Angela D. HOBSON; Aderus D. Milan, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HSC REAL ESTATE, INC., Defendant-Appellee, 483 F. App'x 332

MEMORANDUM Angela Hobson (“Hobson”) and Aderus Milan (“Milan”) appeal the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in their housing discrimination action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and related Washington state law claims. Reviewing the grant of

summary judgment de novo, Las Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme, 632 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir.2011), we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Section 1981 Claims In discrimination cases, “very little evidence” is required for plaintiffs to survive

summary judgment, since “the ultimate question is one that can only be resolved through a ‘searching inquiry* — one that is most appropriately conducted by the fact-finder, upon a full record.” Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 930 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). One way a plaintiff alleging discrimination can defeat a motion for

summary judgment is by producing direct evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the defendant. McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir.2004). The property manager’s statements about Milan’s anticipated exit from the apartment evince racial animus bearing a sufficient nexus to the challenged housing decisions to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated HSC’s denial of Milan’s tenancy application and eviction of Hobson.

See Metoyer, 504 F.3d at 937-38 (combining evidence raising a triable issue of fact regarding supervisor’s role in decision to fire African-American plaintiff with evidence of supervisor’s discriminatory remarks regarding African-Americans to conclude that plaintiff presented direct evidence sufficient to survive

summary judgment). We therefore reverse the adverse grant of

summary judgment on Hobson’s and Milan’s § 1981 claims. 2. State Law Claims Hobson’s and Milan’s Washington state law claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 153 Wash.2d 331, 103 P.3d 773, 786 (2004) (citing Wash. Rev.Code § 4.16.080(2)). Because Hobson and Milan have not explained why HSC’s denial of Milan’s tenancy application or eviction of Hobson constitute anything other than discrete acts, the continuing violation doctrine is inapplicable. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 108-13, 115, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002); Antonius v.

King Cnty., 153 Wash.2d 256, 103 P.3d 729, 736 (2005). HSC denied Milan’s application on February 1, 2006, more than three years before Appellants filed suit in the district court. Appellants’ equitable tolling arguments rest on assertions unsupported by citations to the record. The district court therefore correctly dismissed Milan’s and Hobson’s claims related to the denial of Milan’s application as time-barred. The district court properly reached the merits of Hobson’s state law claims relating to her eviction, since HSC initiated eviction proceedings within the three-year limitations period.

For the same reasons given above regarding direct evidence of discrimination, we reverse the district court’s grant of

summary judgment on Hobson’s state law race discrimination claim. See Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., 162 Wash.2d 340, 172 P.3d 688, 698 (2007) (three-part McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis does not apply where plaintiff supports Washington Law Against Discrimination claim with direct evidence of discrimination). We affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment on Hobson’s disability discrimination claim, since Appellants have not developed an argument challenging that decision. James River Ins. Co. v. Hebert Schenk, P.C., 523 F.3d 915, 920 n. 1 (9th Cir.2008) (holding waived arguments not adequately presented in briefs). Costs on appeal are awarded to appellants. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this disposition. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. . HSC argues that these statements constitute inadmissible hearsay. But the district court did not abuse its discretion in including them in the

summary judgment record, see Fed. R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) (describing as "not hearsay” statements offered against an opposing party and made by that party's employee within the scope of the employment), and we therefore consider them on appeal. ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that evidentiary rulings made in the context of

summary judgment are reviewed for an abuse of discretion).