DJ St. JON, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellánt, v. Timothy J. TATRO, an individual; Peter A. Zamoyski, an individual; Tatro & Zamoyski, LLP, a California Limited Liability Partnership; Vincent J. Bartolotta, Jr., an individual; Karen R. Frostrom, an individual; Thornes Bartolotta & McGuire, a California Limited Liability Partnership; M. D. Scully, an individual; William M. Rathbone, an individual; Timothy K Branson, an individual; Gordon & Rees LLP, a California Limited Liability Partnership; City of San Diego, a California municipality; Jan I. Goldsmith, City Attorney for San Diego; Donald R. Worley, Assistant City Attorney for San Diego; John E. Riley, Deputy City Attorney for San Diego, Defendants-Appellees, 698 F. App'x 917

MEMORANDUM Plaintiff-Appellant D.J. St. Jon appeals the district court’s dismissal of her complaint for lack of standing and pursuant to the Rooher-Feldman doctrine. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND As the facts and procedural history are familiar to the parties and not disputed, we do not recite them here. We will address them below as necessary to explain our disposition. ANALYSIS The district court held that St. Jon lacked standing to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because, among other things, she had not suffered an injury in fact.

On appeal, St. Jon waived any argument to the contrary by failing to raise it specifically and distinctly in her opening brief. See Greenwood v. F.A.A., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994). St. Jon mentioned her alleged injuries in footnote 4 on page 25 of her opening brief, but provided no argument or citations to legal authority. This does not suffice. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 F.3d 1161, 1164 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014) (lack of argument); Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 894 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (footnote). Accordingly, St. Jon lacks an injury in fact and standing to sue.

See Civil Rights Educ. & Enft Ctr. v. Hosp. Props. Tr., 867 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). However, St. Jon would lack standing even if she had not waived an injury-in-fact argument. St. Jon has not established that she suffered any injury in fact that was causally connected to the conduct of Defendants-Appellees, which injury a favorable decision would likely redress. See id. Because this case is resolved on the basis of standing, we do not reach the question of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine’s applicability.

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s dismissal of St. Jon’s complaint is AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.