Stanford Paul BRYANT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. N. KARLOW; et al., Defendants-Appellees, 523 F. App'x 476

MEMORANDUM California state prisoner Stanford Paul Bryant appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging denial of access to courts and retaliation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo both a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000), and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 821 (9th Cir.2010). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Bryant’s access-to-courts claim for failure to state a claim because the constitutional right of access to courts does not encompass the right to pursue a state law tort suit for medical malpractice or negligence. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354-55, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (for cognizable access-to-courts claim, plaintiff must allege that defendants frustrated his pursuit of a direct appeal of a criminal conviction, a habeas petition, or a civil rights action to vindicate basic constitutional rights).

The district court properly dismissed Bryant’s retaliation claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because Bryant failed to describe the alleged retaliatory conduct in his grievance so as to put prison officials on notice of the wrong for which he sought redress. See Sapp, 623 F.3d at 823-24 (for proper exhaustion in compliance with California state regulations, inmates need to put enough information in their grievances to alert prison officials to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought).

Bryant’s motions for judicial notice, filed on April 22 and May 31, 2013, and his motion for extension of time to respond to defendants’ motion to strike, filed on May 29, 2013, are denied. Defendants’ motion to strike portions of Bryant’s reply brief, filed on May 13, 2013, is denied. AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.