Eric W. BRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MERCER ADVISORS INCORPORATED, A Corporation, Defendant-Appellee, 502 F. App'x 710

MEMORANDUM Eric W. Bright appeals pro se from the district court’s

summary judgment in his employment discrimination action alleging violations of Title VII and state law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir.2003). We affirm. The district court properly granted

summary judgment on Bright’s retaliation claims because Bright failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he engaged in a protected activity. See Rand v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1197 (9th Cir.2003) (describing the elements of a pri-ma facie retaliation claim under Title VII, including that the plaintiff was engaged in protected activity); Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1411-12 (9th Cir.1987) (plaintiff failed to show that he engaged in protected activity where his complaint to his employer did not indicate a concern about discrimination). The district court properly granted

summary judgment on Bright’s racial discrimination claim because Bright failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably, or whether defendant acted with discriminatory intent. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640 & n. 5 (describing the elements of a prima facie discrimination claim under Title VII). The district court properly granted

summary judgment on Bright’s breach of contract claim because Bright failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant failed to comply with its employee handbook by retaliating against him or failing to investigate his alleged complaints of discrimination. See Chartone, Inc. v. Bernini, 207 Ariz. 162, 83 P.3d 1103, 1111 (2004) (describing the elements of a breach of contract claim under Arizona law). The district court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the scheduling order to allow defendant to amend its answer because defendant showed good cause. See Johnson v.

Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir.1992) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a party seeking to amend its pleadings after the date set in the scheduling order must show good cause). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.