Linda COELHO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Carolyn W. COLVIN, Defendant-Appellee, 525 F. App'x 637

MEMORANDUM Linda Coelho appeals from the district court’s judgment affirming the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) denying Coelho’s application for Social Security disability benefits. We affirm. The ALJ reasonably declined to credit the opinions of Coelho’s treating physicians because they were inadequately supported by the objective medical evidence. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). The ALJ noted, for example, that one of the opinions failed to explain how Coelho’s cervical radiculopathy (a neck condition) resulted in right knee dysfunction.

More generally, the ALJ acknowledged that Coelho “clearly has an impairment of the cervical spine,” but reasonably concluded that this impairment did not support the extreme “limitations in walking, sitting, standing, and other postural positions” that the treating physicians assessed. Although Coelho objects by citing various pieces of objective evidence in the record, for the most part those references confirm only the underlying impairment that the ALJ acknowledged.

Coelho does not cite any persuasive evidence overlooked or otherwise downplayed by the ALJ that supports the particular limitations found by the physicians. Because the ALJ had proper reasons for rejecting the treating physicians’ opinions, there is no independent problem with his reliance on the opinions of non-examining physicians. Cf. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir.2007). The ALJ also reasonably found Co-elho’s subjective complaints to be lacking in credibility. Here again, the ALJ was entitled to rely on the lack of objective medical findings. See Burch v.

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir.2005). The ALJ also emphasized one particular inconsistency between Coelho’s claim that she could not even pick up a pair of jeans with her right hand and an assessment in the record reporting her right grip strength as “4+/5 (essentially normal).” Finally, the ALJ was entitled to infer that Coelho’s pain was not as great as she claimed from the fact that she “did not seek an aggressive treatment program.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.2008). Taken together, these considerations support the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding.

The ALJ reasonably concluded that Coelho’s spinal impairment did not meet the requirements for Listing 1.04(A), citing the absence of evidence of motor loss, sensory loss, or reflex loss. Coelho argues that the ALJ’s explanation for this conclusion was inadequate. However, under the applicable regulations, Coelho was required to support her claim with objective medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.00(D). On appeal, she cites primarily medical findings that either were remote in time or merely repeated Coelho’s self-reports of her own symptoms.

The ALJ was therefore entitled to disregard these findings without additional elaboration. Coelho’s remaining challenges to the ALJ’s decision are unpersuasive and, in any event, she would be unable to show more than harmless error given our con-elusions above. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir.2012). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.