Larry J. HUDACK; Marianne S. Hudack, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Dallas Scott HOLMES, Judge Riverside Superior Court, in his official capacity, Defendant-Appellee, 691 F. App'x 883

MEMORANDUM Larry J. Hudack and Marianne S. Hu-dack appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising from state court proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a jurisdictional dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the Hudacks’ action as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the Hu-dacks’ action is a “de facto appeal” of a prior state court judgment, in which they raise issues that are “inextricably intertwined” with that judgment. See Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 858-60 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiffs claim because the relief sought “would require the district court to determine the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Hudacks’ action without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court can dismiss without leave to amend where amendment would be futile). The Hudacks’ motion to strike portions of Judge Holmes’ answering brief (Docket Entry No. 17) and motion for sanctions (Docket Entry No. 27) are denied. AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.