SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF LAW, a California corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA; The Committee of Bar Examiners; James H. Aguirre, Individually and in his official capacity; Archie Joe Biggers, individually and in his official capacity; James A. Bolton, individually and in his official capacity; Cometria C. Cooper, individually and in his official capacity; J. Scott Bovitz, individually and in his official capacity; Richard A. Frankel, individually and in his official capacity; K.V. Kumar, individually and in his official capacity; Sean M. McCoy, individually and in his official capacity; Sandra Mendoza, individually and in her official capacity; Joel Miliband, individually and in his official capacity; Martha Prudenhamiter, individually and in her official capacity; Steven J. Renick, individually and in his official capacity; Sandra L. Salazar, individually and in her official capacity; Jeanne C. Vanderhoff, individually and in her official capacity; Lee H. Wallach, individually and in his official capacity; Patricia P. White, individually and in her official capacity; Alan Yochelson, individually and in his official capacity; George Leal, individually and in his official capacity; David A. Carrillo, in his official capacity; Lisa Cummins, individually and in her official capacity; Patrick R. Dixon, individually and in his official capacity, Erroneously Sued As Patrick R. Duncan; John P. McNicho-las, individually and in his official capacity, Erroneously Sued As John P. Nicholas; James Vaughn, individually and in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellees, 613 F. App'x 659

MEMORANDUM The Southern California Institute of Law (SCIL) appeals the district court’s dismissal of its federal constitutional claims against members of California’s Committee of Bar Examiners (CBE). As the facts are known to the parties, we repeat them only as necessary to explain our decision. We need not decide whether Appellees enjoy absolute immunity in this case, because SCIL has failed to allege a cognizable injury.

The letter SCIL received from CBE had no legal consequence; by sending it, CBE did not “make any decision or take any state action affecting [SCIL’s] rights, benefits, relationship or status with the state.” Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.1994). Rather, the letter simply notified SCIL that CBE was contemplating taking action against the school, and would do so if SCIL failed to correct its conduct. This mere warning of potential action against SCIL does not give rise to the school’s constitutional claims. See Corales v.

Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 565 (9th Cir.2009) (“Plaintiffs do not have a retaliation claim based on threats of discipline for First Amendment activity if that threat is itself based upon lawful consequences and is not actually administered.”); Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir.1987) (“We find no case that squarely holds a threat to do

an act prohibited by the Constitution is equivalent to doing the act itself ... [and] we are not prepared to create an exception to this pattern.”); Kerley Indus., Inc. v. Pima Cnty., 785 F.2d 1444, 1446 (9th Cir.1986) (“[A letter without] operative legal effect ... cannot constitute the basis of a claim of deprivation of property without due process.”). Because no action affecting SCIL’s constitutional rights ever occurred, the school’s claims with respect to CBE’s letter were properly dismissed. AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.