Sharon Louise HODGES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Steven Wray GRIMAUD, an Executive Officer for the United States Department of Defense; Melinda Grimaud, Defendants-Appellees, 502 F. App'x 704

MEMORANDUM Sharon Louise Hodges appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging federal and state law claims in connection with her ex-husband’s child support obligations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1061, 1065 (9th Cir.2004). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Hodges’s abuse of process, libel and slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims because these claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.

See Ariz.Rev.Stat. § § 12-541(1), 12-542 (one-year statute of limitations for libel and slander claims; two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); CDT, Inc. v. Addison, Roberts & Ludwig, C.P.A., P.C., 198 Ariz. 173, 7 P.3d 979, 982 (2000) (under the discovery rule, a claim does not accrue until the plaintiff knows, or with reasonable diligence should know, the facts underlying the claim). The district court properly dismissed Hodges’s claim under Bivens v.

Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), because Hodges failed to allege facts indicating that defendants acted under the color of federal law. See Morgan v. United States, 323 F.3d 776, 780 (9th Cir.2003) (in order to state a Bivens claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of her or his constitutional rights by agents acting under the color of federal law); see also Morse v. N.

Coast Opportunities, Inc., 118 F.3d 1338, 1342 (9th Cir.1997) (“[T]he standard for determining the existence of federal government action can be no broader than the standard applicable to State action under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983.”). The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Hodges’s claim for fraud on the court in connection with 1987 child support proceedings because Hodges failed to allege facts showing that defendants committed a fraud that was aimed at the court. See Appling v. State Farm, Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., 340 F.3d 769, 780 (9th Cir.2003) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a claim for fraud on the court requires “a fraud that is aimed at the court[,]” and a party’s nondisclosure, without more, is insufficient). Hodges’s contention that the district court improperly converted defendants’ motion to dismiss to a motion for

summary judgment is rejected. Moreover, the court gave Hodges an opportunity to amend her claims, which she declined. We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam). We deny Hodges’s request for clarification of the November 15, 2011 order, set forth in her opening brief. We deny defendants’ request for attorney’s fees on appeal, set forth in the answering brief, as procedurally improper. AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.