MEMORANDUM The district court did not err by granting defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff did not file her discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) until more than two years after her termination—well beyond the 300-day statute of limitations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Laquaglia v. Rio Hotel & Casino, Inc., 186 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff argued below, and argues here, that she is entitled to equitable tolling because she was not aware of the filing deadline, she was without counsel, and the EEOC initially accepted her charge before ruling it untimely.
None of these grounds, however, provides a basis for equitably tolling the statute of limitations. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct, 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990); Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiffs request to amend her complaint. Plaintiff has offered no indication of what additional facts she would allege in an amended complaint to support her equitable tolling argument. See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998). AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.