MEMORANDUM Marlon Blacher, aka Marlon Jessie Blacher, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s
summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging denial of access to the courts. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014), and we affirm. The district court properly granted
summary judgment because Blacher failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he exhausted his administrative remedies before filing his lawsuit or whether administrative remedies were “effectively unavailable.” See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires “proper exhaustion,” which means “using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)” (emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)); Sapp v.
Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 826 (9th Cir. 2010) (PLRA does not require exhaustion when remedies are “effectively unavailable”). We reject as meritless Blacher’s contention that the district court failed to use Blacher’s correct legal name. We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.