George A. HINSHAW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNUM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Erroneously Sued As Unum Provident Life Insurance Company of America, Group Life Disability, Defendant-Appellee, 677 F. App'x 433

MEMORANDUM George A. Hinshaw appeals pro se from the district court’s

summary judgment in his action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm. Where an ERISA-governed plan grants discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan, we review for an abuse of discretion the administrator’s

interpretation of the plan, and de novo the district court’s application of this standard. Tapley v. Locals 302 & 612 of the Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs-Emp’rs Constr. Indus, Ret. Plan, 728 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013). Where the administrator has a conflict of interest, we apply abuse of discretion review to a discretion-granting plan “informed by the nature, extent, and effect on the decision-making process of any conflict of interest that may appear in the record.” Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 967 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).

Summary judgment for defendant was proper because Hinshaw failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the administrator’s conflict of interest impacted its decision and whether the administrator’s decision was a reasonable

interpretation of the plan’s terms. See Stephan v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 697 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir. 2012) (traditional

summary judgment principles apply to consideration of the “nature and impact” of a conflict of interest); McDaniel v. Chevron Corp., 203 F.3d 1099, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000) (under abuse of discretion standard, plan administrator’s decision to deny benefits must be upheld “if it is based upon a reasonable

interpretation of the plan’s terms and if it was made in good faith”). The district court did not clearly err by finding that ERISA’s safe harbor provision did not apply to this case. The evidence showed that Hinshaw’s employer made contributions to the long-term disability plan. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j); Armani v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 840 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2016) (setting forth standard of review for district court’s findings of fact). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.