercise of jurisdiction” when the reasonableness factors weigh in the defendant’s favor. See Earl M. Maltz, Unraveling the Conundrum of the Law of Personal Jurisdiction: A Comment on Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 1987 Duke L.J. 669, 689-90.

In any event, the cases purporting not to consider the extent of contacts are ambiguous; although claiming that the degree of interjection is irrelevant, the cases have explicitly considered the extent of contacts in deciding how much weight to give other factors. Compare, e.g., Sinatra v. National Enquirer, 854 F.2d 1191, 1199 (refusing to consider the extent of availment), with id. at 1199 (looking at continuing contacts with forum state in determining burden).

In short, we conclude that notwithstanding cases suggesting otherwise, we must consider the exiguity of the Swedish doctors’ contacts with California in conducting the balance. Since the doctors’ contacts were attenuated, this factor weighs in their favor. However, we cannot say that it weighs heavily in their favor given our assumption that they were sufficient to meet the purposeful availment prong. 2 We next consider the burden on the Swedish doctors of defending a lawsuit in California.

The Supreme Court has recognized that defending a lawsuit in a foreign country can impose a substantial burden on a nonresident alien. “The unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114, 107 S.Ct. at 1033. The burden in this case is particularly great because the Swedish doctors have no ongoing connection to or relationship with the United States. Cf.

Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1199 (“The continuing contacts between the [Swiss] [c]linic’s United States-based agent and California translate into less of a litigation burden than if the Clinic maintained no physical presence or agent within the United States.”). Our cases have also been inconsistent in determining whether the corresponding burden on plaintiff in bringing the claims against the defendant in an alternate forum should lessen the impact of this factor on the overall reasonableness determination. Compare, e.g., Pacific Atlantic Trading Co. v.

M/V Main Exp., 758 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir.1985) (“the burden on the defendant is the primary concern” and thus the possible burden on the plaintiff does not dilute the strength of this factor), with Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1199 (“the burden on the defendant must be examined in light of the corresponding burden on the plaintiff’)- We need not reconcile these standards today, however, because the burdens in this case fall asymmetrically. The burden on the Swedish doctors of defending in California would be substantially greater than the burden on Core-Vent in bringing their claims in Sweden.

The doctors are individuals with little or no physical contacts with California. Core-Vent, on the other hand, is a large international corporation with worldwide distribution of its products. Regardless whether the burden on the plaintiff is considered, this factor weighs heavily in favor of the doctors. Despite its strong weight, this factor alone is not dispositive. “Modern advances in communications and transportation have significantly reduced the burden of litigating in another country.” Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1199.

While defending the lawsuit in California would be difficult for the Swedish doctors, it would not be impossible. 3 The next factor concerns the extent to which the exercise of jurisdiction would conflict with the sovereignty of the defendants’ state. “[T]he foreign-acts-with-forum-effects jurisdictional principle must be applied with caution, particularly in an international context.” Pacific Atlantic Trading Co., 758 F.2d at 1330. “Great care and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115, 107 S.Ct. at 1034 (citation omitted). “[LJitigation against an alien defendant creates a higher jurisdictional barrier than litigation against a citizen from a sister state because important sovereignty concerns exist.” Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1199.

In determining how much weight to give this factor, we have focused on the presence or absence of connections to the United States in general, not just to the forum state. Sovereignty concerns weigh more heavily when the defendants have no United States-based relationships. Id. at 1191. For example; in Sinatra, we found it significant that the defendant — a Swiss clinic — had an agent in the United States who actively solicited business in California and considered California one of the clinic’s best sources of American clients.

Id. at 1191; see also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112-13, 107 S.Ct. at 1032 (absence of agent or subsidiary in the United States enhanced sovereignty concerns); FDIC v. British-American Ins. Co., 828 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir.1987) (absence of officer, affiliate or subsidiary in United States significant in evaluating sovereignty concerns). Here, the Swedish doctors are individuals with no United States-based relationships.

Thus, the sovereignty factor also weighs heavily in the Swedish doctors’ favor. 4 We next' consider California’s interest in adjudicating the suit. “California maintains a strong interest in providing an effective means of redress for its residents [who are] tortiously injured.” Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1200; cf. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 118-19, 107 S.Ct. at 1035 (weak state interest because plaintiff is non-resident of California). Here, when the allegedly libelous articles were published and when the lawsuit was brought, Core-Vent was incorporated and had its operations in California.

This factor weighs in Core-Vent’s favor. 5 The next factor concerns the efficiency of the forum. In evaluating this factor, we have looked primarily at where the witnesses and the evidence are likely to be located. Id. We decline to speculate where the evidence and witnesses are likely to be located in this ease, however, because neither party has addressed this issue.

The fact that the lawsuit will continue in California with other parties tips the efficiency factor in Core-Vent’s favor. 6 We finally consider whether an alternate fortim exists, as well as the convenience and effectiveness of relief for the plaintiff. Here, the claims against the Swedish doctors could possibly be brought in Sweden. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the unavailability of an alternative forum. Pacific Atlantic, 758 F.2d at 1331.

Core-Vent has not met its burden of proving that it would be precluded from suing the doctors in Sweden. “Doubtless [it] would prefer not to, but that is not the test.” Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d at 625. The maintenance of a suit in Sweden may be costly and inconvenient for Core-Vent, but Core-Vent has not shown that its libel claims cannot be effectively remedied there. See Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1201. Moreover, Core-Vent can get full relief from the remaining defendants in its action in California. The effectiveness of relief does not seem to be compromised by the dismissal of the doctors.

In any event, neither the Supreme Court nor our court has given much weight to inconvenience to the plaintiff. As we noted in Garcia Marquez, “no doctorate in astrophysics is required to deduce that trying a case where one lives is almost always a plaintiffs preference.” 942 F.2d at 624.

A mere preference on the part of the plaintiff for its home forum does not affect the balancing; indeed, this factor is insignificant in this case. 7 We conclude, based on these factors, that the Swedish doctors have presented a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would not comport with fair play and substantial justice and would thus be unreasonable. We are not unmindful that California has a strong interest in providing a forum to those who are injured in its state.

However, where the plaintiff is an international corporation and where the defendants are individual citizens of a foreign country who lack connections to the United States and whose purposeful interjection into the forum state has been very limited, that interest must give way. Requiring the doctors to submit to the jurisdiction of the court would impose substantial burdens on them and would interfere with the sovereignty of a foreign nation.

The Supreme Court in Asahi indicated that a plaintiff seeking to hale a foreign citizen before a court in the United States must meet a higher jurisdictional threshold than is required when the defendant is a United States citizen. Indeed, commentators have suggested that the international factors were determinative in Asahi. See, e.g., Maltz, supra

Part III.B.A., at 689-91. We conclude that Core-Vent has not met this higher threshold here. IV Core-Vent makes several additional arguments regarding the district court’s refusal to exercise jurisdiction over Branemark. None has merit. We reject the contention that the district court can exercise general jurisdiction over Branemark. In support of its claim that Branemark has had systematic and continuous contacts with California, Core-Vent alleges only that Branemark attended five medical conferences in California over the last four years.

Branemark cannot be “haled into a jurisdiction as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.” Lake, 817 F.2d at 1421. We likewise reject the argument that Branemark agreed to submit to jurisdiction in California. In an unrelated patent infringement case, Core-Vent, Nobelpharma, and Branemark entered into a settlement agreement that provided, in part, that the enforcement of the agreement was to occur in California courts. That agreement has no bearing on this suit.

Core-Vent finally contends that because Nobelpharma, at Branemark’s direction, filed suit against Core-Vent in California in an unrelated action, Branemark should be subject to personal jurisdiction in all cases involving Core-Vent. Core-Vent offers no support for the proposition that in such circumstances the exercise of jurisdiction is proper. We reject the argument. V In sum, we conclude that the district court properly declined to exercise jurisdiction over the Swedish doctors. AFFIRMED. . According to the appellees, Core-Vent moved its headquarters to Nevada sometime after the district court's ruling. .

The libel claims were brought against Albrekts-son, Lekholm, and Sennerby but not Branemark. Antitrust claims were brought against Brane-mark. However, Core-Vent claims that the antitrust conspiracy was furthered through the articles. For purposes of this appeal, we will assume arguendo that the claims against Brane-mark arose out of the libelous articles that were allegedly written at Branemark's direction. . The dissent's reliance on Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984), is misdirected. Keeton is distinguishable from both Calder and the instant case.

In Keeton the defendant was a nationally published magazine; in Calder and here, the moving defendants were individuals employed by magazines. As the Court noted in Keeton, "jurisdiction over an employee does not automatically follow from jurisdiction over the corporation which employs him.” 465 U.S. at 781 n. 13, 104 S.Ct. at 1482 n. 13. Thus, although California may well have had jurisdiction,, according to Keeton, over the magazine that published the doctors' article, it does not follow that by the same rule California has jurisdiction over the doctors.