Raymond FELDMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOSCO CREDIT LLC, a foreign entity, Defendant-Appellee, 699 F. App'x 718

MEMORANDUM Raymond Feldman appeals pro se from the district court’s

summary judgment in his diversity action seeking to set aside a state court judgment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Owen, 519 F.3d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 2008). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Hell’s Angels Motorcycle Corp. v. McKinley, 360 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm. The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Feldman’s collateral attack on the state court judgment under the Rooker-Peldman doctrine because Feld-man’s action amounted to a forbidden “de facto appeal” of a prior, final state court judgment.

See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (“It is a forbidden de facto appeal under Rooker-Feldman when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly, committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.”). We reject as without merit Feldman’s contention that he was entitled to

summary judgment in his favor based on the district court’s granting of the parties’ requests for judicial notice. We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F,3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.