MEMORANDUM Arturo Pacheco appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his motion for
summary judgment and its sua sponte
summary judgment for the defendant on Pacheco’s claim that defendant discriminated against him on the basis of his race and national origin by refusing to return him to his position as a bus driver following his return from medical leave. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo
summary judgment, Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir.2004), and we affirm. The district court properly denied Pacheco’s motion for
summary judgment because Pacheco presented no evidence establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, and defendant presented un-controverted evidence that the motive for his decision was nondiscriminatory. See Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“[A]n employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was untrue and there was abundant and un-controverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred.”). Contrary to Pacheco’s contention, the district court properly granted
summary judgment for defendant sua sponte because Pacheco “had a full and fair opportunity to ventilate the issues involved in the matter.” Gospel Missions of Am. v. City of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 548, 553 (9th Cir.2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Pacheco’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive. AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.