Dorothy PERALTA, Steven S. Begverdi, and James Moscoso, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., fka America's Wholesale Lender; Countrywide Bank, FSB, Defendants-Appellees, 375 F. App'x 784

MEMORANDUM Plaintiffs-appellants Dorothy Peralta, Steven S. Begverdi, and James Moscoso appeal under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1), from the denial of their motion to remand to California state court a putative class action case against Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., fka America’s Wholesale Lender, and Countrywide Bank, FSB (“Countrywide Bank”) (collectively “Countrywide”). We vacate the order granting plaintiffs-appellants’ application to appeal, and dismiss the appeal as improvidently granted.

Countrywide removed the putative class action case from California state court under CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), which vests district courts with jurisdiction over class actions if the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.00, and any member of the class is a citizen of a state different from any defendant.

The district court denied the remand motion on the ground that minimal diversity was established because plaintiffs-appellants are California citizens, and Countrywide Bank is a Colorado citizen, the state of its main office. 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (national banks are citizens of the states in which they are “located”). The only issue plaintiffs-appellants raise in this appeal is whether Countywide Bank is also a citizen of California, allegedly the state of its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (corporations are citizens of their state of incorporation and principal place of business).

Section 1453(c)(1) provides discretionary appellate review of orders granting or denying motions to remand a class action to the state court from which it was removed. The provision is intended to create a body of appellate law to guide

interpretation of CAFA without undue delay of class action litigation. See S.Rep. No. 109-14, at 49 (Feb. 28, 2005); College of Dental Surgeons of Puerto Rico v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 585 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir.2009); Alvarez v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 585 F.3d 890, 894 (5th Cir.2009). Absent an extension of time, the court must render judgment within 60 days of granting an application to appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(2) and (3); Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994, 996 (9th Cir.2007).

Under this framework, the presence of an important, but non-CAFA issue, does not warrant interlocutory appellate review of a remand order. See, e.g., Alvarez, 585 F.3d at 894 (dismissing appeal under § 1453(c)(1) as improvidently granted because the only issue briefed— application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine — was not a unique CAFA issue); Coffey v. Freeport McMoran Copper & Gold, 581 F.3d 1240, 1247-48 (10th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (addressing CAFA issues in § 1453(c)(1) appeal, but declining to address assertion of federal jurisdiction under CERCLA).

Resolution of Countrywide Bank’s citizenship does not implicate an

interpretation of CAFA. The issue involves

interpretation of the term “located” in 28 U.S.C. § 1348, consideration of § 1348’s extensive legislative history, and analysis of the United States Supreme Court’s

interpretation of § 1348 in Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 126 S.Ct. 941, 163 L.Ed.2d 797 (2006). The court declines to resolve the complex jurisdictional issue of a national bank’s citizenship on a limited record, with abbreviated briefing, and a decisional deadline. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. PERMISSION TO APPEAL VACATED, and APPEAL DISMISSED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.