UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eduardo SOSA, Defendant-Appellant, 697 F. App'x 551

MEMORANDUM Eduardo Sosa challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that Border Patrol Agents lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. An officer may conduct an investigatory stop of a person or vehicle if he has reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity “may be afoot.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)). To determine whether a stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, we look at the totality of the circumstances. Id.

In the context of border patrol stops, the factors we consider include: “(1) characteristics of the area; (2) proximity to the border; (3) usual patterns of traffic and time of day; (4) previous alien or drug smuggling in the area; (5) behavior of the driver, including ‘obvious attempts to evade officers’; (6) appearance or behavior of passengers; (7) model and appearance of the vehicle; and, (8) officer experience.” United States v. Garcia-Barron, 116 F.3d 1305, 1307 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)).

In addition, “the notoriety of a road as an alien smuggling route ... [is] a relevant factor supporting reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Palos-Marquez, 591 F.3d 1272, 1277 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the behavior of the men whom the car picked up, the íocation and timing of the pickup, and the movement of the car, taken together, demonstrate that the agents had reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop. AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.