Mehrdad SHAYEFAR; Gina Shayefar, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Von-Alan Hinano KALELEIKI, Defendant-Appellant, and Sarah-Therece K. Kaleleiki, Defendant, 698 F. App'x 467

MEMORANDUM Von-Alan Hinano Kaleleiki appeals pro se from the district court’s

summary judgment in favor of the Shayefars in their action to quiet title. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s grant of

summary judgment and determination of subject matter jurisdiction. Haro v. Sebelius, 747 F.3d 1099, 1107 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm. The district court properly granted

summary judgment on the Shayefars’ claim to quiet title because defendants failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether they held superior title to the Shayefars on the subject property. See Maui Land & Pineapple Co. v.

Infiesto, 76 Hawaii 402, 879 P.2d 507, 512-13 (1994) (“In an action to quiet title, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove title in and to the land in dispute ... [by showing] either that he has paper title to the property or that he holds title by adverse possession ... [and] that he has a substantial interest in the property and that his title is superi- or to that of the defendants.”); Makila Land Co., LLC v. Kapu, 139 Hawai'i 261, 388 P.3d 49, 50 (Ct.

App. 2016) (“A prima facie case can be made in various ways, but is usually done by bringing forward evidence of the initial land grant award' and tracing ownership forward to the plaintiff through ‘mesne conveyances, devise, or descent’ or through evidence of adverse possession .... ” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Silva, 124 Hawai'i 476, 248 P.3d 1207, 1213 (Ct.

App. 2011) (“If the plaintiff and the defendant both bring forward evidence supporting their claims of title, then the court must decide, based on the evidence presented, which party has title superior to that of the other party.”). To the extent that appellant challenges the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the district court properly determined that there was diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Naffe v. Frey, 789 F.3d 1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (setting forth requirements for diversity jurisdiction); see also United States v.

Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting jurisdictional challenge by Hawaiian nationals). We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,