Fernando ARANDA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Elizabeth MEYERS; et al., Defendants-Appellees, 369 F. App'x 874

MEMORANDUM Fernando Aranda, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging improper electronic surveillance within the prison and a conspiracy to poison him. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000), and we affirm. The district court properly dismissed the surveillance claim because Aranda’s allegations regarding the prison’s use of electronic surveillance do not state a Fourth Amendment claim. See Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527-28, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (“A right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal order.”). The district court properly dismissed the conspiracy claim because Aranda’s allegations do not indicate that the defendant correctional officers conspired to poison Aranda’s coffee, threaten him, or falsely accuse him of being a child molester. See Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v.

Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (“[T]he court [is not] required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims after properly dismissing the federal claims. See Bnjant v. Adventist Health Sys./West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir.2002). Aranda’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive. AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.