Elissa RUBENSTEIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WHITTIER POLICE DEPARTMENT, official capacity; et al., Defendants-Appellees, and Harrison, Officer, Whittier Police Department, individual capacity; et al., Defendants, 691 F. App'x 852

MEMORANDUM Elissa Rubenstein appeals pro se from the district court’s

summary judgment in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising from her arrest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s ruling on a motion for

summary judgment. Szajer v. City of Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm. The district court properly determined that Rubenstein’s action was time-barred because all claims accrued more than two years before Rubenstein filed her complaint, and Rubenstein did not establish that she was entitled to tolling. See Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (for § 1983 claims, federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations and tolling provisions for personal injury actions); see also Cal. Civ.

Proc. § 335.1 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Cal. Civ. Proc. § 352(a) (tolling of the limitations period for insanity); Hsu v. Mt. Zion Hosp., 259 Cal.App.2d 562, 66 Cal.Rptr. 659, 664-65 (1968) (commitment to a mental health facility is not conclusive of insanity for the purposes of § 352(a)). We do not consider documents not filed with the district court. See United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).

Rubenstein’s motions to supplement the record (Docket Entry Nos. 10 and 12) are denied. AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent-except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.