Johnny R. ANDOE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kevin KEMPH, Director; et al., Defendants-Appellees, 694 F. App'x 518

MEMORANDUM Johnny R. Andoe, an Idaho state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We reverse and remand.

Dismissal of Andoe’s access-to-courts claim was proper because Andoe failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants’ conduct caused actual injury to a nonfrivolous legal claim. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-53, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (setting forth elements of an access-to-courts claim and actual injury requirement). However, Andoe was not given an opportunity to amend this claim prior to dismissal of the action. See Lucas v.

Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.”). Moreover, An-doe alleged in his verified complaint that he was transferred to another prison in retaliation for filing grievances, and the district court did not evaluate Andoe’s retaliation claim. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context); see also Hebbe v.

Pliller, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (pro se pleadings are liberally construed). We reverse the judgment, and remand for the district court to consider Andoe’s retaliation claim in the first instance, and to determine whether leave to amend the complaint would be appropriate. We rejeet as meritless Andoe’s contentions regarding the district court’s treatment of his motion to reassign the case. REVERSED and REMANDED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.