UNITED STATES of America, Appellee v. Paul ASKEW, Appellant, 375 U.S. App. D.C. 440

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH, in which Circuit Judge SENTELLE joins. Dissenting opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge EDWARDS. KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge. When the police have reasonable suspicion that a person committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, the officers may forcibly stop that individual. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

During the Terry stop, the officers may briefly take certain reasonable investigative steps — including questioning the suspect and conducting identification procedures such as fingerprinting and “show-ups” (in a show-up, the police have a witness or victim look at the suspect).' See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 185, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817, 105 S.Ct. 1643, 84 L.Ed.2d 705 (1985); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981).

In this case, the police learned that an armed robbery had just occurred on a street in Washington, D.C. Shortly afterward, an officer saw Paul Askew walking on a nearby street. Based on reasonable suspicion that Askew had committed the armed robbery, the officer stopped him. The police then brought the robbery victim to the scene of the stop and conducted a show-up. The officers unzipped Askew’s outer jacket during the show-up so that the victim could see Askew’s clothing— that step, the police believed, could assist the witness’s identification.

Unzipping the outer jacket ultimately led the officers to discover that Askew was illegally carrying a gun. Askew’s primary argument to this Court is that the initial unzipping of his jacket was an unreasonable search. We disagree. In a show-up during a Tern/ stop, the Fourth Amendment permits police officers to reasonably maneuver a suspect’s outer clothing — such as unzipping an outer jacket so a witness can see the suspect’s clothing — when taking that step could assist a witness’s identification. We affirm the District Court’s judgment. I 1.

The District Court’s findings of fact (and, where specific findings are lacking, the relevant testimony from the suppression hearing) show the following. See United States v. Askew, 313 F.Supp.2d 1, 2-3 (D.D.C.2004). At about 11 p.m. on December 19, 2003, a Metropolitan Police Department radio broadcast reported an armed robbery near ’ 9th and G Streets, S.E., in the District of Columbia. The radio report in part described the robbery suspect as male, approximately six-feet tall, and wearing a blue sweatshirt and blue jeans.

While driving in his patrol car, Officer Anthony Bowman heard the dispatch and began canvassing the area near the robbery scene. Within minutes, Officer Bowman saw Paul Askew walking near 9th Street and Independence Avenue, S.E. Noticing that Askew was a man with a mustache who “vaguely matched” the broadcast description, Officer Bowman asked the dispatcher whether the alleged robber had a mustache. The dispatcher replied that the robbery suspect indeed had been described as having a mustache. Meanwhile, when Askew saw that Officer Bowman’s car was following him, Askew turned and walked in a different direction.

Officer Bowman continued to follow Askew in the police car. After calling in his location to other police, Officer Bowman parked the patrol car, got out, and stopped Askew. Officer Bowman requested that Askew present identification and instructed Askew to keep his hands on top of his head, not in his pockets. Askew complied with those requests. Officer Bowman then told Askew that he had been stopped because he matched the description of an armed robbery suspect.

Officer Bowman noticed that Askew was wearing two jackets: “[H]e had on a navy blue jacket with a darker blue fleece type jacket underneath.” Other police (including Officer Anthony Willis and Officer James Koenig) arrived at the scene. For the officers’ safety, Officer Koenig conducted a standard pat-down frisk of Askew’s outer clothing pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Officer Koenig did not feel a weapon.

Another officer then arrived with the robbery victim to conduct a “show-up” procedure (which allows a witness or victim to look at a suspect for identification purposes). The victim remained inside the police car as the officers brought Askew toward the car. Officer Willis recalled that the suspect described in the radio broadcast was wearing a blue hooded sweatshirt. As Officer Willis testified, he wanted the victim to see what Askew had on “to make sure that he wasn’t zipping nothing up to cover up.” To that end, Officer Willis started to pull down Askew’s outer jacket zipper.

The zipper stopped when it hit what Officer Willis described as a “hard” or “solid” object and “didn’t go past” the object. Askew then knocked Officer Willis’s hand away from the zipper. At about this time, the show-up ended, and the officer accompanying the victim in the car drove her away from the scene of the show-up. At this point, Officer Willis and Officer Edward Snead were not aware of the results of the show-up.

They quickly walked Askew backward and made him sit upright on the hood of a police car. (The testimony suggests less than a minute passed between the end of the show-up and the walk to the police car. See Suppression Hr’g Tr. 54-55 (Mar. 10, 2004).) Officer Willis fully unzipped Askew’s outer jacket, revealing that Askew wore a black pouch underneath the jacket. The pouch was partially open, and a silver object protruded from it. The police recognized the object as a gun. The police then handcuffed Askew and formally arrested him.

Although the record does not specify the grounds for the arrest, District of Columbia law prohibits carrying a pistol without a license. See D.C. Code § 22-4504(a). In the meantime, the victim informed the officer in the police car that Askew was not the man who had committed the robbery. The record does not specify the precise moment when this occurred, although the officers on the scene did not become aware until some undetermined time after Askew’s arrest on the weapons violation.

See 313 F.Supp.2d at 3 & n. 4 (officer accompanying victim “did not advise Officer Willis and his colleagues whether the complainant had made an identification.”); see also Suppression Hr’g Tr- 13 (Mar. 26, 2004) (Officer Willis learned results of show-up “after [officers] had handcuffed” Askew); Suppression Hr’g Tr. 54 (Mar. 10, 2004) ([Question to Officer Snead]: “So at least you never heard from [officer accompanying victim] at that time what the results of the show-up were? [Answer]: Not at that time.”). 2.

Based on Askew’s prior felony conviction, the Government subsequently obtained a one-count federal grand jury indictment charging Askew with possessing a firearm as a felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Askew moved to suppress the evidence of the firearm on the ground, among others, that the unzipping of the outer jacket violated the Fourth Amendment and that the gun was the fruit of the constitutional violation. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied the motion. 313 F.Supp.2d at 1. At the outset, the District Court concluded that Officer Bowman had the authority under Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), to stop Askew — given Askew’s proximity to the location of the reported robbery, his physical resemblance to the armed robbery suspect described in the police radio broadcast, and his change of course upon seeing Officer Bowman. See 313 F.Supp.2d at 4. The District Court also concluded that Terry authorized Officer Koenig to frisk Askew for potential weapons (the District Court here was referring to the initial frisk that did not disclose Askew’s gun). Id.

The court held that the partial unzipping of the outer jacket for the show-up procedure was also permissible. Id. at 6-7. The court further ruled that, because Officer Willis’s partial unzipping of Askew’s jacket for purposes of the show-up was constitutional, the Fourth Amendment permitted the officers, after feeling the hard object, to restrain Askew and fully unzip his jacket to determine whether the hard object was a weapon. Id. at 5. Askew entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving his right to bring this appeal from the District Court’s denial of the motion to suppress. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2).

The District Court sentenced Askew to 36 months of imprisonment and 36 months of supervised release. On appeal, the parties agree that the Fourth Amendment governs the analysis and that the evidence of the gun must be excluded if we find the search unreasonable. Askew does not challenge the District Court’s conclusions that Officer Bowman had reasonable suspicion to stop Askew and that Officer Koenig’s frisk of Askew was valid. Askew focuses instead on the conduct of the police during the show-up — in particular, the two unzippings of the outer jacket.

We review de novo the District Court’s legal conclusion that the search was constitutional. In doing so, we accept the District Court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). II 1. The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The touchstone of the Amendment is reasonableness, which “is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.” Ohio v.

Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996). As the Supreme Court has said, “[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).

Under the Terry line of eases, the police may forcibly stop a person based upon “reasonable suspicion” that the individual committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, “even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). During a Terry stop justified by reasonable suspicion, the police may take two kinds of actions: Officers may take reasonable protective measures, and they may take reasonable investigative measures.

To place the issues raised by this appeal in context, we briefly summarize the Supreme Court precedents governing both measures. First, during a Terry stop, the police may take reasonable protective steps to ensure the safety of the officers and the public. An encounter between a police officer and a potential criminal suspect can be a dangerous situation; thousands of officers each year are assaulted, and in 2005 more than one officer per week was feloniously killed in the line of duty in the United States.

The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to choose between investigating possible criminal activity and avoiding violent attack. On the contrary, courts appropriately give great deference to police officers’ interest in safety as they protect the citizenry. As the Court in Terry succinctly stated, “it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.” 392 U.S. at 23, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see also Adams v.

Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“[T]he policeman making a reasonable investigatory stop should not be denied the opportunity to protect himself from attack by a hostile suspect.”).

Therefore, as the Terry Court explained, when an officer stops an individual based on reasonable suspicion and has reason to believe the person may be “armed and dangerous,” the officer is authorized to conduct a protective patdown frisk “limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 26-27, 88 S.Ct. 1868; cf. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (similar rule for protective searches incident to arrest based on probable cause).

So too, because of the heightened danger in Terry stops of cars, the police may conduct protective searches for weapons in the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-52, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983); cf. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457-60, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981) (similar rule for protective searches of cars incident to arrest based on probable cause).

Second, in addition to reasonable protective steps, the police may take reasonable investigative steps during a Terry stop to determine whether the individual committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime (in other words, to try to confirm or dispel the reasonable suspicion that justified the stop in the first place). As the Supreme Court has stated, “a law enforcement officer’s reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate further.” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist.

Court of Nev., Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 185, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004); see Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (“ ‘several investigative techniques ... may be utilized effectively in the course of a Terry-type stop.’”) (quoting 3 Wayne R. Lafave, Search And Seizure § 9.2 pp. 36-37 (1978)). 2. To resolve this case, we must initially review the Supreme Court’s case law analyzing the following key question: What investigative steps are permissible and impermissible during a Terry stop? We begin by describing the category of impermissible steps.

A Terry stop occurs when the police have “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity—but the police’s justification has not yet risen to the level of “probable cause” needed for an arrest. Because the police do not yet have probable cause for an arrest, the police during a Terry stop may not engage in what the Supreme Court has called a “full search.” Terry,, 392 U.S. at 26, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see id. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (“general exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity [officer] might find”); see also Minnesota v.

Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 378, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) (“evidentiary search,” namely one raising prospect that officer will “rummage and seize at will” beyond “specific authorization”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion of White, J.) (“In the name of investigating ,a person who is no more than suspected of criminal activity, the police may not carry out a full search of the person or of his automobile or other effects.”) (emphasis added).

As the Court has explained, such a “full search”—sometimes called an exploratory or evidentiary search—occurs when the police rummage through a person’s pockets, bags, and clothing for contraband the person may be carrying, such as stolen goods, drugs, or other tangible evidence of crime. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64-65, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968).

Other than the forbidden “full search,” the Supreme Court has held that other investigative steps during a Terry stop are permissible if “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see also Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185, 124 S.Ct. 2451.

The Terry “reasonably related in scope” standard is far from self-defining, but the Supreme Court’s rulings have provided guidance— permitting “several investigative techniques which may be utilized effectively in the course of a Terry-type stop.” Summers, 452 U.S. at 700 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (quoting 3 Lafave, Search And Seizure § 9.2 pp. 36-37 (1978)). The permissible investigative steps include the following: • The police may ask questions to the individual who has been stopped.

See Terry, 392 U.S. at 6-7, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (“Officer McFadden approached the three men, identified himself as a police officer and asked for their names.”); see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (recognizing police ability to “ask questions, or check identification” during Terry stop); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (“[T]he officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.

But the detainee is not obliged to respond.”); Terry, 392 U.S. at 34, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (White, J., concurring)' (“[T]he person may be briefly detained against his will while pertinent questions are directed to him.”). • When the police have a reasonable basis for believing that a traveler is carrying luggage that contains drugs, the police may seize the luggage “briefly to investigate the circumstances” that give rise to their suspicion, and they may subject the luggage to a dog sniff for narcotics. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983); see also Illinois v.

Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) (allowing dog sniff of motorist’s lawfully stopped car). «The police may obtain fingerprints; in particular, such fingerprinting is authorized “if there is a reasonable basis for believing that fingerprinting will establish or negate the suspect’s connection with [a] crime, and if the procedure is carried out with dispatch.” Hayes v.

Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817, 105 S.Ct. 1643, 84 L.Ed.2d 705 (1985). • A witness show-up is permissible: When it is “known that an offense has occurred in the area, the suspect may be viewed by witnesses to the crime.” Summers, 452 U.S. at 701 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (quotation marks omitted). (Whether the resulting witness identification may be admitted as evidence in a criminal trial is an analytically separate question. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 111-14, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977); United States v.

Washington, 353 F.3d 42, 44-45 (D.C.Cir.2004).) Ill We apply the above principles to the issues presented by this case. To begin with, we note that there are two separate Fourth Amendment “events” that must be analyzed. The primary and more difficult question in this case concerns the initial unzipping of Askew’s jacket. The secondary question is whether, after the initial unzipping revealed a hard object and Askew knocked away the officer’s hand, the police’s subsequent full unzipping of the jacket was permissible. (We address that secondary question in

Part IV below.) 1. Following Officer Bowman’s stop of Askew, the police brought the robbery victim to the scene to conduct a show-up for identification. As part of that show-up, Officer Willis partially unzipped Askew’s outer jacket so that the victim could see Askew’s “blue fleece type jacket” underneath. 313 F.Supp.2d 1, 2 (D.D.C.2004). The Supreme Court has stated that show-ups are permitted during Temj stops.

The precise question here, therefore, is whether the added step of unzipping a jacket is permissible when doing so could reasonably assist the witness’s identification during the show-up—in other words, whether such a step is “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

That reasonableness inquiry weighs the competing interests of the individual and the Government, balancing “the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security against the importance of' the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985); see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983).

In conducting the reasonableness inquiry, we consider on one side of the balance the extent to which the challenged investigative step promotes law enforcement aims and protects the public—namely, “the public interest that the crime be solved and the suspect detained as promptly as possible.” Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229, 105 S.Ct. 675. The unzipping of Askew’s jacket clearly promoted the same government interest that justified the show-up itself: the interest in reliably determining whether Askew was the armed robber.

A reliable witness identification generally allows the police to determine whether to further investigate or arrest the person stopped, or to move on to someone else entirely. This government interest is particularly important in cases (such as this one) where an armed criminal is at large and may pose a danger of causing additional harm to the public. And the identification is generally more likely to be accurate if the witness can see the characteristics of the person stopped that the perpetrator displayed during commission of the crime.

Steps furthering that interest might include, for example, temporarily removing a hat (so a witness can view hair color or style) or rolling up a shirt sleeve (to reveal a watch or tattoo that had been observed by the witness on the suspect’s arm). So too, if a robbery victim says the actual suspect was wearing a certain color shirt underneath a jacket, the police have an interest in unzipping the jacket to allow the victim to see if the individual stopped is wearing such a shirt. This case is no different.

We assess on the other side of the Fourth Amendment balance the extent of the additional intrusion on individual privacy — that is, the additional intrusion caused by unzipping the outer jacket. Here, to begin with, the police did not conduct a “full search,” which Terry ruled flatly impermissible in a stop based solely on reasonable suspicion. 392 U.S. at 26, 88 S.Ct. 1868. In unzipping Askew’s jacket, Officer Willis was not conducting a “general exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity he might find.” Id. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868.

Moreover, the primary intrusions on Askew’s individual privacy resulted from the forcible detention itself and the initial protective frisk, both of which were plainly permissible under Terry. Our focus therefore is on the additional step of unzipping a jacket to reveal clothing underneath. Contrary to Askew’s contention, this is a relatively minimal additional interference with individual privacy. The Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, for example, authorized officers conducting traffic stops to order the driver out of the car.

The Court reasoned that during a valid stop, the “additional intrusion” that leaving the car imposed upon the driver’s personal privacy “can only be described as de minimis. The driver is being asked to expose to view very little more of his person than is already exposed.” 434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977). That provides a fair description of the additional intrusion in this case as well. Supreme Court precedent helps confirm that the Government’s strong interest in identification of an armed robber outweighs the limited additional intrusion at issue in this case.

In particular, in balancing the competing interests of the Government and Askew, we find the Court’s decision in Hayes v. Florida instructive and important. In Hayes, the Court stated that the Fourth Amendment permits the police to take fingerprints during a Terry stop; such fingerprinting is legitimate, the Court concluded, “if there is a reasonable basis for believing that fingerprinting will establish or negate the suspect’s connection with [a] crime, and if the procedure is carried out with dispatch.” 470 U.S. 811, 817, 105 S.Ct. 1643, 84 L.Ed.2d 705 (1985).

Here, as in Hayes, the police had an objective basis for believing that the identification procedure could “establish or negate the suspect’s connection with [a] crime.” Here, as in Hayes, the police action was “carried out with dispatch.” And here, as in Hayes, the intrusion fell short of the “full search” that the Supreme Court has prohibited during Terry stops.

The purposes of the investigative steps at issue here and in Hayes are precisely the same (to match the person with a crime that has recently occurred), and the degree of intrusion is similar (indeed, to many people, fingerprinting would seem more intrusive than unzipping an outer jacket). To be sure, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hayes concerning the validity of brief, in-the-field fingerprinting might be described as dicta.

But the Court’s analysis obviously was carefully considered; indeed, it was a point of strenuous disagreement between the Hayes majority and Justice Brennan in his separate opinion (joined by Justice Marshall). And we have said that “carefully considered language of the Supreme Court, even if technically dictum, generally must be treated as authoritative.” United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 375 (D.C.Cir.2006); Sierra Club v. EPA, 322 F.3d 718, 724 (D.C.Cir.2003); NRDC v. NRC, 216 F.3d 1180, 1189 (D.C.Cir.2000); United States v. Oakar, 111 F.3d 146, 153 (D.C.Cir.1997).

That principle comfortably covers the Hayes discussion of fingerprinting during Terry stops. In short, the opinion in Hayes guides us here. If the police during a Terry stop may take fingerprints for identification purposes, it logically follows that the police during a Terry stop may unzip an individual’s outer jacket for identification purposes (that is, so a witness can see the suspect’s clothing). 2. Askew has advanced three arguments why the unzipping of the outer jacket was nonetheless unreasonable.

First, Askew notes the possibility of pretext searches: He suggests that some officers would maneuver outer clothing as a pretext for a full search, even though the officers lack probable cause to conduct a full search. The risk of pretextual police behavior has, of course, generated a great deal of concern about Terry stops. See, e.g., 4 Wayne R. Lafave, Search And Seizure § 9.1(

e) p. 279 (4th ed. 2004) (“For many of those who honestly oppose ... the power of police to stop and frisk, the central point is that police often have utilized street encounters for improper purposes .... ”); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity, 3 U.Pa.J.Const. L. 296, 336 (2001) (“[J]ust as the police use the traffic stop to place themselves in a position to search the vehicle and occupants, they use the stop of pedestrians to gain the opportunity to frisk.”).

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held, however, that the risk of pretextual police behavior does not alter the Fourth Amendment analysis. Instead, the constitutional inquiry focuses on whether the police took protective and investigative steps that were objectively reasonable under the circumstances. In other words, “the Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); see also Brigham City v.

Stuart, — U.S. -, -, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1948, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). Second, Askew advances a slippery slope argument: He contends that upholding the search here necessarily means that extensive body searches or strip searches also would be permitted. That is simply wrong.

The history of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is a history of judicial line-drawing as courts assess “reasonableness” by balancing the public’s interest in preventing and detecting crime (and thereby maintaining order and public safety) against the individual’s interest in privacy. This case involves the police reasonably maneuvering a suspect’s outer jacket during a show-up to assist a witness’s identification (by allowing the witness to see the suspect’s clothing).

Of course, there are a variety of conceivable searches — such as hypothetical advanced by Askew — that would be more intrusive than the search at issue here and would more severely affect personal privacy interests. In such hypothetical cases, the Government would face a heavier burden in showing that the investigative step was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868; cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-72, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); Helton v.

United States, 191 F.Supp.2d 179, 184-85 (D.D.C.2002). ' Third, Askew makes a bright-line argument: He suggests that Terry does not permit investigative steps that involve a “search” of any kind, no matter how limited. The initial flaw in this argument is that the Supreme Court has in fact authorized certain intrusive searches during Terry stops — so long as they are reasonable under the circumstances and are not what the Court has called a “full search.” See Terry, 392 U.S. at 26, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion of White, J.).

For example, the Terry Court itself approved the protective step of frisking for potential weapons even though the Court recognized such action was a “serious intrusion” and plainly entailed a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 392 U.S. at 16-17, 88 S.Ct. 1868. And as explained above, the Hayes Court endorsed the investigative step of on-the-scene fingerprinting — even though compelled fingerprinting is intrusive and triggers independent Fourth Amendment protection, as the Court explained when comparing fingerprinting to “other types of searches and detentions.” 470 U.S. at 814, 105 S.Ct. 1643.

Indeed, in Hayes two Justices strongly disagreed with the majority, warning that “on-site fingerprinting (apparently undertaken in full view of any passerby) would involve a singular intrusion on the suspect’s privacy, an intrusion that would not be justifiable (as was the patdown in Terry) as necessary for the officer’s protection.” Id. at 819, 105 S.Ct. 1643 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment, joined by Marshall, J.). But the position of Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall did not prevail in Hayes-, had it done so, Askew’s bright-line argument here would of course have more force.

Askew’s bright-line argument — that an investigative step is impermissible if it constitutes a Fourth Amendment search — also contravenes the persuasive views of the leading Fourth Amendment scholar. Professor LaFave has explained that certain “identification searches” do not “require rummaging through a suspect’s personal effects as does an ordinary full-blown search.” 4 Lafave, Search And Seizure § 9.8(

b) p. 730 (quotation marks omitted). For that reason, Professor LaFave explained: “Taking fingernail scrapings, for example, is a search, but yet is a very limited intrusion, and thus should be deemed, permissible ” for identification during a Terry detention. Id. (quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). Professor LaFave’s bottom line, therefore, is that certain investigative steps are (and should be) permitted during Terry stops even though they constitute “searches” under the Fourth Amendment. Based on the Supreme Court’s precedents, we agree.

In sum: Balancing the competing interests and taking our cues from Supreme Court precedent, especially Hayes, we conclude that the police during a Terry show-up may reasonably maneuver a suspect’s outer clothing (such as unzipping an outer jacket so a witness can see the suspect’s clothing) when taking that step could assist a witness’s identification. In this case, therefore, the Fourth Amendment allowed the police to initially unzip Askew’s outer jacket so that the robbery victim could see Askew’s clothing, thereby assisting the victim’s identification during the show-up.

That step was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified” stopping Askew in the first place. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868. IV Askew argues that, even assuming the first unzipping was permissible, the second unzipping was impermissible. The District Court rejected that argument, concluding: “If it was constitutional for Officer Willis to unzip the jacket in the course of the show-up, the later investigation to determine whether the hard object was a weapon certainly was constitutional.” 313 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.2004). We agree with the District Court.

To review: The first unzipping of the outer jacket occurred during the show-up itself. During that unzipping, Officer Willis discovered that Askew had a hard object underneath the jacket zipper, and Askew knocked Officer Willis’s hand away from the zipper. The show-up ended, and the officer accompanying the victim in the car drove her away from the scene. At this point, the officers remaining with Askew were not yet aware of the results of the show-up.

Shortly thereafter, based on the hard object underneath the jacket and Askew’s knocking away Officer Willis’s hand, the officers walked Askew over to a police car, made him sit up on it, engaged in a second (and this time complete) unzipping of the jacket, and seized a gun found on Askew’s person. We conclude that the second unzipping was justified on any of three alternative grounds. First, it was justified as a protective step as part of the continuing Terry stop for suspicion of armed robbery.

Second, it was justified as a protective step to prevent the possibility of armed violence while the police disengaged at the conclusion of that Terry stop. Third, it was justified because the initial unzipping gave the officers reasonable suspicion to detain and investigate Askew for a new crime— carrying a dangerous weapon in public in violation of District of Columbia law.

First, the developments during the initial unzipping — Officer Willis discovering a hard object underneath Askew’s jacket in the initial unzipping and Askew knocking away Officer Willis’s hand — justified the officers in believing that Askew may have been “armed and presently dangerous.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Under Supreme Court precedent, these facts entitled the officers to take the protective step of unzipping Askew’s jacket in full and seizing the weapon. See Adams v.

Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 148, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (officer’s “reaching to the spot” where driver was said to have been hiding gun to remove it was “limited intrusion designed to insure [the officer’s] safety”; “So long as the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop, and has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to [the] protective purpose.”) (footnote omitted); see also Pennsylvania v.

Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (bulge in driver’s jacket allowed officer to conclude driver “was armed and thus posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the officer,” authorizing search). That Officer Koenig had not felt a weapon in conducting the earlier pat-down frisk did not prevent the officers from acting on the new information at this point. The Fourth Amendment does not impose a rigid “one-frisk” rule requiring officers to ignore new information that might lead them to realize that an initial frisk was an inadequate safeguard. See United States v.

Osbourne, 326 F.3d 274, 278 (1st Cir. 2003) (reasonableness of second or subsequent protective step is “determined under a standard that takes account of the fact that context is vital”) (internal quotation marks omitted). It bears mention, moreover, that the officers involved in the second unzipping did not yet know the results of the show-up procedure when they conducted that second unzipping. On the contrary, as the District Court found, only after Askew’s formal arrest on the gun charge did these officers on the scene learn Askew had not been identified by the victim as the armed robber.

See 313 F.Supp.2d at 3 n. 4 (officer accompanying victim “did not advise Officer Willis and his colleagues whether the complainant had made an identification.”). In a fast-moving and inherently dangerous Terry stop, we think it entirely reasonable for officers on the scene to continue to protect their safety, and the public’s safety, until these officers themselves know that the initial basis for the stop has dissipated (at least so long as there is not unreasonable delay in obtaining that information). Cf. United States v.

Brown, 334 F.3d 1161, 1166 n. 2 (D.C.Cir. 2003) (in assessing reasonable suspicion and fear of danger, “this court cannot take into account ... facts ... not known to the investigating officers at the time of the search,” including facts complainant never told officers conducting search and facts suspect later told another officer). Here, moreover, the police acted promptly; they did not continue to hold Askew for an unreasonably lengthy period of time, as may have occurred, for example, in United States v. Babwah, 972 F.2d 30, 33 (2d Cir.1992).

In short, the officers here still had justification for holding Askew when they conducted the second unzipping, and the second unzipping was thus a reasonable protective step under Terry. Second, even if the reasonable suspicion of armed robbery had dissipated before the second unzipping, the police in any event could take steps to protect themselves while disengaging from the encounter with Askew. In Michigan v.

Long, the Supreme Court held that, during a Terry stop of a driver, the Fourth Amendment allows officers to conduct a protective search of the car’s passenger compartment based on reasonable fear that the driver poses a danger. 463 U.S. 1032, 1045-52, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). One rationale for this holding was the Supreme Court’s concern that absent a protective search, at the end of the Terry stop, “if the suspect is not placed under arrest, he will be permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will then have access to any weapons inside.” Id. at 1052, 103 S.Ct. 3469.

It follows that a Terry protective search of the person or vehicle is a proper response to fear not only that a suspect might use a weapon during the Terry stop, but also that the suspect might use a weapon after the stop ends and before the police have disengaged. So too here: Had the police not unzipped the jacket a second time to identify and remove the weapon and instead permitted Askew to leave, Askew would have had access to that weapon as the officers departed.

As this Court has recognized, Long teaches that it is “appropriate to conduct a Terry search to ensure that such access would not endanger the lives of the departing officers.” United States v. Christian, 187 F.3d 663, 671 (D.C.Cir.1999); see id. at 665, 669-671 (protective search of suspect’s car reasonable when suspect stood next to car with six-inch bladed dagger by driver’s seat visible through partially open window).

Askew’s argument, in other words, “misunderstands the nature of the protective search; the fear of a person’s gaining immediate control of weapons does not limit itself to the time of the stop, but extends through the entire interaction between him and the officer.” United States v. Wallen, 388 F.3d 161, 166 (5th Cir.2004). A protective search is therefore justified in a case where “a reasonable officer would ... be concerned about the ever-present possibility of violent interaction when the suspect[ ] [was] released at the conclusion of the investigatory stop.” United States v.

Holmes, 376 F.3d 270, 278 (4th Cir.2004). Third, even assuming the officers no longer had justification to hold Askew on suspicion of armed robbery when they conducted the second unzipping, the second unzipping was constitutional for yet another reason: Once the officers discovered the hard object during the show-up and Askew knocked Officer Willis’s hand away in response to the discovery, the officers had reasonable suspicion that Askew was committing a crime distinct from armed robbery — namely, carrying a dangerous weapon in violation of District of Columbia law.

District of Columbia law provides: “No person shall carry within the District of Columbia either openly or concealed on or about their person, a pistol, without a license issued pursuant to District of Columbia law, or any deadly or dangerous weapon capable of being so concealed.” D.C. Code § 22-4504(a). The police officers reasonably believed that a hard object carried underneath a jacket could be a dangerous weapon. From the fact that Askew knocked away Officer Willis’s hand, the officers could also reasonably infer that Askew was attempting to conceal a weapon.

See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (officers must be “able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” their action).

Based on the reasonable suspicion that Askew was carrying a concealed weapon, the officers acted well within Fourth Amendment bounds in seizing the weapon: “So long as the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop, and has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to [the] protective purpose.” Adams, 407 U.S. at 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921 (footnote omitted).

During a Terry stop, when the officers feel or observe an object that might be a weapon, or develop reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be carrying a weapon in a specific place on his person or in his car, the police may seize the weapon. See id. at 146, 148, 92 S.Ct. 1921; United States v. Holmes, 385 F.3d 786, 790-91 (D.C.Cir.2004) (Roberts, J.) (officer reasonably removed from suspect’s outer coat pocket a “hard, square object”), see also United States v.

Harris, 313 F.3d 1228, 1237 (10th Cir.2002) (“If the officer discovers what he believes to be a weapon, he may reach inside the suspect’s clothing and remove it.”) (citing Adams, 407 U.S. at 148, 92 S.Ct. 1921); United States v. Swann, 149 F.3d 271, 272, 276-77 (4th Cir.1998) (officer reasonably removed hard, rectangular object from suspect’s sock). On any of these three alternative grounds, we reject Askew’s claim that the second unzipping was unreasonable. V Because the first and second unzippings were both reasonable, the gun seized from Askew was admissible evidence.

That principle is, of course, settled: When taking permissible protective and investigative steps during a Terry stop, the police?may come across contraband or evidence that the police could not have searched for directly; in such cases, the evidence nonetheless may be seized and used in a criminal prosecution of the suspect. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). For purposes of clarity, we also identify two questions that we need not and do not reach in this case.

First, because we conclude that the initial unzipping of the jacket was a reasonáble step during the show-up, we do not decide whether the police even without a witness present could reasonably maneuver a suspect’s outer clothing, such as unzipping an outer jacket to see the suspect’s clothing, when necessary for identification purposes. .

Second, because the Government has not pressed the point, we also do not consider whether the police could have justified the initial unzipping of Askew’s jacket as a protective step and not just as an investigative step: Several federal courts have approved initial frisks that go beyond a patdown of outer clothing when necessary to ensure that the person stopped.is in fact not carrying a weapon. See United States v. Reyes, 349 F.3d 219, 225 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Baker, 78 F.3d 135, 138 (4th Cir.1996); United States v.

Thompson, 597 F.2d 187, 191 (9th Cir.1979). * :|s * * ¡Y We affirm the judgment of the District Court. So ordered. Given that oneside of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness balance looks at the degree of intrusion on the individual the Supreme Court in certain other areas has similarly distinguished (

i) the intrusion caused by so-called full searches from (ii) the lesser intrusion caused by more limited searches. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 335, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990) (distinguishing protective sweep, or "cursory inspection” of premises incident to in-home arrest, from "full search”); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 n.28 (1984) ("warrantless search and seizure limited to scraping suspect's fingernails justified even when full search may not be”) (citing Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973)).

In certain other contexts, the Court has held any degree of intrusion unreasonable, noting that "[a] search is a search.” Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987). But cf. Buie, 494 U.S. at 335 n. 3, 110 S.Ct. 1093 (characterizing Hicks as involving police "searching for evidence plain and simple.”).