April REDDING, legal guardian of minor child, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT # 1; Kerry Wilson, husband; Jane Doe Wilson, wife; Helen Romero, wife; John Doe Romero, husband; Peggy Schwallier, wife; John Doe Schwallier, husband, Defendants-Appellees, 504 F.3d 828

Opinion by Judge CLIFTON; Dissent by Judge THOMAS. CLIFTON, Circuit Judge: Plaintiff-Appellant Savana Redding, a minor, by her mother and legal guardian, appeals from the district court’s order entering

summary judgment in favor of Defendants Kerry Wilson, Helen Romero, Peggy Schwallier, and the Safford Unified School District, in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for monetary damages. Redding alleges that Defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a warrantless search of her person during school hours and on school premises. Because we conclude that Defendants did not violate Redding’s Fourth Amendment rights, we affirm the district court’s order. I.

Background A few years ago, Safford Middle School in Safford, Arizona, adopted a policy prohibiting the “nonmedical use, possession, or sale of drugs on school property or at school events.” The term “drugs” is defined by the policy as including, but not limited to: (1) “[a]ll dangerous controlled substances prohibited by law,” (2) “[a]ll alcoholic beverages,” and (3) “[a]ny prescription or over-the-counter drug, except those for which permission to use in school has been granted.” Although it is not entirely clear from the record, it appears that the school implemented this policy in response to a prior incident, in which a student brought a prescription drug to school and distributed it to classmates, one of whom became seriously ill and was hospitalized.

On August 22, 2003, Safford Middle School held a dance to commemorate the beginning of a new school year. During the dance, several staff members from the school noticed “unusually rowdy behavior” from a small group of students, including Redding, who was then thirteen years old and entering eighth grade, and her friend Marissa. The staff members also detected the smell of alcohol coming from that group. Later that evening, staff members found a bottle of alcohol and a package of cigarettes in the girls’ restroom. No official action was taken against any of the students at that time.

On October 1, 2003, Jordan, another student at Safford Middle School, along with his mother, requested a meeting with Principal Robert Beeman and Vice Principal Kerry Wilson. During the meeting, Jordan’s mother explained that a few nights before, Jordan had become violent with her and was sick to his stomach. Jordan claimed that the incident occurred after he had taken some pills a classmate had given him. Jordan went on to inform Beeman and Wilson that certain students were bringing drugs and weapons to school.

He then gave the administrators detailed accounts regarding the actions of several students, including Redding. Specifically, Jordan informed Beeman and Wilson that Redding had served alcohol to her classmates at a party she hosted at her home prior to the dance in August. On the morning of October 8, 2003, Jordan again asked to meet with Vice Principal Wilson. During the meeting, Jordan handed Wilson a white pill and said that Marissa had given it to him and that a group of students were planning to take pills at lunch.

Upon learning this information, Wilson took the pill to Peggy Sehwal-lier, the school nurse, and asked her to identify it. Schwallier identified it as “Ibuprofen 400 mg,” a pill available only by prescription. Based on this information, Wilson went to Marissa’s classroom and asked Marissa to collect her belongings and accompany him to his office. As Marissa got up to comply, Wilson noticed a black planner lying on the desk next to hers. Wilson asked Marissa whether the planner belonged to her and Marissa said no.

Wilson nevertheless picked up the planner and handed it to a teacher, who promised that he would attempt to find the owner. Soon thereafter, the teacher discovered that the planner contained knives, lighters, a cigarette, and a permanent marker. He promptly communicated this information to Wilson. Wilson escorted Marissa back to his office and invited Helen Romero, an administrative assistant, to come in to observe. In Romero’s presence, Wilson asked Marissa to turn out her pockets and open her wallet. Marissa did so, producing one blue pill, several white pills, and a razor blade.

The blue pill was later identified as “Na-prosyn 200 mg,” an over-the-counter drug used to treat pain and inflammation. Wilson asked Marissa where the blue pill had come from, and Marissa replied: “I guess it slipped in when she gave me the IBU 400s.” When Wilson asked “who is she?,” Marissa responded, “Savana Redding.” Wilson then questioned Marissa about the black planner. Marissa denied ownership of the planner and claimed she had no knowledge of its contents. At this point, Wilson asked Romero to take Marissa into the nurse’s office and conduct a search of Marissa’s person and clothing for pills.

Romero complied. She took Marissa into the nurse’s office and closed the door, which locked automatically. She then invited school nurse Schwal-lier to observe. In Schwallier’s presence, Romero asked Marissa to: (1) remove her shoes and socks, (2) lift up her shirt and pull out her bra band, and (3) take off her pants and pull out the elastic of her underwear. Marissa complied with each request. The search of Marissa’s person and clothing did not yield any more pills, and as soon as the search was over, Romero returned Marissa’s clothes and permitted her to get dressed.

While Romero and Schwallier searched Marissa, Wilson retrieved Redding from her classroom and asked her to accompany him to his office. When they arrived, Wilson first admonished Redding about the importance of telling the truth. After Redding assured Wilson that she would be truthful, Wilson showed Redding the black planner he had found near Marissa’s desk. Redding acknowledged that the planner belonged to her but claimed that she had lent it to Marissa several days earlier to help Marissa hide some things from her parents. Redding denied having any knowledge of the planner’s contents.

Wilson then showed Redding the pills he had seized from Marissa and asked her what she could tell him about them. After Redding denied having knowledge of the pills, Wilson told Redding that he had received a report that she had been passing the pills out to her classmates and asked Redding if she would object to being searched. Redding denied bringing pills to school, denied distributing pills to her classmates, and told Wilson that she did not mind being searched. Wilson then invited Romero into his office, and together, they conducted a search of Redding’s backpack.

After the search proved fruitless, Wilson asked Romero to take Red-ding into the nurse’s office and conduct a search of her person. Romero complied. Romero took Redding into the nurse’s office and again invited Schwallier to observe.

At the time of the search, Redding was wearing “stretch pants without pockets and a T-shirt without pockets.” In Schwallier’s presence, Romero asked Red-ding to: (1) remove her jacket, shoes, and socks, (2) remove her pants and shirt, (3) pull her bra out and to the side and shake it, exposing her breasts, and (4) pull her underwear out at the crotch and shake it, exposing her pelvic area. The search did not produce any pills. Immediately after it had concluded, Defendants returned Redding’s clothes and allowed her to get dressed. At no point during the search did either Schwallier or Romero touch Redding.

Prior to the search, no attempt was made to contact Redding’s mother. Redding subsequently brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Wilson, Romero, Schwallier, and the Safford Unified School District. She alleges that Defendants’ search of her person violated her Fourth Amendment rights. Defendants moved for

summary judgment, arguing that they did not violate Redding’s constitutional rights, and that even if they did, they were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not “clearly established” at the time the search took place. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The district court granted Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, holding that Defendants did not violate Redding’s Fourth Amendment rights because their search of Redding’s person was both justified at its inception and permissible in its scope. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). Redding timely appealed from the district court’s order. II. Discussion We review de novo the district court’s grant of

summary judgment. Rivera v. Philip Morris, Inc., 395 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir.2005). In doing so, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to ... the non-moving party, and accept the version of all disputed facts most favorable to[that party].” Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1054 n. 1 (9th Cir.2003). The fundamental principle that “students do not ‘shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate’ ” is beyond reasonable dispute. Morse v. Frederick, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2618, 2622, 168 L.Ed.2d 290 (2007) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.

Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969)). At the same time, the Supreme Court has admonished us that “the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings” and that “the rights of students must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.” See id. (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

It is in this context that we evaluate the constitutionality of the challenged search. The search of Redding’s person was conducted by public school officials and took place during school hours and on school premises. The validity of the search is, therefore, governed by New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extended to searches of students by public school officials and set forth the constitutional standard for adjudging the “reasonableness” of such searches.

See id. at 333-37, 341-43, 105 S.Ct. 733; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 735 (2002) (“We must ... review the School District’s [search policy] for ‘reasonableness,’ which is the touchstone of the constitutionality of a governmental search.”).

According to the Court, the search of a student by a public school official is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if it is both: (1) “justified at its inception,” and (2) “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, 105 S.Ct. 733 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under T.L.O., a search is justified at its inception if there are “reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school.” Id. at 341-42, 105 S.Ct. 733. A search is permissible in its scope if “the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” Id. at 342, 105 S.Ct. 733. We agree with the district court that Defendants’ search of Redding satisfied both of the T.L.O. criteria. 1.

The Search was Justified at its Inception Based on the information available to them, Defendants had “reasonable grounds” for suspecting that the search of Redding’s person would turn up evidence that Redding had “violated or [was] violating either the law or the rules of the school.” See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-43, 105 S.Ct. 733. At the time Defendants searched Redding, they had several key pieces of information tying her to the possession and distribution of pills in violation of school policy.

Earlier that morning, Jordan told Vice Principal Wilson that Marissa possessed pills, had distributed at least one of those pills to Jordan, and planned to get together with a group of students to take pills at lunch. Wilson discovered pills on Marissa’s person during his search of her pockets and wallet. Marissa then volunteered that she had gotten the pills from Redding.

While decisional law from this circuit is sparse, other circuits have held that students who provide information implicating other students in illegal or otherwise prohibited activities are tantamount to “informants,” and have used case law from the criminal context to determine the circumstances under which such students’ “tips” could give rise to reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a search. See, e.g., Phaneuf v. Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 597-99 (2d Cir.2006); Williams v.

Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 888 (6th Cir.1991) (“We can correlate the allegations of a student, implicating a fellow student in unlawful activity, to the case of an informant’s tip.”). In Phaneuf, for example, the Second Circuit held that a student informant’s allegation regarding another student’s marijuana possession, while warranting “additional inquiry and investigation,” failed to justify the ensuing search of the suspected student’s person. Phaneuf, 448 F.3d at 598-99.

The court noted that while the student informant made the tip “face-to-face,” claimed that her knowledge was based on a “direct conversation” with the plaintiff, and gave “relatively specific” information, her tip was nevertheless inadequate because there was no concrete evidence of her reliability, and the defendants had failed to make any effort to “investigate, corroborate, or otherwise substantiate [the tip] prior to ordering the strip search.” Id. at 598.

By contrast, in Williams, the Sixth Circuit held that a student informant’s tip sufficed to justify the ensuing search of another student’s person. 936 F.2d at 889. In that case, the court recognized that “[w]hile there is concern that students will be motivated by malice and falsely implicate other students in wrongdoing,” it noted that the defendant in Williams had “carefully questioned [the student informant] about any improper motive for making the allegations, and was satisfied none existed.” Id. at 888-89.

In addition, the court pointed out that there was at least some independent evidence, separate and apart from the student’s tip, that could have led the defendant to “reasonably suspect [the plaintiff of] concealing evidence of illegal activity on her person.” Id. at 889. The instant case is more analogous to the circumstances of Williams. Like the defendant in that case, Wilson did not order the search of Redding’s person based solely on an uncorroborated tip. Cf.

Phaneuf, 448 F.3d at 598 (“[Defendant’s] acceptance of one student’s accusatory statement to initiate a highly intrusive search of another student — with no meaningful inquiry or corroboration — concerns us.”); see also id. at 598-99 (“While[an] uncorroborated tip no doubt justified additional inquiry and investigation by school officials, we are not convinced that it justified a step as intrusive as a strip search.”). To the contrary, he made diligent efforts to “investigate, corroborate, or otherwise substantiate [the tip]” prior to ordering the search. Cf id. at 598.

Upon receiving Jordan’s tip, which was given face-to-face, Wilson took reasonable steps to investigate Marissa, whom Jordan had implicated. See United States v. Salazar, 945 F.2d 47, 50-51 (2d Cir.1991) (“[A] face-to-face informant must, as a general matter, be thought more reliable than an anonymous ... tipster, for the former runs the greater risk that he may be held accountable if his information proves false.”). He interviewed Marissa, asked her a number of in-depth questions regarding the pills, and conducted a search of her person and belongings.

After Wilson discovered pills, Marissa immediately attributed them to Redding. Even then, Wilson still refrained from immediately conducting a search of Redding’s person. To the contrary, he questioned Redding about her knowledge of the pills and her ownership of the black planner. It was only after Redding had acknowledged ownership of the planner, acknowledged her friendship with Marissa, and conceded that she had, in fact, lent her planner to Marissa with the express purpose of helping Marissa hide contraband from her parents, that Wilson proceeded to order the challenged search.

There was also sufficient evidence to support Jordan’s and Marissa’s veracity. Jordan’s tip was substantially corroborated by Defendant Wilson’s subsequent investigation of Marissa. See Phaneuf, 448 F.3d at 597 (noting that an informant whose information is corroborated by independent investigation tends to be more reliable because “an informant who is right about some facts is more likely to be right about others”). Jordan’s primary complaint was that Marissa possessed pills and had distributed at least one of the pills to him.

During the ensuing search of Marissa, Wilson did, in fact, find pills on Marissa’s person. Ample facts supported Marissa’s veracity as an informant, as well. It is undisputed that school employees had witnessed Redding and Marissa socializing with the same group of friends, and presumably with each other, at the August school dance. Redding also acknowledged a friendship between Marissa and herself during her interview with Wilson.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, during that same interview, Redding conceded to Wilson that she had lent Marissa her planner to help Marissa conceal contraband from her parents. The girls’ friendship and pri- or interactions made Marissa’s accusations against Redding credible, and Wilson acted reasonably in relying upon those accusations in justifying his further investigation, and ultimate search, of Redding.

Finally, we note that there was at least some independent evidence, separate and apart from Jordan’s and Marissa’s respective tips, that supported Defendants’ suspicion that Redding was involved with the pills. Jordan had previously informed Wilson that Redding distributed alcohol to her classmates at her home prior to a school dance in August. As previously discussed, we accept Redding’s version of the disputed fact as true and assume, for purposes of this appeal, that Redding did not, in fact, serve alcohol at that party.

But the fact that Jordan so informed the school officials was not disputed, and Redding has failed to show that this allegation, “even if untrue, w[as] not made or that[Defendants] could not reasonably believe [it] to be true.” Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1323 (7th Cir.1993). While this allegation, in itself, would not have been enough to justify Defendants’ subsequent search of Red-ding, it was a relevant factor which the school officials were entitled to take into account.

See Phaneuf, 448 F.3d at 599 (“A student’s past history of drug use can be a factor adding to the mix in a school official’s decision to conduct a strip search.”). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in holding Defendants’ search of Redding’s person to be justified at its inception. 2. The Search was Permissible in Scope Under the T.L.O. framework, the search of a student by a public school official must also be permissible in its scope. See 469 U.S. at 341-42, 105 S.Ct. 733.

A search is permissible in its scope if “the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” Id. at 342, 105 S.Ct. 733. As to scope of search, courts have looked to a number of factors. Many have considered, for example, the importance of the governmental interest at stake. Compare Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1322-23 (upholding strip search aimed at finding drugs); Williams, 936 F.2d at 887 (accord), with Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch.

Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir.2005) (invalidating strip search aimed at finding stolen money and noting that “a search undertaken to find money serves a less weighty governmental interest than a search undertaken for items that pose a threat to the health or safety of students, such as drugs or weapons”)- Others have considered the size of the contraband to be found. See Williams, 936 F.2d at 887 (“Defendants were not unreasonable, in light of the item sought ... a small vial containing suspected narcotics, ... in conducting a search so personally intrusive in nature.”).

Some have also considered the physical setting and circumstances surrounding a search in determining the search’s overall reasonableness. See, e.g., Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1323; Singleton v. Bd. of Educ., 894 F.Supp. 386, 391 (D.Kan. 1995). We assess each of these factors in turn and conclude that, under the facts of this case, Defendants’ search of Redding’s person was permissible. We begin by assessing the importance of the governmental interest at stake: barring the unauthorized use of prescription drugs on school premises.

While the inherent risks posed by prescription drugs, particularly ibuprofen, may not be as grave as the risks posed by the illegal substances at issue in some of the other cases, see, e.g., Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1322, it cannot be denied that prescription drugs have the potential to do great harm if misused. Wilson was specifically informed by Schwallier, the school nurse, that the pill in question was available only by prescription and thus had reason to take its potential distribution to other students seriously.

Put more broadly, Defendants had a strong interest both in safeguarding students entrusted to their care from the harm posed by the misuse of prescription drugs and in enforcing the school’s official policy, which prohibited the use, possession, and distribution of such drugs without permission.

In addition, because Defendants had experienced at least one prior incident involving the misuse of prescription drugs, had recently been told that Jordan had become violent and sick to his stomach after taking pills given to him by a classmate, and were told that other students were planning to take pills together, they had good reason to be extra vigilant in monitoring the drugs’ unauthorized use. The first factor, therefore, favors Defendants. Next, we turn to the size of the contraband to be found. This factor favors Defendants, as well.

In Williams, the Sixth Circuit held that because school administrators were searching for “a small vial containing suspected narcotics,” their “personally intrusive” search of the suspected student’s person was not unreasonable. 936 F.2d at 887. Here, Defendants were similarly searching Redding for something small: pills. Moreover, they searched Redding’s person only after receiving reliable information that Redding had pills, failing to find the pills in Redding’s backpack, and observing that she was wearing clothes without pockets.

Cf. id. (noting that “[ajfter [the student’s] locker and purse were searched, it was reasonable for [the defendant] to suspect the girl may be concealing the contraband on her person”). In light of these factors, we hold that Defendants did not exceed the permissible scope of the search when they asked Red-ding to remove her clothing and conducted a search of her person. Finally, we conclude that Defendants administered the search in a reasonable manner.

The search of Redding’s person was conducted by two employees who were of the same gender as Redding, and the search took place in the privacy of the school nurse’s office with the door securely locked. Cf. Beard, 402 F.3d at 606 (noting that “[t]he fact that the search[ ] ... did not occur in the presence of only school officials, but rather in the presence of other students, ... supports the conclusion that the search[] w[as] unreasonable”). Redding was not physically touched in any way during the search, and she was not asked to remove her bra or underwear.

Furthermore, Defendants returned Red-ding’s clothing and permitted her to get dressed as soon as the search was over. See, e.g., Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1323 (upholding a search under similar conditions); Singleton, 894 F.Supp. at 391 (accord). Under those facts, we cannot say that Defendants’ search of Redding’s person exceeded the permissible scope prescribed by the Supreme Court in T.L.O. In a related vein, Redding argues that Defendants’ search of her person exceeded its permissible scope because Defendants failed to utilize the least restrictive means possible.

Specifically, Redding argues that Defendants did not contact Redding’s mother prior to conducting the search or have Redding remove her clothing behind a screen. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held, however, that “reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment does not require adherence to the least restrictive means. In rejecting a similar argument in Board of Education v.

Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 735 (2002), for example, the Court emphasized: “[Rjeasonableness under the Fourth Amendment does not require employing the least intrusive means, because ‘the logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers.’ ” Id. at 837, 122 S.Ct. 2559 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976)) (internal alteration omitted); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.

Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995) (“We have repeatedly refused to declare that only the ‘least intrusive’ search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”). Because Redding’s argument in this respect has already been considered and rejected by the Supreme Court, we decline to credit it here. III. Conclusion We conclude that Defendants’ warrant-less search of Redding’s person during school hours and on school premises did not violate Redding’s Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court granting

summary judgment in favor of Defendants. AFFIRMED. . Defendant Wilson alleged in his affidavit that Safford Middle School suffers from a "history of problems with students using and distributing prohibited and illegal substances on campus.” In her affidavit, Redding disputed this allegation. Because this is an appeal from an order granting

summary judgment to Defendants, we accept Redding's version of disputed facts as true. See Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1054 n. 1 (9th Cir.2003). . In her affidavit, Redding admitted that she hosted a small get-together at her house prior to the dance, but denied serving alcohol. According to Redding, "[t]he only beverage served at the gathering was soda.” We accept Redding's version of this disputed fact. See Drummond, 343 F.3d at 1054 n. 1.