MEMORANDUM Robynne Ariel Fauley appeals pro se from the district court’s

summary judgment in LNV Corporation’s diversity action arising out of judicial foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Doe v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm. The district court properly granted

summary judgment because Fauley failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether LNV was not entitled to judicial foreclosure. See Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 73.0301, 86.710-86.715, Brandrup v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., 353 Or. 668, 303 P.3d 301, 315 (2013) (en banc) (“A trust deed follows the promissory note that it secures.”); Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Walmsley, 277 Or.App. 690, 374 P.3d 937, 940 (2016) (concluding plaintiff entitled to enforce a promissory note where plaintiff established “that it possessed the note at the time of the foreclosure action and that the note was indorsed to plaintiff.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Fauley’s motion for reconsideration because Fauley failed to demonstrate any grounds for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and listing grounds warranting reconsideration). We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We do not consider documents not filed with the district court. See United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”). All pending motions and requests are denied. AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.