MEMORANDUM UHS of Delaware, Inc. appeals the district court’s order finding unenforceable a provision in an arbitration agreement that waives representative claims under California’s Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”). Reviewing the order de novo, see Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 718 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (citation omitted), we affirm. UHS argues that DirecTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, - U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 463, 193 L.Ed.2d 365 (2015), abrogated Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail North America, Inc., 803 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 2015), and Iskanian v.
CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289, 327 P.3d 129 (2014), and therefore the district court’s reliance on Sakkab and Iskanian was erroneous. We disagree and conclude that Imburgia is not clearly irreconcilable with Sakkab or Iskanian. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Imburgia simply held that a California court failed to place arbitration contracts “on equal footing with all other contracts” when it interpreted a choice-of-law provision in an arbitration agreement. 136 S.Ct. at 468-71 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 163 L.Ed.2d 1038 (2006)). Sakkab and Iskanian, in contrast, directly addressed the validity of PAGA waivers in arbitration agreements under state and federal law. Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 431—40; Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 378-89, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289, 327 P.3d 129. Therefore, neither case is undermined by Imburgia. AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. . Because we affirm, we deny Appellee Vanessa Rivera’s motion for
summary affir-mance as moot.