MEMORANDUM Clyde Veltmann and Diantha Veltmann appeal pro se from the district court’s order awarding attorney’s fees and collection costs to plaintiffs in this diversity action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs, and for clear error its underlying factual determinations. P.N. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 474 F.8d 1165, 1168 (9th Cir.2007). We affirm. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the amount of attorney’s fees was reasonable. See Tallara v.
Matson Terminals, Inc., 511 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir.2007) (“This court grants ‘considerable deference’ to a district court’s determination as to what hours are ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’ ” (citation omitted)); see also Secalt S.A. v. Wuxi Shenxi Constr. Mach. Co., 668 F.3d 677, 690 (9th Cir.2012) (“[Cjounsel ‘is not required to record in great detail how each minute of his time was expended.’ ” (citation omitted)).
Contrary to the Veltmanns’ contentions, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the attorney’s fees incurred in other actions and the costs associated with the transportation of the horses were reasonably related to the collection of the promissory note. See Husain v. Olympic Airways, 316 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir.2002) (“Clear error review is deferential to the district court, requiring a ‘definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’ ” (citation omitted)). We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v.
Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam). The Veltmanns’ request for a stay is denied. AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.