MEMORANDUM Tom MeMackin appeals pro se from the district court’s
summary judgment in an unlawful detainer action brought against MeMackin by the United States on behalf of the General Services Administration (“GSA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Togu chi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.2004), and we affirm. The district court properly granted
summary judgment because McMackin failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to GSA’s right to damages and the amount of damages owed. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (setting forth
summary judgment standard); Sprincin King St. Partners v. Sound Conditioning Club, Inc., 84 Wash.App. 56, 925 P.2d 217, 221-23 (1996) (discussing Washington unlawful detainer law and noting that commercial tenant’s allegations of breach by landlord did not excuse failure to pay rent). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying McMackin’s motion to compel discovery of documents that he had previously requested from GSA under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) because McMackin did not demonstrate that he sought these documents through discovery. See Preminger v.
Peake, 552 F.3d 757, 768 n. 10 (9th Cir.2008) (district court’s discovery rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion). Moreover, McMackin neither asserted a FOIA claim, nor showed that he exhausted his administrative remedies under FOIA. See United States v. Steele (In re Steele), 799 F.2d 461, 465-66 (9th Cir.1986) (failure to exhaust administrative remedies required under FOIA before seeking judicial review deprives district court of jurisdiction). McMackin’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive. AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.