Beau R. BRADLEY, DBA Bradley Livestock LC; Wood's Three Creek Ranches, Ltd.; Charles G. Wood, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Tom VILSACK, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture; United States Department of Agriculture; Tom Tidwell, in his official capacity as Chief of the United States Forest Service; United States Forest Service; Dave Myers, in his official capacity as Forest Supervisor of the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest, Defendants-Appellees, 467 F. App'x 713

MEMORANDUM Plaintiffs-Appellants Beau Bradley, Wood’s Three Creeks Ranches, Ltd., and Charles G. Wood (collectively “Bradley”), filed suit against the United States to quiet title to an alleged easement to maintain and operate the Noble Lake Reservoir within the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest. The district court granted

summary judgment to the government on the ground that Bradley’s claim was barred by the 12-year statute of limitations in the Quiet Title Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g); Skranak v. Castenada, 425 F.3d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir.2005). We agree. At a minimum, the 1973 and 1985 special use permits issued by the United States Forest Service to Bradley’s predecessors in interest each gave notice of the government’s adverse property interest in the very thing Bradley claims to own — an easement to maintain and use the Noble Lake Reservoir.

The government reserved the right to terminate the permit, and thus forbid access, in the Forest Service’s sole discretion; charged “rent”; and included an abandonment and reversion provision, which required Bradley to remove the reservoir upon abandonment, termination or revocation of the permit. See Skranak, 425 F.3d at 1216-17 (government actions that deny easement’s existence will trigger the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations); McFarland v.

Norton, 425 F.3d 724, 727 (9th Cir.2005) (claim accrued when plaintiff knew or should have known that government claimed the right to deny plaintiffs “historic access”). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.