Jason Scott HARPER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Arnold SCHWARZENEGGER; et al., Defendants-Appellees, 613 F. App'x 648

MEMORANDUM Jason Scott Harper appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that prison officials failed to protect him from assault by his cellmates. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm. The district court properly dismissed Harper’s action for failure to state a claim. See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir.2012) (explaining we review de novo an order dismissing a prisoner complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim).

The record demonstrates Harper failed to plead facts sufficient to sustain a plausible Eighth Amendment violation claim. See Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir.2013) (setting forth three-part inquiry into failure-to-protect claim). First, Harper failed to allege facts demonstrating he was “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 1075. Second, Harper failed to show that Defendants “kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an' excessive risk to [Harper’s] health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).

Additionally, Harper’s Due Process, rights were not implicated, because Harper does not have a protected liberty interest in single-cell status classification. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005); Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir.2007). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Harper leave to file a Fifth Amended Complaint, because after granting four amendments to the complaint, granting a fifth would be futile. See Cervantes v.

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir.2011) (setting forth standard of review and noting that district court may dismiss without leave to amend when amendment would be futile); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir.1992) (district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where it has afforded plaintiff one or moré opportunities to amend). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.