UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert R. SOLOMON III, Defendant-Appellant, 700 F. App'x 682

MEMORANDUM Robert R. Solomon III appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 37-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Solomon contends that the district court improperly determined that his prior assault conviction under California Penal Code § 245(a)(4) was a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(

A) and, therefore, improperly determined his base offense level. He acknowledges that this claim is foreclosed by our holding in United States v. Grajeda, 581 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2009) (violation of

section 245 “is categorically a crime of violence” under the elements clause). However, he argues that this holding has been undermined by Johnson v. United States, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015). We disagree. Johnson held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), was unconstitutionally vague, and did not address the elements clause. See Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2563. Moreover, Johnson’s holding had no effect on the advisory Guidelines. See Beckles v. United States, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 886, 895, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017).

Finally, contrary to Solomon’s contention, our decision in Grajeda is not “clearly irreconcilable” with Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013), or Mathis v. United States, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016). See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.