Everett SEYMOUR; David McElroy, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. McLANE COMPANY, INC., a Texas corporation, Defendant-Appellee, 519 F. App'x 489

MEMORANDUM Everett Seymour and David McElroy appeal pro se from the district court’s

summary judgment in their putative class action alleging state law claims related to their employment as truck drivers. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Conlon v. United States, 474 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2007), and we affirm. The district court properly granted

summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to any of their claims. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(3) (matters set forth in a request for admission are deemed admitted unless the party to whom the request is directed submits a timely response or later seeks permission to withdraw or amend a response); Conlon, 474 F.3d at 621, 624 (unanswered requests for admission, or untimely and deficient responses to the same, may be relied on as the basis for granting

summary judgment); Pelletier v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F., 968 F.2d 865, 872 (9th Cir.1992) (to survive

summary judgment, nonmoving party “ordinarily must furnish affidavits containing admissible evidence tending to show the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact”). We lack jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ appeal from the district court’s award of attorney’s fees to defendants as the prevailing party because plaintiffs failed to file an amended notice of appeal from this award following the grant of

summary judgment. See Hunt v. City of Los Angeles, 638 F.3d 703, 719 (9th Cir.2011) (no jurisdiction to review the -attorney’s fee award where party filed a timely notice of appeal of the underlying judgment, but failed to file a timely supplemental notice of appeal as to a subsequent award of attorney’s fees).

Plaintiffs’ contentions regarding the district court’s alleged errors in denying then-motion for declaratory judgment and an alleged conspiracy between the court, defendants, defense counsel, and plaintiffs’ former counsel to threaten, intimidate, or destroy evidence are unpersuasive and unsupported by the record. AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.