Twyla LaWanna Sharon BOATLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY, Department of Child Safety, Defendant-Appellee, 689 F. App'x 520

MEMORANDUM Twyla LaWanna Sharon Boatley appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, We review de novo. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissal under the Rook-er-Feldman doctrine); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Boatley’s claim under § 671(a)(15) because “42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) neither confers an enforceable private right on its beneficiaries nor creates an implied cause of action on their behalf,” Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 364, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). The district court properly dismissed Boatley’s challenge to the actions of the Arizona “Superior Court Juvenile Court” for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because her challenge constituted a forbidden “de facto appeal” of a prior, final state court judgment.

See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163 (“It is a forbidden de facto appeal under Rook-er-Feldman when the ‘plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.”). We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.