George Thomas LeROY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Brian BELLEQUE, Respondent-Appellee, 621 F. App'x 468

MEMORANDUM Petitioner-Appellant George LeRoy appeals from the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C, § 2253, and we affirm. In 1996, LeRoy was convicted in Oregon state court of attempted murder, attempted aggravated murder, first degree and second degree assault, and felon in possession of a firearm. Because he raised an insanity defense, the jury was instructed, as required by Oregon law, see Or.Rev.

Stat. §§ 161.313,161.327, that, if they were to find the defendant “guilty except for insanity,” the defendant could be released from custody if either the court or a state agency'found that he was no longer a danger to others (hereinafter the “consequences instruction”). On direct appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that the consequences instruction did not violate either the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. State v. Leroy, 182 Or.App. 543, 49 P.3d 115 (2002) (per curiam). The Oregon Supreme Court denied review. State v. Leroy, 335 Or. 104, 59 P.3d 1279 (2002).

After unsuccessfully seeking post-conviction relief in Oregon state court, LeRoy filed this federal habeas petition, arguing that the consequences instruction violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to an impartial jury and a fair trial. The district court denied the petition. LeRoy’s habeas petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Because LeRoy’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims were adjudicated on the merits by the Oregon Court of Appeals, we may grant LeRoy’s petition only if the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “The starting point for cases subject to § 2254(d)(1) is to identify the ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’ that governs the habeas petitioner’s claims.” Marshall v.

Rodgers, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1446, 1449, 185 L.Ed.2d 540 (2013) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). “If Supreme Court ‘cases give no clear answer to the question presented, ... it cannot be said that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law.’ ” Hedlund v. Ryan, 750 F.3d 793, 799 (9th Cir.2014) (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126, 128 S.Ct. 743, 169 L.Ed.2d 583 (2008)).

Further, the Supreme Court “has held on numerous occasions that it. is not an ‘unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law1 for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by” the Supreme Court. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009). . The Supreme Court has not held that giving a consequences instruction related to an insanity defense violates a defendant’s constitutional rights.

The cases Le-Roy cites are not to the contrary; their holdings do not “squarely establish” the “specific legal rule” that LeRoy espouses. Accordingly, we conclude that the decision of the Oregon Court of Appeals rejecting LeRoy’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The district court did not err in denying LeRoy’s habeas petition. AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.