MEMORANDUM California state prisoner Anthony Tyrone Campbell appeals pro se from the district court’s
summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1988 action alleging excessive force. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s
summary judgment on the basis of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm. The district court properly granted
summary judgment because Campbell failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he properly exhausted his available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), or whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable. See Ross v. Blake, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1856, 1860, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016) (proper administrative exhaustion under the PLRA is mandatory, but may not be required when “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation”); Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (“[Pjroper exhaustion of administrative remedies ... means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.