Xu Ming LI; Xin Kui Yu, Petitioners, v. John ASHCROFT, Attorney General, Respondent, 312 F.3d 1094

Opinion by Judge WALLACE; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge PAEZ. WALLACE, Senior Circuit Judge. Xu Ming Li and Xin Kui Yu petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (Board) decision to deny their applications for asylum and withholding of removal under both 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(

A) and

Article 3 of the United Nations’ Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention), opened for signature February 4, 1985, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 20 (1988), 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1028 (1984). The Board had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b)(2) and § 240.53. We have jurisdiction over these timely filed petitions under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(

a) and 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(e). We deny the petitions. I. Xu Ming Li, born on February 26, 1979, was raised in a village within Fu Chow City, Fujian Province, People’s Republic of China. After graduating from the Chinese equivalent of junior high school in 1995, she lived at home with her parents, where she helped with household chores. Xin Kui Yu was raised in the same village as Xu Ming Li. By the time of an August 10, 1999 hearing before the Immigration Judge (IJ), he was twenty-two years old. Xin graduated from the Chinese equivalent of high school at the age of nineteen in 1996.

Following graduation he worked as a fisherman. Xu and Xin met through a mutual friend at a McDonald’s restaurant in Fu Chow City on August 1, 1998. They quickly fell in love and began seeing each other on a daily basis. So that she and Xin could spend more time together, Xu moved from her parents’ newer five-story house to her parents’ older and empty two-and-a-half-story house. Xin often stayed with Xu at the old house until two or three in the morning and rumors began to circulate throughout their small village. On August 15th, a man from the village confronted Xu at the old house.

He told her that her relationship with Xin was “shameful” and that she should end it. Xu replied that she “did not believe in the policy,” and that it was not fair. She said “this is freedom for being in love.... You should not interfere this .... I’m going to have many babies with my boyfriend ...,” and “you have nothing to do with this.... ” She then told him to get out. Before leaving, the man warned her to “be careful” and said that she would pay. Two days later, two nurses from the “Department of Birth Control” came to Xu’s house to take her to a medical center for a pregnancy examination.

Xu described the incident: Two men pressing on my, both of my arms. I was taken to the birth control department of the village. I was put on a bench. Two nurse [sic] came in. They put their hands on my arm, and the doctor came in to examine my private area. I was so scared. I was yelling. I was making noises.... I said you guys are not fair to me. That is no reason to do this to me. Let me go. Let me go. Release me. I was kicking my feet. The family planning person came in and pressed my leg. Stop yelling. If keep on yelling, and in the future you are subject to this kind of test anytime.

And if you are found pregnant, then you are subject to abortion, and your boyfriend will also be, will under sterilization operation. For the rest of your life you cannot have child. The examination lasted approximately half an hour. On August 25th, Xu and Xin went to the head of the village’s Family Planning Department to apply for a marriage certificate. There, Xu learned that the minimum marriage age was twenty for females and twenty-two for males. Xu and Xin were nineteen and twenty-one, respectively.

The head of the Family Planning Department sent them to the leader of the village, presumably to seek a waiver, as Xin testified that in certain circumstances the village leader could waive the age requirement. The leader of the village denied their request and sent them on their way. Shortly thereafter, a neighbor named Lin Shao suggested that Xu and Xin go to the United States and offered to help them in the endeavor. After taking their pictures and collecting information from them, Shao told them he would arrange for them to leave in a week.

While Xu and Xin were waiting to hear from Lin, the rumors continued to swirl and the situation became increasingly difficult for them and their families. In an attempt to quell the gossip and harassment, Xu and Xin, with the blessing of their parents, decided to marry despite the age restrictions. They were engaged to be married on October 8th and began preparations on the 10th for the wedding. On either the 10th or the 15th of October, they tried once more to obtain a marriage certificate but were unsuccessful.

Wedding invitations were sent out on the 17th for a combined ceremony and banquet that was to be held on the 24th. On October 19th, a classmate of Xin’s (who happened to be a government messenger) told Xin that he had seen a copy of an arrest order for Xin and Xu that was to be carried out the next day. Fearing the worst, Xin and Xu fled to Guang Chi to stay with one of Xin’s friends. After Xin and Xu arrived in Guang Chi, they called home and learned that the Security Bureau had indeed come looking for them. Xu and Xin stayed in Guang Chi until Xu’s parents arrived on October 31st.

The parents took them to Fuzhou and bought them tickets to fly to Dau Lin on November 1st. After arriving in Dao Lin, Xu and Xin took a ship to South Korea. From Korea, they flew to San Francisco, California on November 5, 1998, where they presented themselves as United States citizens. After being questioned, they admitted that they were citizens of China. The Immigration and Naturalization Service then sought to have them removed for seeking admission to the United States by fraudulent means in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).

At a hearing on February 1, 1999, Xu conceded that she was removable but applied for asylum and withholding of removal. The IJ found Xu and Xin’s testimony to be credible but concluded that Xu was not eligible for asylum or entitled to withholding , of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1281(b)(3)(

A) because she failed to demonstrate that she had been persecuted in China or that she had a well-founded fear of persecution. The IJ further determined that she was not entitled to withholding of removal under

Article 3 of the Convention because she failed to prove that she had been tortured. The Board accepted the IJ’s decision and dismissed Xu’s administrative appeal. When the Board adopts theTJ’s decision, we treat the IJ’s decision and the Board’s decision as one and the same. Gonzalez v. INS, 82 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir.1996). We review factual findings underlying the Board’s dismissal of Xu’s appeal for substantial evidence. See Ochave v. INS, 254 F.3d 859, 861-62 (9th Cir.2001).

This means that we will grant the petition only if the evidence in the record is so strong that it compels a contrary conclusion. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Chen v. INS, 266 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir.2001) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). ‘We review de. novo purely legal questions regarding the requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act ... although the BIA’s

interpretation of the meaning of the statute is entitled to deference according to the rules of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S,Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).” Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). II. With a few exceptions not relevant here, the Attorney General, in his discretion, may grant asylum to an alien who qualifies as a refugee under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). A refugee under

section 1101(a)(42)(

A) is a person who is “unable or unwilling to return” to her home country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Id. An alien may also be entitled to withholding of removal. To qualify for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), an alien must establish by a “clear probability” that her “life or freedom would be threatened” upon return because of her “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Navas v.

INS, 217 F.3d 646, 655 (9th Cir.2000); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). - Withholding of removal’s “clear probability” standard is more stringent than asylum’s “well-founded fear” standard, in part because withholding of removal is a mandatory form of relief. Navas, 217 F.3d at 655- Consequently, “failure to satisfy the lesser standard of proof required to establish eligibility for asylum necessarily results in a failure to demonstrate eligibility for withholding of deportation.” Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We will therefore first determine whether Xu is eligible for asylum before turning to withholding of removal. The relationship between China’s one-child policy and our asylum laws has stirred some controversy in the last fifteen years. In In re Chang, 20 I, & N. Dec. 38, 1989 WL 247513 (B.I.A.1989), the Board officially determined that a person who was subject to China’s one-child policy did not qualify for asylum or withholding of deportation on that basis alone because subjection to the one-child policy, even if it included

an act as severe as forced sterilization, would not constitute persecution “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Id. at 46-47 (emphasis added). The House of Representatives responded to the Board’s decision in Chang some years later when it held hearings to highlight some of China’s population control practices. Coercive Population Control in China: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Operations and Human Rights of the Comm, on Int’l Relations of the House of Representatives, 104th Cong. (1995).

Not long after the hearings, the House drafted language to reverse the Chang decision and extend asylum protection to victims of coercive family planning practices in China. That language ultimately became law as

section 601 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub.L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-546.

Section 601 added a new third sentence to the refugee definition in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42): For purposes of determinations under this chapter, a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).

Only 1,000 people may be admitted each year under this new provision. Id. § 1157(a)(5). A handful of decisions have addressed the meaning of the amendment. In re X-P-T, 21 I. & N. Dec. 634, 635, 1996 WL 727127 (B.I.A.1996), took the obvious step of acknowledging IIRIRA’s reversal of Chang when it extended asylum protection to an alien that had been forcibly sterilized under China’s one-child policy. In In re C-Y-Z, 21 I. & N.

Dec. 915, 1997 WL 353222 (B.I.A.1997), the Board extended asylum protection under this provision even further when it concluded that the spouse of a person who had been forcibly sterilized was also eligible for asylum. See also Zhao v. Reno, 265 F.3d 83, 95 (2d Cir.2001). The Fourth Circuit in Chen v. INS, 195 F.3d 198, 201 (4th Cir.1999), addressed an alien’s well-founded fear of being forcibly sterilized upon return to China. To date, the cases have focused on the “involuntary sterilization” portion of the new third sentence.

We are the first Circuit to address the meaning of the new third sentence’s more opaque “other resistance to a coercive population control program” language. A. Xu first argues that she is eligible for asylum and entitled to withholding of deportation because she was persecuted in China for resisting its coercive family planning practices.

The first part of the new third sentence in the refugee definition states: [A] person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account,of political opinion ... 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).

This passage describes four categories of individuals deemed to have been persecuted because of political opinion: 1) those forced to have an abortion, 2) those forcibly sterilized, 3) those persecuted because they failed or refused to undergo 1 or 2, and 4) those persecuted for their “other resistance to a coercive population control program.” Id. Based on the plain language of the statute, an alien in categories 1 or 2 need not prove persecution, apparently because forced abortion and involuntary sterilization are persecution per se under the new provision.

An alien in categories 3 or 4, however, must show that her treatment was also persecutory. Thus, to take advantage of sentence three’s “other resistance” clause, Xu must demonstrate that she was 1) persecuted 2) on account of 3) her resistance to 4) a “coercive population control program.” Id. Each persecution inquiry is unique and depends to a great extent on the facts of the particular case. Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967-68 (9th Cir.1998). Yet no case is decided in a vacuum.

We have frequently relied on analogous factual settings in past cases to help us decide whether to grant or deny asylum petitions for review. Id. Unfortunately, no reported case is quite like this one. As we have pointed out, there are a handful of cases that deal with forced sterilization. Those cases, though, seem to involve a type of suffering that is different in degree and duration. One of our previous decisions, while not identical to this case, is comparable. Pra-sad v.

INS, 47 F.3d 336 (9th Cir.11-1995), is one of a number of cases involving the alleged persecution of Fijians of Indian descent at the hands of ethnic Fijians following a 1987 coup in Fiji. Prasad, a Fijian of Indian descent, was stopped and arrested by ethnic Fijians while he was driving his taxi. He was taken to a police station where he was placed in a cell. Id. at 339. While there, he was “hit on his stomach and kicked from behind.” Id. He was released after somewhere between four and six hours. Id.

Though in Prasad we thought that a reasonable fact-finder could have determined that Prasad’s treatment was persecutory, we affirmed the Board because the evidence did not compel such a determination. Id. at 340. Prasad’s experience is in some ways comparable to Xu’s. Prasad and Xu were both detained by .governmental officials and physically mistreated. There are significant differences in Prasad and Xu’s experiences, however. Xu’s pregnancy examination, for example, is hardly comparable to Prasad being hit and kicked.

Further, Prasad was detained for between four and six hours while Xu was detained for only half-an-hour. While Prasad’s experience was not altogether like Xu’s, their experiences are sufficiently comparable that we can resolve this case by following the approach used in Prasad. Here, the Board could have concluded that Xu was persecuted on the record before it. Yet that record was not so compelling that it required such a conclusion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Chen, 266 F.3d at 1098. We have stated that persecution under the asylum laws does not include every act that our society would deem offensive. Ghaly v.

INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir.1995). Rather, it includes only those acts which are extreme. Id. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision that Xu’s treatment did not constitute persecution as thus .understood under the asylum laws. Because Xu has failed to satisfy the persecution element of the refugee definition’s third sentence, we need not decide whether she has satisfied the remaining elements. Xu also argues that the record compels us to conclude that she was persecuted on account of her membership in a “particular social group.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).

Because substantial evidence supports the. Board’s decision that Xu was not persecuted, we have no need to decide this question either. B. Xu next argues that she is eligible for asylum because the evidence compels us to conclude that she has a well-founded' fear of persecution. Because substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that Xu was not persecuted, we will not presume that Xu has a well-founded fear of persecution. See Navas, 217 F.3d at 657. Instead, Xu must demonstrate that she has a “subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable” fear of persecution if she returns to China.

Fisher, 79 F.3d at 960. The subjective component may be satisfied by credible testimony that the applicant genuinely fears persecution. The objective component requires a showing by credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record, of facts supporting a reasonable fear of persecution on the relevant ground. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). ' ■ • The Board concluded that Xu “came to the United States ... to get married and to get a job.” Xu and Xin are both now old enough to marry legally in China.

Xu has pointed to no evidence which suggests that she will be persecuted upon her return either for her desire to marry legally or for her past resistance to China’s marriage laws. Consequently, Xu’s fear, assuming it exists, is not objectively reasonable, and the Board’s decision that she does not have a well-founded fear of future persecution is supported by substantial evidence. C. Because substantial evidence supports the Board’s denial of Xu’s asylum application, it also supports the Board’s denial of her withholding of deportation application. Fisher, 79 F.3d at 961. III. Xu also seeks protection under

Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention), opened for signature February 4, 1985, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 20 (1988), 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1028 (1984). The United States signed the Convention on April 18, 1988, and the Senate ratified it on October 27, 1990. 136 Cong. Rec. S17, 486-501 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). The Convention became binding on the United States in November of 1994 after President Clinton delivered the ratifying documents to the United Nations. U.N.

Doc. 571 Leg/SER.E/13.IV.9 (1995); Convention, art. 27(2). The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 initiated the implementation of the Convention.

Section 2242, Pub.L. No. 105-277, Div. G, 112 Stat. 2681-761 (Oct. 21, 1998) (codified at note to 8 U.S.C. § 1281). It states that “[i]t shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected, to torture ....” Id. It authorizes the appropriate agencies to adopt implementing regulations. Id. Those regulations are contained in 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16 .18.

They state that “[protection under the Convention Against Torture will be granted either in the form of withholding of removal or ... deferral of removal,” Id. § 208.16(c)(4), and define torture as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person information or a confession, punishing him or her for

an act he or she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. Id. § 208.18(a)(1). The regulations further state that “[t]or-ture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment and does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment....” Id. § 208.18(a)(2).

As with a traditional application for withholding of deportation, and unlike asylum’s less rigorous “well-founded fear” standard, the applicant must prove that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed” to receive protection under the Convention.

Id. § 208.16(c)(2). [T]he Convention’s reach is both broader and narrower than that of a claim for asylum or withholding of deportation: coverage is broader because a petitioner need not show that he or she would be tortured “on account of’ a protected ground; it is narrower, however, because the petitioner must show that it is “more likely than not” that he or she will be tortured, and not simply persecuted upon removal to a given country. Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir.2001).

The Board accepted the IJ’s conclusion that Xu had not been subjected to an “extreme form of cruel, inhuman treatment” because, at most, she had been forcibly examined. It is possible that the IJ believed that an applicant is entitled to protection under the Convention on the basis of past torture alone. This would be error because protection under the Convention extends only to cases involving a likelihood of future torture. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4).

Because nearly all of the evidence presented to the IJ went to Xu’s past treatment, we will assume that the IJ followed the regulations by considering evidence of past torture to determine the likelihood that she would be tortured if she returned to China. Id. § 208.16(c) (3) (i). While one may condemn the way Xu was treated as inconsistent with human rights, we cannot say that the record compels us to conclude that her treatment was an “extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment,” or that she would likely face such extreme treatment upon her return.

Id. § 208.18(a)(2). • The Board’s conclusion that Xu was not entitled to withholding of deportation under the Convention is supported by substantial evidence. IV. Finally, Xu contends that the IJ made a number of procedural, factual, and legal errors. With respect to procedure, Xu argues that the IJ erred when he 1) failed to limit the cross-examination of Xin’s brother to matters addressed during his direct examination and 2) failed to admit documentary evidence. Proceedings before the IJ, however, are not bound by strict evidentiary rules. Lopez-Chavez v. INS, 259 F.3d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir.2001).

Instead, the proceedings must be consistent with the requirements of due process. Id. Xu cites no authority, and we are aware of none, which suggests that the IJ’s decisions on these evidentiary questions violated Xu’s right to due process. Her evidentiary arguments are therefore of no matter. Xu also argues that the IJ erred when it cut her case short and when it relied on certain factual errors. Unfortunately, Xu has not cited authority for these arguments, nor has she explained why they justify our intervention. Consequently, we deem these arguments waived. See FDIC v.

Garner, 126 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir.1997). Xu finally contends that the’ IJ failed to apply the new “coercive population control” portion of the refugee definition. Not so. The IJ determined that the “coercive population control” portion of the refugee definition was not “eontroll[ing]” because Xu’s treatment did not rise to the level of past persecution. Xin’s petition is denied for the same reasons we deny Xu’s petition. Petitions DENIED. .

The dissent argues that “the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution cannot be rebutted merely by pointing to changes in an applicant’s personal life.” We need not determine whether this statement of the law is correct because, as we have stated, Xu does not enjoy a presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution. See Navas, 217 F.3d at 657. Moreover, changes in the applicant's personal life have direct bearing on whether the applicant has a “subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable” fear of persecution under Fisher, 79 F.3d at 960.