Armando MARMOLEJO-CAMPOS, aka Campos Ramos Armando, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent, 558 F.3d 903

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge BYBEE; O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge: We are called upon to decide whether an alien may be removed from the United States for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude as determined under federal immigration law. I A Petitioner Armando Marmolejo-Cam-pos, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without inspection near Nogales, Arizona, sometime in 1983. In 1990, he was convicted of felony theft in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes

section 13-1802, and was sentenced to two months imprisonment. Years later, Campos was pulled over while driving in Mari-copa County, Arizona, and charged with aggravated driving under the influence (“DUI”), in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes

section 28-1383(A)(l). Under that statute, a person is guilty of an aggravated DUI if he “drivfes]” or takes “actual physical control” of a vehicle “while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs” and “while the person’s driver license or privilege to drive is suspended, canceled, revoked or refused or while a restriction is placed on the person’s driver license or privilege to drive as a result of [a prior DUI-related conviction].” Id.

In 1997, Campos pled guilty to committing such offense and, in so doing, admitted that he was driving on the day in question, that his blood alcohol content upon arrest was .164, and that he did not have a valid driver’s license at the time. Campos was sentenced to four months in prison and three years probation as a result of this conviction. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) subsequently placed Campos in removal proceedings, but he successfully petitioned for a waiver of inadmissibility and an adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident, which he received in 2001.

One year later, Campos pled guilty to violating Arizona’s aggravated DUI statute for a second time, after he was again pulled over in Maricopa County for running a red light while intoxicated. At Campos’s plea hearing, he admitted that he ran the red light, that his blood alcohol content upon arrest was .233, and that he knew at the time he was driving that his license had been suspended or revoked. Campos was sentenced to two and a half years in prison as a result of this second offense.

B After his second aggravated DUI conviction, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), the successor to the INS, reinstituted removal proceedings against Campos, charging that he was removable under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) as an alien convicted of “a crime involving moral turpitude” within ten years of admission, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), and as an alien convicted of “two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct,” see id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).

Campos filed a motion to terminate the proceedings, arguing that his aggravated DUI convictions were not crimes of moral turpitude. An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) held otherwise and ordered him removed to Mexico. C The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or the “Board”) affirmed the IJ’s decision in an unpublished order signed by a single member of the Board. That order relied on the BIA’s en banc precedent, In re Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dee. 1188 (B.I.A.1999), which held that a violation of Arizona’s aggravated DUI statute is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Hernandez-Martinez v.

Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir.2003), we considered Lopez-Meza and rejected the Board’s

interpretation of the Arizona statute. Although we did not opine on the Board’s conclusion that the act of driving under the influence with a suspended or otherwise restricted driver’s license is a crime involving moral turpitude, we held that the Board misinterpreted Arizona’s aggravated DUI statute by failing to acknowledge that it prohibits more than that act alone. Id. at 1118-19. As we explained,

section 28-1383(A)(1) can be violated (1) by “driving” while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs with a suspended or otherwise restricted driver’s license, or (2) by maintaining “actual physical control” of a vehicle under the same conditions. Id. When a criminal statute has multiple independent prongs, the Board must determine whether any conduct violative of the statute meets the relevant definition of a deportable offense under the INA. Id. at 1118.

By failing to assess Arizona’s aggravated DUI statute as such, we held that the Board committed an “error of law” and we expressed our doubt that it intended to categorize the second act as a crime of equal severity as the first. Id. at 1119. Still, we did not foreclose the possibility that a conviction under

section 28-1383(A)(1) could qualify as a crime of moral turpitude if the record of conviction demonstrated that the offender had been driving at the time of the arrest. Acknowledging Hemandez-Martinez, the IJ and the BIA in this case looked beyond the statute to the record of Campos’s conviction and determined that the transcripts of his 1997 and 2002 plea hearings sufficiently established that both offenses for which he was convicted involved driving while intoxicated. Relying on Lopez-Meza, the BIA concluded that such convictions were crimes involving moral turpitude.

D Campos timely filed a petition for review. A divided panel of our court denied the petition, upholding the Board’s determination that a violation of Arizona’s aggravated DUI statute that involves actual driving is a crime involving moral turpitude. Marmolejo-Campos v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 922 (9th Cir.2007), reh’g en banc granted, 519 F.3d 907 (9th Cir.2008). We now consider this question en banc. II A We have no jurisdiction to review a final order removing an alien on account of a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).

Nevertheless, we have jurisdiction to review the Board’s determination that Campos’s convictions are, in fact, “crimes involving moral turpitude” as the INA defines that term. See Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir.2000). B Before examining the Board’s decision, we must determine the standard of our review, an issue which has been squarely raised in this case. The BIA’s ultimate determination that a petitioner such as Campos has committed a crime involving moral turpitude requires two separate inquiries. First, the BIA must determine what offense the petitioner has been convicted of committing.

This requires the agency to interpret the statute under which the petitioner was convicted and, in certain cases, to examine the record of conviction. See infra at 911-12. Second, once the Board has identified the petitioner’s offense, it must determine whether such conduct is a “crime involving moral turpitude” as defined in the applicable

section of the INA. This requires the Board to apply the definition of the term “moral turpitude” and to determine whether the petitioner’s conduct meets such definition. It is well established that we give no deference to the BIA’s answer to the first question. The BIA has no special expertise by virtue of its statutory responsibilities in construing state or federal criminal statutes and, thus, has no special administrative competence to interpret the petitioner’s statute of conviction. As a consequence, we review the BIA’s finding regarding the specific act for which the petitioner was convicted de novo.

See Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir.2005); Gol deshtein v. INS, 8 F.3d 645, 647 n. 4 (9th Cir.1993). The Board’s answer to the second question requires a different standard of review. Our precedents, however, have not always been consistent. At times, we have suggested that the BIA’s determination that a specific act is a crime of moral turpitude is a finding entitled to deference, although we have not prescribed the precise nature of such deference. See Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 n. 6 (9th Cir.2008); Hernandez-Martinez, 329 F.3d at 1119.

At other times, we have reviewed the determination de novo. See, e.g., Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1159, 1165 (9th Cir.2006); Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1018-20; Notash v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 693, 696 (9th Cir.2005). And in still other cases, we have suggested that while our review might be deferential in theory, it is de novo in fact. See Nicanor-Romero v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 992, 997-98 (9th Cir.2008).

In light of this uncertainty, we set forth the following principles. 1 When the Board considers whether a certain crime involves “moral turpitude,” it must interpret that term through a process of case-by-ease adjudication. When reviewing an agency’s

interpretation of its governing statute, we follow the two-step framework famously set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Initially, we determine whether “the intent of Congress is clear.” Id. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778. If it is, both the court and the agency “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. If the statute is “silent or ambiguous,” however, we may not supply the

interpretation of the statute we think best (as we would without an agency pronouncement), but must limit ourselves to asking “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Not every agency

interpretation of its governing statute is entitled to Chevron deference, however. In United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001), the Supreme Court emphasized that Chevron only applies (1) “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law,” and when (2) “the agency

interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” Id. at 226-27, 121 S.Ct. 2164. In other words, before we apply Chevron, we must conclude that Congress delegated authority to the agency to interpret the statute in question and that the agency decision under review was made with a “lawmaking pretense.” Id. at 233, 121 S.Ct. 2164. 2 The Board’s

interpretations of the INA made in the course of adjudicating cases before it satisfy the first requirement for Chevron deference set forth in Mead: the Board, through the Attorney General’s delegation, is authorized to promulgate rules carrying the force of law through a process of case-by-case adjudication and, thus, “should be accorded Chevron deference” as it exercises such authority to “give[] ambiguous statutory terms ‘concrete meaning.’ ” INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448-49, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). Whether the Board’s

interpretations of the INA satisfy Mead’s second requirement depends on the form the Board’s decision takes. “Our cases applying Mead treat the precedential value of an agency action as the essential factor in determining whether Chevron deference is appropriate.” Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir.2006) (collecting cases). Thus, we have held that the Board’s prece-dential orders, which bind third parties, qualify for Chevron deference because they are made with a “lawmaking pretense.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

We have not accorded Chevron deference to the Board’s unpublished decisions, however, because they do not bind future parties. See Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1012-14 (9th Cir.2006). Nevertheless, Skidmore deference remains “intact and applicable” when an agency with rulemaking power interprets its governing statute without invoking such authority. Mead, 533 U.S. at 237, 121 S.Ct. 2164 (discussing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)).

Under Skidmore, the measure of deference afforded to the agency varies “depend[ing] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” 323 U.S. at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161. Recognizing that the BIA’s

interpretations of the INA are entitled to at least this much respect, we have applied Skidmore when reviewing its unpublished orders. See, e.g., Ortiz-Magana v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 1042, 1050 (9th Cir.2008); Estrada-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 517, 520 (9th Cir.2007); Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir.2007); Garcia-Quintero, 455 F.3d at 1014. 3 In light of these principles, we consider the extent to which the BIA’s

interpretations of the term “moral turpitude” are entitled to our deference. a The meaning of the term falls well short of clarity. Indeed, as has been noted before, “moral turpitude” is perhaps the quintessential example of an ambiguous phrase. See Galeana-Mendoza v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 1054, 1055 (9th Cir.2006).

In a series of published decisions, the BIA has set forth its general understanding that a “crime involving moral turpitude” involves “conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one’s fellow man or society in general.” In re Perez-Contreras, 20 I. & N. Dec. 615, 618 (B.I.A.1992); see also In re Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 669, 670 (B.I.A.1988) (same).

In a welcome effort to “establish a uniform framework” for the determination of crimes involving moral turpitude, the Attorney General has recently decreed that “[a] finding of moral turpitude ... requires that a perpetrator have committed [a] reprehensible act with some form of scienter.” In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688, 706 (2008). Despite the principles set forth above, we have been hesitant to defer to such general statements by the Board, and we are not alone in this view.

As the Seventh Circuit has explained, the Board’s general understanding of the term “moral turpitude” is not the result of “any insights that it might have obtained from adjudicating immigration cases,” Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir.2004), but simply a recitation of the definition found in the criminal law, see, e.g., Benitez v. Dunevant, 198 Ariz. 90, 7 P.3d 99, 104 (2000); In re Craig, 12 Cal.2d 93, 82 P.2d 442, 444 (1938); In re Farina, 94 Wash.App. 441, 972 P.2d 531, 541 (1999).

Thus, as we have stated before, because the Board’s general definition of “moral turpitude” fails to “particularize” the term in any meaningful way, “ ‘giving Chevron deference ... has no practical significance.’ ” Galeana-Mendoza, 465 F.3d at 1058 n. 9 (quoting Mei, 393 F.3d at 739). Consequently, without more specific guidance from the Board, we have relied on our own generalized definition of “moral turpitude,” see Carty v.

Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir.2005) (explaining that we have traditionally divided crimes involving moral turpitude into two basic types: “those involving fraud and those involving grave acts of baseness or depravity.”); see also Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1074 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., concurring for the majority) (same), although we have noted that our understanding does not differ materially from the Board’s, Galeana-Mendoza, 465 F.3d at 1058 n. 9. b Orders issued by the BIA contain more than an abstract definition of moral turpitude, however.

When the Board adjudicates a case, it must determine whether a petitioner’s offense, once established, meets the definition of such term. In so doing, it assesses the character, gravity, and moral significance of the conduct, drawing upon its expertise as the single body charged with adjudicating all federal immigration cases. This is precisely the type of agency action the Supreme Court instructs is entitled to Chevron deference. See Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439.

Indeed, we accord Chevron deference to the BIA’s construction of other ambiguous terms in the INA promulgated through its precedential decisions. See, e.g., Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 941, 947-48 (9th Cir.2007) (“particularly serious crime”); Murillo-Espinoza v. INS, 261 F.3d 771, 774 (9th Cir.2001) (“conviction”); Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir.1996) (en banc) (“persecution”). Similarly, we accord Skidmore deference to the Board’s nonprecedential decisions interpreting its governing statute. See supra at 909-10 (collecting cases).

We see no reason to exempt the Board’s treatment of “moral turpitude” from these rules. C With this backdrop in mind, we now consider the proper standard of review in this case. The Board affirmed the IJ’s order of removal, holding that Campos’s 1997 and 2002 aggravated DUI convictions were “crimes involving moral turpitude” under the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)®, (ii). As previously explained, supra at 907, we review de novo the Board’s

interpretation of the Arizona statute under which Campos was convicted. If we uphold such

interpretation, we must consider the extent to which we will defer to the Board’s decision that the conduct it found the Arizona statute to prohibit — driving under the influence with a suspended or otherwise restricted license — is a crime of moral turpitude. The BIA dismissed Campos’s appeal in an unpublished order. That order, however, relied upon Lopez-Meza, a prec-edential decision addressing the disposi-tive question of statutory

interpretation at issue in this ease. As the Supreme Court has suggested, we conclude that where, as here, the Board determines that certain conduct is morally turpitudinous in a precedential decision, we apply Chevron deference regardless of whether the order under review is the precedential decision itself or a subsequent unpublished order that relies upon it. See Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 418, 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439 (applying Chevron deference to a nonprece-dential BIA order interpreting the phrase “serious nonpolitical crime” that relied on the

interpretation of such phrase in an earlier precedential decision); see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 & n. 12, 121 S.Ct. 2164 (noting Aguirre-Aguirre’s application of Chevron deference with approval); Garcia-Quintero, 455 F.3d at 1014 (suggesting that Chevron deference may be appropriate when the BIA relies upon a precedential BIA decision “addressing the precise question at issue” in an unpublished order). In sum, we conclude that, once the elements of the petitioner’s offense are established, our review of the BIA’s determination that such offense constitutes a “crime of moral turpitude” is governed by the same traditional principles of administrative deference we apply to the Board’s

interpretation of other ambiguous terms in the INA. We have sometimes suggested otherwise in the past. Nicanor-Romero, 523 F.3d at 997 (declining to defer to the Board’s generalized definition of “moral turpitude” but failing to assess the Board’s particularized application of that definition to the petitioner’s case); Plasencia-Ayala v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 738, 744-45 (9th Cir.2008) (rejecting the argument that “Chevron deference should apply to the BIA’s

interpretation of the ‘amorphous phrase’ ‘crime involving moral turpitude’ ” even though such

interpretation was based on a precedential decision). We now overrule those cases and any others that have impliedly so held. And, in so doing, we join every other court of appeals to have considered the question. See Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir.2008); Wala v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir.2007); Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir.2004); Yousefi v. INS, 260 F.3d 318, 325-26 (4th Cir.2001); Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 185 (5th Cir.1996); Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 572 (8th Cir.1995); Cabral v. INS, 15 F.3d 193, 194 (1st Cir.1994).

Ill With our standard of review established, we examine the BIA’s decision in this case. We begin with the Board’s construction of Campos’s aggravated DUI convictions. A To determine whether a specific crime meets the definition of a removable offense listed in the INA, our court applies the categorical and modified categorical approaches set forth in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). See Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1017.

While we first apply the categorical approach, if the statute of conviction is not a “categorical match” for the generic federal crime because it criminalizes both conduct that does involve moral turpitude and other conduct that does not, “we apply a ‘modified’ categorical approach.” Fernandez-Ruiz, 468 F.3d at 1163.

Under that approach, in the past, we have seen fit to “ ‘look beyond the language of the statute to a narrow, specified set of documents that are part of the record of conviction, including the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, or the transcript from the plea proceedings.’ ” Id. at 1163-64 (quoting Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613, 620 (9th Cir.2004)). If these documents establish that the jury found, or the petitioner pled guilty to, elements of a crime involving moral turpitude, he is properly removable. Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1020.

Arizona’s aggravated DUI statute contains four elements. The first three elements are immediately apparent: A person must (1) “drivfe]” or maintain “actual physical control” over a vehicle, (2) while “under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs,” (3) while his or her license or privilege to drive is “suspended, canceled, revoked, or refused or while a restriction is placed upon the person’s driver license[as a result of a prior DUI-related offense].” Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 28-1383(A)(l); see supra 905.

As for the fourth element, Arizona courts have held that to sustain a conviction, the text of the statute requires the state to prove that the offender drove with a suspended or otherwise revoked license, and that he knew or should have known of the suspension or revocation. See State v. Cramer, 192 Ariz. 150, 962 P.2d 224, 226 (1998) (“To support the conviction for aggravated DUI, the state is required to prove the defendant drove a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol while his license was revoked and that he knew or should have known of the revocation.” (emphasis added)); State v.

Superior Court, 190 Ariz. 203, 945 P.2d 1334, 1337 (1997) (same); State v. Agee, 181 Ariz. 58, 887 P.2d 588, 590 (1994) (same); see also State v. Williams, 144 Ariz. 487, 698 P.2d 732, 734 (1985) (same). “Should have known” is a negligence standard. See State v. Hyde, 186 Ariz. 252, 921 P.2d 655, 678 (1996). The BIA has held that mere negligence cannot support a finding of moral turpitude. See Perez-Contreras, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 618-19. In Lopez-Meza, the BIA concluded that a violation of

section 28-1383(A)(

l) was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1195-96. As noted, we rejected that conclusion in Hernandez-Martinez because the Board failed to acknowledge that

section 28-1383(A)(

l) independently prohibits both driving and physically controlling a vehicle while under the influence and with a suspended or otherwise restricted license. Hernandez-Martinez, 329 F.3d at 1118. Still, we did not consider whether a violation of

section 28 — 1383(A)(1) could qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude if the petitioner had actually been driving at the time of the arrest. Acknowledging Hemcmdez-Martinez, the Board in the case before us examined the transcript of Campos’s 1997 and 2002 plea hearings and concluded that his testimony in both proceedings plainly demonstrated that both convictions arose out of incidents in which he was actually driving. The Board’s reliance on the plea transcripts was an appropriate application of the modified categorical approach. See Tokatly, 371 F.3d at 620.

Moreover, they adequately show that Campos admitted to driving on both occasions. Accordingly, we agree with the Board that the 1997 and 2002 aggravated DUI convictions both involved actual driving. The Board then relied on its precedent in Lopez-Meza to conclude that such conduct is a crime involving moral turpitude. Thus, the Board’s decision in this case must stand if Lopez-Meza is based on a permissible construction of the INA. B The BIA has never held that a simple DUI offense is a crime involving moral turpitude, a fact it attributes to “a long historical acceptance.” Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1194.

Although the dangers of drunk driving are well established, the Board’s unwillingness to classify it as a crime of moral turpitude is, perhaps, not surprising because statutes that prohibit driving under the influence typically do not require intent, but rather “are, or are most nearly comparable to, crimes that impose strict liability.” Begay v. United States, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 1586, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008); id. at 1587 (“[T]he conduct for which the drunk driver is convicted (driving under the influence) need not be purposeful or deliberate.”); see Leocal v.

Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004) (stating that a DUI offense involves “accidental or negligent conduct”). Yet the Board treats Arizona’s prohibition on aggravated DUI differently because it contains an additional “aggravating” element: the offender’s knowledge, at the time of the DUI, that the state has denied him the privilege to drive under any circumstances. See Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1195 (citing Arizona caselaw interpreting

section 28-1383(A)(

l) as containing a knowledge requirement); see supra at 912-13 (collecting such Arizona cases). Thus, the Board reasoned that “aside from the culpability that is often, but not inherently, present in a simple DUI offense,” an individual who commits an aggravated DUI does so “knowing that he or she is absolutely prohibited from driving” and, in so doing, commits a morally turpitudinous offense. Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1195-96 (emphasis added); cf. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 706 & n. 5 (noting that a scienter element is a hallmark of a crime involving moral turpitude); Danesh, 19 I & N.

Dec. at 673 (explaining that knowing violation of the law “exhibits a deliberate disregard for the law, which we consider to be a violation of the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed to society”). 1 Campos and the dissent argue that the Board’s decision in his case cannot stand because Lopez-Meza conflicts with other BIA precedents and, thus, is not based on a permissible construction of the INA. They are correct that “[unexplained inconsistency” in an agency’s

interpretation of its governing statute can be “a reason for holding an

interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice.” Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 162 L.Ed.2d 820 (2005); Dissent at 919-21. Nevertheless, we are mindful that such inconsistency provides a basis for rejecting an agency’s

interpretation only in “rare instances, such as when an agency provides no explanation at all for a change in policy, or when its explanation is so unclear or contradictory that we are left in doubt as to the reason for the change in direction.” Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 493 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc); see also Lands Council v.

Martin, 529 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir.2008) (applying Morales-Izquierdo to' hold that the Forrest Service provided a “rational explanation” for its change in policy that did not leave the court “in doubt as to the reason for the change in direction” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Campos’s argument is twofold. First, he argues that Lopez-Meza cannot be harmonized with a subsequent BIA decision, In re Torres-Varela, 23 I. & N. Dec. 78 (B.I.A.2001), and that, as a result, the Board erred in relying on Lopez-Meza in his case.

In Torres-Varela, the Board held that an alien who had violated Arizona’s “recidivist DUI” statute, which punishes those who commit a DUI after already having three or more simple DUI convictions, had not committed a crime involving moral turpitude. 23 I. & N. Dec. at 85-86. Campos contends that if committing three separate DUIs is not morally turpitudinous, driving under the influence with a suspended or otherwise restricted license cannot be said to be more offensive conduct.

Yet the en banc panel of the Board in Torres-Varela acknowledged Lopez-Meza and reasoned that its holding did not conflict with that precedent. According to Torres-Varela, “[t]he aggravating factor rendering the DUI conviction a crime involving moral turpitude in ... Lopez-Meza was the culpable mental state needed for a conviction under [section 28-1383(A)(1) ]”: the “showing that the defendant knew, at the time that he was driving while under the influence of alcohol, that his driver’s license had been suspended and that he was not permitted to drive.” 23 I. & N. Dec. at 85 (emphasis added).

The aggravating factor in a recidivist DUI conviction, however, is the fact that the offender has been convicted of simple DUI offenses before. In the Board’s view, recidivist DUI “is based on an aggregation of simple DUI convictions” and, since no single simple DUI is a crime of moral turpitude, a collection of DUIs, no matter how many, can never qualify as such. Id. at 85-86. The Board in Torres-Varela offered a rational distinction between recidivist DUI and aggravated DUI offenses. Thus, we cannot accept Campos’s argument that the Board should not have applied Lopez-Meza’s

interpretation of the aggravated DUI statute at issue in this ease. To reject the Board’s distinction as arbitrary and capricious would be to reject its use of the knowledge element in the aggravated DUI statute as a permissible ground for treating an aggravated DUI differently from a recidivist DUI offense. Again, the Attorney General has declared the presence of scienter to be an essential element of a crime involving moral turpitude. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 706 & n. 5.

Such a distinction consistently has been critical to the BIA’s determination of whether violation of a statute constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. See, e.g., Perez-Contreras, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 618 (“Where knowing or intentional conduct is an element of an offense, we have found moral turpitude to be present.”); Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 673 (transforming assault into a crime involving moral turpitude because the statute required the offender to “know that the person assaulted is a peace officer”); In re McNaughton, 16 I. & N.

Dec. 569, 574 (B.I.A.1978) (stating that “whenever a crime has involved intent to defraud, it has been found to involve moral turpitude”); In re Abreu-Semino, 12 I. & N. Dec. 775, 777 (B.I.A.1968) (stating that “moral turpitude normally inheres in the intent”); In re P-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 795, 798 (B.I.A.1955) (same); In re R-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 772, 773-774 (B.I.A.1955) (stating the rule that “unless the statute under consideration requires knowledge on the part of the receiver that the goods were obtained unlawfully the offense defined does not necessarily involve moral turpitude”); In re M-, 2 I. & N.

Dec. 721, 723 (B.I.A.1946) (holding that an offense involving a breaking and entering may be deemed to involve moral turpitude only if it is accompanied by the intent to commit a morally turpitudinous act after entry); In re G-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 403, 404-06 (B.I.A.1943) (same). While we recognize that Campos’s knowledge that he was driving without a license does not exactly add a knowing or intentional element to DUI because the intent involved is different, we cannot conclude that the Board acted irrationally in using intent as a ground to draw a distinction between recidivist DUI and aggravated DUI.

The dissent criticizes our deference to the BIA’s conclusion that the presence or absence of a mens rea element in the statute of conviction can be essential to a determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude. The “real question,” the dissent asserts, is “what is a sufficiently ‘culpable mental state?’ ” Dissent at 926. This stands in stark contrast to the Attorney General’s determination that “some form of scienter” is all that is required in order to conclude that a crime involves moral turpitude. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 706 (emphasis added).

Indeed, the dissent asks us to apply a heightened standard of review, a standard of review far beyond the deferential approach mandated by Chevron. Because the statutory text is devoid of any provision which requires a particular level of scienter, we must defer to the agency’s case-by-case adjudication of the matter so long as its construction of the statute is permissible. See Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424-25, 119 S.Ct. 1439. As the dissent itself admits, the BIA has not seen fit to create a categorical level of scienter for all crimes involving moral turpitude: nor is it required to.

Here, after assessing “the statutory definition” and “the nature of the crime,” McNaughton v. INS, 612 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir.1980), the BIA concluded that given the mens rea involved, the crime was one of moral turpitude. To the extent such a conclusion conflicts with prior BIA precedent, this is not one of those “rare instances” where we should withhold deference. Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 493; see also Lands Council, 529 F.3d at 1225. The agency has not failed to provide an explanation for its action.

To the contrary, the BIA explicitly pointed to the significance of the mens rea element, a significance only confirmed by Silva-Trevino. See Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1195-96; see also Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 706; Torres-Varela 23 I. & N. Dec. at 85. Such explanation is not irrational, and it certainly does not leave us “in doubt as to the reason for the change in direction.” Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 493; see also Lands Council, 529 F.3d at 1225. The dissent would have us be persuaded by the reason for the change.

Our precedent does not require so much. 2 Second, Campos, along with the dissent, argues that the Board’s decision in Lopez-Meza cannot be reconciled with its prior holding in In re Short, 20 I. & N. Dec. 136 (B.I.A.1989). In that case, the Board held that the federal offense “assault with intent to commit any felony” could not be categorized as a crime involving moral turpitude without first considering whether the underlying felony was itself such an offense. Id. at 139 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 113(b) (repealed 1994)).

The Board reasoned that because simple assault is not a crime involving moral turpitude, “if ... the felony intended as a result of that assault also does not involve moral turpitude, then the two crimes combined do not involve moral turpitude.” Id. The Board then stated that “[mjoral turpitude cannot be viewed to arise from some undefined synergism by which two offenses are combined to create a crime involving moral turpitude, where each crime individually does not involve moral turpitude.” Id. Campos and the dissent contend that this latter statement from the Board’s opinion in Short governs this case.

Because the Board has never held that simple DUI or driving with a suspended license, standing alone, are crimes of moral turpitude, they argue that committing both offenses at the same time is not a crime involving moral turpitude either. Yet the en banc panel in Lopez-Meza considered the same argument and rejected it. As the BIA explained, [wje did not hold in [Short ] that a combination of acts that are included as elements of a specific offense could never, when added together, build to such a heightened deviance from accepted moral standards as to reach a level of conduct deemed morally turpitudinous.

In fact, additional aggravating elements can often transform an offense that otherwise would not be a crime involving moral turpitude into one that is. Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1196 (emphasis added). In other words, the Board construed Short as prohibiting a finding of moral turpitude based on the amalgamation of offenses in that case (simple assault with intent to commit a felony of unproven seriousness), but held that Short did not prohibit a finding of moral turpitude based on any combination of acts proscribed by a single criminal statute that might arise in a future case.

We conclude that the Board provided a reasoned explanation for its resolution of any tension between its holdings in Lopez-Meza and Short. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1000-01, 125 S.Ct. 2688. Moreover, the Board’s rejection of the rule Campos seeks is not irrational. It is possible that two separate acts may not be turpitudinous standing alone, but that their commission in tandem rises to the level of an offense so contrary to accepted societal standards as to result in a crime involving moral turpitude.

The Board’s en banc decision in Lopez-Meza was accompanied by a dissent that would have held that aggravated DUI is not a crime involving moral turpitude. Our decision today is likewise accompanied by a vigorous dissent. The existence of such dissents indicates that the question of whether the offense at issue rises to the level of a crime involving moral turpitude is one upon which reasonable minds can differ. Yet Congress left the choice between reasonable

interpretations of the INA to the Attorney General and, by his delegation, to the BIA, and “ ‘desired [that body] (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.’ ” Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982, 125 S.Ct. 2688 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41, 116 S.Ct. 1730, 135 L.Ed.2d 25 (1996)). We are satisfied that the Board’s determination — DUI offenses committed with the knowledge that one’s driver’s license has been suspended or otherwise restricted are crimes involving moral turpitude — is a reasonable

interpretation of the INA. The deferential standard that governs our review requires no more. IV Accordingly, Campos’s petition for review is DENIED. . At the time of Campos's conviction, Arizona’s aggravated DUI statute was codified at Arizona Revised Statutes

section 28-697. Five months later, Arizona redesignated the statute as Arizona Revised Statutes

section 28-1383. 1996 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 76, §§ 3, 25, as amended by 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 1, § 108 (effective Oct. 1, 1997); 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 220, § 82. For purposes of this opinion, we refer to the aggravated DUI statute by its current designation,

section 28-1383. . The statute provides in pertinent part: A. A person is guilty of aggravated driving or actual physical control while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs if the person does any of the following: 1. Commits a violation of § 28-1381[(driving under the influence)], § 28-1382 [(driving under the extreme influence)] or this

section while the person’s driver license or privilege to drive is suspended, canceled, revoked or refused or while a restriction is placed on the person's driver license or privilege to drive as a result of violating § 28-1381 or 28-1382 or under § 28-1385[ (administrative license suspension for driving under the influence) ]. . On March 1, 2003, the INS ceased to exist as an agency under the U.S. Department of Justice and its functions were transferred to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement within the newly formed DHS. .

DHS withdrew its charge that Campos was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). . The BIA also concluded that Campos' theft conviction constituted a crime involving moral turpitude. Campos does not dispute this conclusion on appeal. The only issues preserved on appeal with respect to his remova-bility under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) are: (1) whether aggravated DUI rises to the level of a crime involving moral turpitude and (2) a limited challenge to the adequacy of the administrative record. .

The Attorney General has recently stated that it may be appropriate for immigration judges to look beyond the record of conviction when applying the modified categorical approach. See In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 699 (2008) (”[W]hen the record of conviction fails to show whether the alien was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, immigration judges should be permitted to consider evidence beyond that record if doing so is necessary and appropriate to ensure proper application of the Act's moral turpitude provisions.”).

As that question is not squarely before us, we reserve judgment as to the validity of that portion of our prior case law which suggests review should be more confined. See, e.g., Nicanor-Romero v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 992, 1007 (9th Cir.2008) (limiting review to particular documents in the alien’s record of conviction). . Frequently, we have characterized the question presented in these cases as singular, i.e., whether the petitioner’s statutory crime is a crime of moral turpitude. As noted, we review the BIA’s

interpretation of criminal statutes de novo. However, many of our prior cases have not acknowledged the second component of the BIA’s inquiry, its

interpretation of the INA. See, e.g., Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1017, 1018-20 (reviewing both components of the BIA's decision but suggesting that the standard of review is singular). One reason for such omission is that once the conduct proscribed by the petitioner's statute of conviction is identified (e.g., fraud), the question whether such conduct involves "moral turpitude" is not in doubt and thus merits little or no analysis from the court. .

The Attorney General is charged with the "administration and enforcement” of the INA and the "determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law [are] controlling.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1). While retaining ultimate authority, the Attorney General has delegated his discretion and authority in interpreting the INA to the BIA to exercise in the course of adjudicating cases before it. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1). .

As we explained in Garcia-Quintero, the applicable regulations allow the BIA to decide most appeals through brief, nonprecedential orders authored by a single member of the Board. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5). Only if that member determines that a case presents "[t]he need to establish a precedent construing the meaning of laws, regulations, or procedures” is it transferred to a three-judge panel for decision in a published order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6).

The Board’s internal policies establish "[ujnpublished decisions are binding on the parties to the decision but are not considered precedent for unrelated cases." BIA Prac. Man., Ch. 1.4(d)(ii) (rev. June 15, 2004). . Some have suggested that the imprecision of the term “moral turpitude” demonstrates Congress’s intent that its meaning be developed over time through judicial and administrative construction. Others have construed matters less charitably.

As Justice Jackson once wrote, “Congress knowingly conceived [the term] in confusion,” deliberately ignoring a warning raised by a member of the House that " '[n]o one can really say what is meant by ... a crime involving moral turpitude.’ ” Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 233-34, 71 S.Ct. 703, 95 L.Ed. 886 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization Hearings on H.R.Rep. No. 10384, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1916)). . Again, the Attorney General has suggested that a broader scope of review is appropriate. See supra note 6. .

We also recognize that they both involved actual knowledge, not mere negligence. Campos admitted in 1997 that he knew he did not have a valid license, and he admitted in 2002 that he knew his license had been suspended or revoked. The dissent disagrees with our conclusion as to Campos's 1997 conviction. Dissent at 925-26 n.15. The fact of Campos's conviction is proof that his license had been "suspended, canceled, revoked or refused” in 1997. Ariz. Rev.Stat. § 28 — 1383(A)(1).

With this established, what else could Campos’s admission— which indicated he knew he did not possess a valid license — have meant except that he knew his license was "suspended, canceled, revoked or refused”? Moreover, despite the fact that the BIA precedent under which he was deemed removable requires a knowledge scienter, see Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1195-96, Campos never contends that he was convicted of anything but a "knowing” violation of

section 28-1383. In any case, the record undeniably reflects that Campos knew he was "absolutely prohibited from driving.” Id. at 1196. Even if the record of Campos's 1997 DUI conviction does not establish the requisite mens rea, the point is academic. The BIA determined that he was alternatively removable on the basis of his 1990 theft conviction. Campos did not appeal that portion of the BIA’s decision, thus waiving any challenge to its validity. See Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Mont.

Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1164 (9th Cir.2003) (explaining that we "will not consider matters on appeal that are not specifically and distinctly argued in an appellant’s opening brief”). . The Supreme Court has held that simple DUI is not a "violent felony” as defined in the Armed Career Criminal Act, Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1586, or a "crime of violence” under the INA, Leocal, 543 U.S. at 8-9, 125 S.Ct. 377. Nevertheless, because those terms contain different elements than a "crime involving moral turpitude,” such holdings bear little relation to the question presented here.

See Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1586 (explaining that a "violent felony” must include "purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct” (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)); Leocal, 543 U.S. at 8-9, 125 S.Ct. 377 (stating that a "crime of violence” must have "as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another” (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)). . The petitioner in Torres-Varela was convicted of violating Arizona Revised Statutes

section 28-697(A)(2), which has since been redesignated as

section 28-1383(A)(2), see supra note 1, the subsection adjacent to Arizona's prohibition on aggravated DUI,

section 28—1383(A)(1). The term "recidivist DUI” is not used in the Arizona statute, but we employ it here to distinguish § 28-1383(A)(2) from § 28-1383(A)(l). . The dissent derides this "lame[] attempt” to distinguish Lopez-Meza from Short, demanding that the BIA explain "by what logic” it can reach the conclusion it sets forth. Dissent at 2678-80. Again, the dissent demands more than is required by Chevron. The BIA’s distinction is not irrational: Short did not purport to establish a categorical rule.

It is possible that two non-tuipitudinous offenses, committed at the same time could rise to the level of a crime involving moral turpitude. As the Chief Judge mentioned at oral argument, while neither simple DUI nor driving at excessive speeds individually constitute crimes involving moral turpitude, it would not be irrational to conclude that driving at excessive speeds while drunk amounted to “conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved.” Perez-Contreras, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 618.

To the extent Lopez-Meza is somehow inconsistent with Short, as we stated previously, the agency’s explanation for its departure does not leave us "in doubt as to the reason for the change in direction.” Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 493; see also Lands Council, 529 F.3d at 1225.