Denise SCHMIDT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONTRA COSTA COUNTY; Judicial Council of California, Administrative Office of the Courts; Contra Costa Superior Court; Laurel Brady; Thomas Maddock; Lois Haight; Barry Baskin; Ken Torre, Defendants-Appellees, 482 F. App'x 280

MEMORANDUM In an Opinion concurrently filed with this memorandum, we affirmed the district court’s

summary judgment ruling that Judge Laurel Brady, Judge Thomas Mad-dock, Judge Barry Baskin, and Judge Lois Haight (“the Judge Defendants”) are entitled to legislative immunity from Plaintiff-Appellant Denise Schmidt’s federal constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as from her state constitutional claims. Here, we address the district court’s (1) grant of

summary judgment to the Judge Defendants and Ken Torre on Schmidt’s state law wrongful termination claim; (2) grant of

summary judgment to Contra Costa County (“the County”) on Schmidt’s Monell claim; and (3) denial of Schmidt’s request for additional discovery and related motions. We affirm in all respects. 1.Schmidt is not entitled to

summary judgment on her wrongful termination claim. The district court dismissed this claim in its December 2009 Order because “[t]he parties agree[d]” that the claim “[wa]s not viable,” and Schmidt failed to appeal that ruling. Even if we were to treat Schmidt’s appeal as a challenge to the district court’s dismissal of her claim, the district court did not err in dismissing the claim. Under California law, a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy may be brought only against an employer, which forecloses the individual Judge Defendants’ liability. See C.A. v. William S.

Hart Union High School Dist., 53 Cal.4th 861, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 270 P.3d 699, 707 n. 6 (2012). In addition, to the extent that Schmidt’s claim against Ken Torre in his official capacity is a claim against the Superior Court itself, the court cannot be held liable because claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy cannot be brought against public entities. Miklosy v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 44 Cal.4th 876, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 690, 188 P.3d 629, 644 (2008); see also Anthoine v. N. Cent. Counties Consortium, 605 F.3d 740, 754 (9th Cir.2010).

Furthermore, subordinate judicial officers like Schmidt are not covered by the employee protection system put in place by the Trial Court Employment Protection and Governance Act. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 71650(d)(1). 2. The district court correctly granted

summary judgment to the County on all claims against it. Schmidt failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact as to the County’s liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because she does not present evidence that the County Counsel was a final policymaker for the County or the Superior Court, Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir.1992), or that County Counsel Silvano Marchesi either delegated his policy-making authority to Deputy County Counsel Mary Ann Mason or ratified her allegedly unconstitutional actions. See Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir.1999); Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1346-47.

Additionally, Schmidt waived any state law claims against the County by failing to argue them in her opening brief. Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 738 (9th Cir.1986); see also United States v. Kimble, 107 F.3d 712, 715 n. 2 (9th Cir.1997). 3. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying either Schmidt’s discovery request or her motions for relief from the magistrate judge’s discovery orders.

Because the Judge Defendants are entitled to legislative immunity for the adoption and application of the temporary commissioner policy that lies at the heart of this case, additional discovery would not have prevented the grant of

summary judgment to the defendants. Roberts v. McAfee, Inc., 660 F.3d 1156, 1169 (9th Cir.2011). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.