Richard Anthony JENKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GRAVES, Officer; et al., Defendants-Appellees, 479 F. App'x 74

MEMORANDUM Oregon state prison Richard Anthony Jenkins appeals pro se from the district court’s

summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process and Eighth Amendment violations arising out of his placement in segregation pending a disciplinary hearing. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Johnson v. City of Seattle, 474 F.3d 634, 638 (9th Cir.2007), and we affirm. The district court properly granted

summary judgment as to Jenkins’s due process claim because Jenkins failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his week-long placement in segregation resulted in any deprivations or changes in the conditions of confinement constituting an “atypical and significant hardship ... in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” that would give rise to a protected liberty interest. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995); see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447, 449 (9th Cir.2000) (where there is no protected liberty interest, there is no due process claim, substantive or procedural). The district court properly granted

summary judgment as to Jenkins’s Eighth Amendment claims because Jenkins failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his stay in segregation resulted in any physical harm or posed a substantial risk of serious harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (to establish violation of Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment, plaintiff must show that conditions of confinement posed a substantial risk of serious harm); Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (conditions must amount to a denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities”). The district court did not abuse its discretion by staying discovery because Jenkins failed to show that discovery would have yielded facts that would have precluded

summary judgment. See Little v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir.1988) (the district court did not abuse its discretion by staying discovery when the discovery could not have affected

summary judgment);, Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 412 (9th Cir.1988) (“The burden is on the nonmoving party ... to show what material facts would be discovered that would preclude

summary judgment.”). Jenkins’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive. Jenkins’s motion of objection to extension of time, filed on May 16, 2011, is denied as moot. AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.