UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Spotted WOLF, Defendant-Appellant, 708 F. App'x 365

MEMORANDUM Charles Spotted Wolf appeals the denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence. See United States v. Atalig, 502 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm. Spotted Wolf contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his burglary conviction under the Major Crimes Act (“MCA”) because the government’s case relied almost solely on the testimony of his co-defendant, Ashley Solheim.

He argues that, under Montana law, a conviction cannot rest solely on the testimony of an accomplice. Spotted Wolfs reliance on state law is misplaced. See United States v. Pluff, 253 F.3d 490, 494 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he MCA’s incorporation of state law in defining and punishing crimes is limited to the applicable elements and sentencing schemes, and does not include all aspects of state law.”). Under federal law, a conviction “may be based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, if the testimony is not incredible or unsubstantial on its face.” Darden v.

United States, 405 F.2d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 1969) (internal quotations omitted). Solheim’s testimony as to Spotted Wolfs involvement in the burglary was neither incredible nor unsubstantial. Moreover, it was supported by the testimony of two other witnesses. The evidence was adequate to allow a rational trier of fact to find the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not-precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.