Bijan LAGHAEI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION; et al., Defendants-Appellees, 624 F. App'x 597

MEMORANDUM Bijan Laghaei appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging various state law claims concerning the foreclosure of his home. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction, Schnabel v. Lui, 302 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir.2002), and we vacate and remand. We reject Laghaei’s contention that defendants waived their right to remove this action to federal court by first filing an unlawful detainer action in Nevada state court.

Laghaei has waived the alleged removal defect by failing to file a motion to remand within 30 days of defendants’ filing their notice of removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal....”). . However, during the pendency of this appeal the Nevada Supreme Court issued its decision in Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., — Nev. -, 302 P.3d 1103 (2013), holding that unlawful detainer and quiet title proceedings are in rem or quasi in rem in nature.

See id. at 1108. “The prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine holds that when one court is exercising in rem jurisdiction over a res, a second court will not assume in rem jurisdiction over the same res.” Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 651 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir.2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment dismissing Laghaei’s complaint for failure to state a claim, and remand to the district court to determine if Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporations’s unlawful detainer action remains pending in Nevada state court, and if so, whether the primary exclusive jurisdiction doctrine applies. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. VACATED and REMANDED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is- not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R, 36-3.