UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Shane Scott OLNEY, Defendant-Appellant, 693 F. App'x 652

MEMORANDUM Shane Olney appeals his conviction for sponsoring or exhibiting an animal in an unlawful animal fighting venture, 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 2. He contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction and that the criminal statute, as applied to him, violates his free exercise rights under the First Amendment. We review both contentions de novo. See United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 497 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1992). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 1.

We reject Olney’s challenge to the district court’s jurisdiction. “[Fjederal court jurisdiction extends to intra-Indian violations of federal criminal laws of general, nationwide applicability.” United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 946 (9th Cir. 2007); see Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116, 80 S.Ct. 543, 4 L,Ed.2d 584 (1960) (“[I]t is now well settled ... that a general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their property interests.”). The statute at issue here, 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1), falls within that category.

Whether or not the State of Washington retroceded its jurisdiction to prosecute state crimes occurring on Yakama land has no bearing on this federal prosecution of a federal crime. 2. We also reject Olney’s free exercise challenge to the statute. Olney was not punished for exercising “his dominion and control of his roosters” in accordance with his expressed religious beliefs.

The district court found no evidence that he “personally exhibited or sponsored any particular rooster he owned in the animal fighting venture.” Olney was convicted for “host[ing] the entire animal fighting venture” in which others participated and exercised dominion and control over their roosters. To the extent 7 U.S.C. § 2156, “a neutral law of general application,” has “the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice” by Olney, it survives First Amendment scrutiny because it has a rational basis. Stormans, Inc. v.

Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1075 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2433, 195 L.Ed.2d 870 (2016). “[T]he prohibition of animal cruelty ... has a long history in American law, starting with the early settlement of the Colonies.” United States v.

Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010); see also id. at 477, 130 S.Ct. 1577 (observing that cockfighting has “long [been] considered immoral in much of America”). - But “cockfighting [is] prohibited only in part out of compassion for the suffering animals; the main reason [it was] abolished was because it was felt that [it] debased and brutalized the citizenry who flocked to witness such [a] spectacle[].” Paris Adult Theatre I v.

Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n.15, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973). “Congress has declared cockfighting a scourge that warrants prosecution, and we have no quarrel with that.” Ortega-Lopez v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 2016). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. . Olney’s request that we take judicial notice of two documents related to retrocession by Washington is therefore DENIED,